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People differ in the way they make decisions that involve risk. Some are risk seeking, 
while others are inclined to be predominantly risk averse. Such individual differences have 
been associated with the developmental period of adolescence (Steinberg, 2008; Crone 
& Dahl., 2012), psychiatric disorders such as ADHD (Groen et al., 2013), poor executive 
functioning (Brand et al., 2006), affective (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) 
and motivational state (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010 ), damage to 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), and 
risk-related personality traits such as sensation seeking and impulsivity (Zuckerman & 
Kuhlman, 2000). The degree to which individuals engage in risk seeking behaviors may 
also depend on the context or the domain in which it takes place (Hanoch, Johnson & 
Wilke, 2006; Blais & Weber, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), for example, the same 
person may take different degrees of risk in the health, recreational, financial, ethical 
or social domain (Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).
Risk-taking behaviors have been extensively studied from a wide range of theoretical 
perspectives. In psychology, risk-taking is predominantly defined as engagement in 
behaviors that are associated with some probability of harmful outcomes (e.g., Boyer, 
2006; Steinberg, 2008) such as excessive drinking (Bouchery, Harwood, Sacks, Simon, & 
Brewer, 2011), smoking (Villanti, Boulay, & Juon, 2011), reckless driving (Jonah, Thiessen, 
& Au-Yeung, 2001), gambling (Johansson, Grant, Won Kim, Odlang, & Götestam, 2009) 
or other financial risks (Grable, 2000), risky sexual behaviors (Brown & Vanable, 2007) 
and extreme sports (Self, De Vries, Findley, & Reily, 2007). In contrast, (neuro) economists 
typically define risk in terms of the variance of possible (monetary) outcomes that an 
option entails (Glimcher et al., 2009; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Tobler, O’ Doherty, Dolan, 
& Schultz, 2007; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006). A risky decision refers to 
choosing the option with the highest outcome variability (i.e., the highest uncertainty 
about the exact outcome), which is typically associated with a higher potential reward 
as compared to a less risky option (Figner & Weber, 2011; Schonberg, Fox & Poldrack, 
2011; Glimcher et al, 2009). Within the formal economic framework of risky decision 
making, the expected value (EV) of an outcome is highest for the ‘best’ combination of 
outcome value (v) and probability (p), (EV = pv). Decision-makers are expected to always 
choose the option with the highest expected value (Glimcher, 2009). However, early 
formal accounts of expected value maximization could not explain the observation that 
people are frequently risk averse in the gain domain, which means that a sure positive 
outcome is preferred over a risky choice of equal or higher expected value (Glimcher, 
2009). The shortcomings of EV models have been later accommodated by models 
such as Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), and Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which allow for a decrease of the subjective value 
of money as wealth increases.
Independent of the way risk-taking behaviors are defined, the choices people face 
in everyday life frequently involve balancing anticipated reward and risk (Zuckerman 
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& Kuhlman, 2000). For example, driving beyond the speed limit allows you to reach 
your destination faster, but also involves an increased risk to end up in an accident. 
Mountain climbing can be a fun and exciting experience, but is also risky due to the 
physical challenges involved and the sometimes extreme weather conditions. Choosing 
a budget health insurance has the benefit of low monthly costs, but at the risk of minimal 
coverage when facing unexpected health expenses.
Factors such as personality differences, context, affective state, motivation 
and cognitive resources influence whether a given decision problem is perceived, 
or represented, as more or less risky (Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; 
Hanoch et al., 2006; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 
2006; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). In turn, the valuation of the different decision-
options and the subsequent selection of an optimal course of action depend on 
this representation of the decision problem (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). 
The construction of the representation of a decision problem is a crucial stage in 
the model of decision making as proposed by Rangel and colleagues (2008). This 
model will provide a theoretical framework for our research described in this thesis. 
Studying Risky Choice
It has been proven a challenge to investigate the mechanisms underlying risk taking 
realistically by means of controlled lab experiments (Schonberg et al., 2011). Typically, 
risk preferences are examined by administering implicit or explicit gambling tasks during 
which participants can choose between relatively risky or safe choices. Whereas implicit 
tasks have been demonstrated to predict real-life risk-taking behaviors quite well (Lejuez 
et al., 2003; Bechara et al., 2001), the underlying mechanisms remain elusive because 
the probability distribution of the potential outcomes are unknown to the participant. 
Conversely, explicit risky decision-making tasks provide clear descriptions of the 
probabilities and values of the potential outcomes, thereby allowing for the examination 
of the specific influence of these components on the decision-making process. However, 
performance on explicit risk tasks usually does not predict risk taking behavior in real 
life so well (Coppola, 2014). 
Given the potentially detrimental outcomes associated with real-life risk taking, 
it is important to obtain more knowledge of the processes involved in real-life risky 
decision making. The main objective of the current thesis was to obtain more insight 
in real-life risky decision making. To this end, risky decision making was examined in a 
way that was expected to relate more strongly to real life than most behavioral tasks, 
yet in a setting with similar experimental control. For this purpose, elements important 
for the construction of the first stage of value-based decision making as proposed 
by Rangel et al. (2008) were taken into account. According to Rangel and colleagues 
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(2008), the representation of a given decision problem as described in this first stage of 
this model modulates subsequent valuation, action selection, outcome evaluation and 
learning, which are important components of value-based decision making. Therefore, 
most of our studies were focused on internal and external factors that may influence 
the representation of a decision problem in a risky context. Before going into these 
factors, the theoretical framework of Rangel and colleagues (2008) that describes the 
separate stages of value-based decision making in detail will be briefly elaborated on. 
A framework of value-based decision making
Value-based decisions are distinguished from sensory-based decisions in that they are 
not driven by perceptual features, but by specific preferences of the individual or the 
subjective value of the available options (Corrado, Sugrue, Brown, & Newsome 2009; 
Doya, 2008; Lee, Seo, and Jung, 2012; Rangel et al., 2008). In contrast to sensory-based 
decisions, there is no objective correct response. Value-based decision making entails 
the evaluation of the expected value of different courses of action and the probability 
with which the associated outcomes will occur. The outcome value (positive, negative) 
and its probability (degree of certainty) are key elements that influence the subjective 
value of options (Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Doya, 2008). Rangel and colleagues (2008) 
have proposed a framework for studying the separate stages of value-based decision 
making that has been derived from theoretical models of decision making in economics, 
psychology and computer science. 
The first stage of this model entails the construction of a representation of a given 
decision problem, which depends on internal (e.g., hunger) and external states (e.g., 
opening hours of the supermarket, the weather) and the potential courses of action 
involved (e.g., order pizza, going out for dinner, make yourself a leftover meal). In the 
second stage, the options available are assigned a value, which need to be compared 
to come to a decision in the third stage of action selection. Importantly, this valuation 
process is based on the representation of the decision problem. Optimal decision 
making requires that these values reliably predict the benefits that are likely to result 
from each action. During the fourth stage, the benefits of the selected action need 
to be evaluated by the brain to update the other processes at the different stages in 
subsequent decision making. This updating of the other stages in subsequent decision 
making is represented by the final stage in which learning takes place. 
In the next section, the theoretical model of Rangel et al. (2008) will be 
applied to decision making under risk, which is a specific type of value-based 
decision making and in relation to real-life risk taking, the focus of this thesis. 
12
A framework of value-based decision making applied 
to risky decisions
Here, we want to further specify the theoretical model of value-based decision making as 
proposed by Rangel and colleagues (2008) by adding the constructs that, based on the 
available literature (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Figner & Weber, 2011; Loewenstein 
et al., 2005; Schonberg et al., 2011; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) can be considered as 
an operationalization of the separate stages of risky decision making. For this purpose, 
these factors are represented by the textboxes that were added to the right side of the 
original model as can be seen in Figure 1. These added constructs were directly and 
indirectly used to examine the different stages of risky decision making in the studies 
described in this thesis, but are by no means exhaustive. 
Figure 1. Modified version of the model of value-based decision making of Rangel and 
colleagues (2008), applied to decision making under risk for this thesis. Dashed boxes 
on the right side were added to the original model for this purpose. Adapted from 
“A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making,” by A. 
Rangel, C. Camerer and P.R. Montague, 2008, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, p. 546.
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(chapter 3, 4, 5)
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In the first phase of the model, during which a representation of the decision 
problem is constructed, the potential actions that shape the decision problem will 
involve a certain degree of risk, which means that the action-outcome associations are 
probabilistic. According to Rangel et al. (2008), risk is, in addition to other internal and/
or external factors such as affective state, social context or delay, a direct modulator 
of the second stage valuation system. With regard to valuation, expectation-based 
models such as Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) propose that expected value, defined as the product of the value and probability 
of possible outcomes (EV = pv), determines the preference for particular options 
under risk. In risk-value models (Markowitz, 1959), not only expected value but also 
risk modulates these preferences. Risk is operationalized as the variance (or standard 
deviation) in the probability distribution of possible outcomes in this framework. Both 
EV and variance will therefore be specified as representing the valuation system in the 
model of Rangel et al. (2008), (Figure 1). In real life, risk perception and valuation also 
depend on internal states such as personality, cognitive resources and motivation, 
and on external states such as context, availability etc. Whether these internal and 
external factors influence the valuation system indirectly through modulations of the 
expected value or perceived variance of outcomes or directly, as additional influencing 
processes will not be the focus of this thesis. Instead, we aimed to incorporate many 
of these potential influences together with EV and variance in the risky decision-
making context utilized in most of our studies, to get a better picture of real-life 
risky decision making. By incorporating these potentially influencing processes, 
subsequent risky decision making will probably better reflect individual differences in 
real-life risk taking. I will continue by describing these potential factors of influence 
for the representation of a decision problem with risk involved in the next sessions. 
Internal states 
Risk-related personality traits 
With regard to individual differences in personality, especially trait sensation seeking 
and impulsivity have been associated with increased risk-taking tendencies (Zuckerman 
& Kuhlman, 2000). Sensation seeking has been described as a stable personality trait 
that varies across individuals and refers to “deliberately seeking out novel, intense, 
complex and varied experiences and the willingness to take physical, social, legal 
and financial risks for the sake of the experience” (Zuckerman, 1994) or “The need 
for novelty and intensity of stimulation” (Arnett, 1993). To illustrate, sensation seeking 
predicts smoking onset (De Leeuw et al., 2011) and has been associated with risky 
driving habits (Jonah et al., 2001; Dahlen, Martin, Ragan & Kuhlman, 2005) increased 
stock trading (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2009) and gambling (Raylu & Oei, 2002), and higher 
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engagement in risky sports (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). Definitions of sensation 
seeking emphasize the deliberate engagement in exciting and rewarding activities for 
the sake of the novel and stimulating experience, not for the sake of the potential risk 
involved. Research has demonstrated that novelty is rewarding (Bevins et al., 2002). 
In addition, sensation seekers tend to perceive new, risky activities as less risky and 
the environment as less threatening as compared to low sensation seekers (Roberti, 
2004). Together, the rewarding aspects of novel experiences in combination with low 
anxiety levels in new situations may positively influence the value of a risky choice 
option, which is likely perceived as less risky and more rewarding in high sensation 
seeking individuals as compared to low sensation seekers. 
The deliberate aspect of sensation seeking contrasts with impulsivity, which can be 
described as “the tendency to enter in situations or to make decisions without much 
planning or deliberation” (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000), “to act without foresight” 
(Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 2006), or as “Actions that are poorly conceived, 
prematurely expressed, and unduly risky or inappropriate to the situation”, (Daruna 
& Barnes, 1993). Severe impulsivity appears to be a reflection of impaired cognitive 
control (Dalley, Everitt & Robbins, 2011) and in particular, impaired response inhibition 
and the tendency to prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards 
(Winstanley, et al., 2006). Impulsivity has also been associated with substance abuse 
and pathological gambling (e.g., Petry, 2001), which seems to be partly driven by reward 
sensitivity (Dawe, Gullo, & Loxton, 2004). Possibly, the heightened reward sensitivity in 
combination with a less thorough consideration of the potential consequences of a risky 
action, may result in a careless decision making style based on a shallow representation 
of the decision problem at hand. 
It is important to note that although sensation seeking and impulsivity are conceived 
of as interrelated personality traits (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, 
Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993) that jointly predict risky behaviors (Donohew et al., 2000), 
the involved pathways to risk seeking behavior appear to diverge. To illustrate this 
distinction in the domain of drug use, sensation seeking seems to be predominantly 
related to an increased likelihood to initiate drug use, whereas impulsivity is primarily 
involved in drug dependence (Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008). 
Cognitive Control and Affect
Economic models such as expected utility (EU; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) 
and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) have provided a robust framework for 
studying deliberate decision making under risk in economic and psychological research. 
However, the affective processes involved are not accounted for by these models. It has 
become evident that the role of affect should not be underestimated in the process of 
decision making under risk (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001). The 
interaction between affect and cognition at the moment of judgment and decision making 
15
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has been the particular focus of dual-process models (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996). 
These models make a distinction between relatively controlled and effortful, slow and 
rule-based, deliberative and analytical information processing that involves brain structures 
that are more developed in higher animals, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
and posterior parietal cortex and relatively fast, automatic, associative and experience-
based processing present in evolutionarily older and lower-level brain structures, both 
subcortical (brainstem, amygdala and ventral striatum) and cortical (orbitofrontal and 
medial regions of the frontal cortex and the insula) present in both lower animals and 
humans animals (Cohen, 2005; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). According to Epstein 
(1994), the experiential system is associated with affect, in contrast to the rule-based 
cognitive system. Both systems have their advantages and limitations (Cohen, 2005). 
Whereas the affective system allows for quick and efficient decision making, emotions 
that are unrelated to a specific decision context may hamper adequate decision making 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005). In contrast, higher-order cognitive processes are slower 
and limited in processing capacity, but more flexible and supportive of goal-directed 
behavior (Cohen, 2005). Applied to decisions under risk these two processing pathways 
are thought to interact and respond to different aspects of a situation (e.g., Kahneman, 
2003; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). Whereas the rule-based, cognitive 
pathway is sensitive to probabilities and values of outcomes, the feelings-based pathway 
responds to affective components of the decision process (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
Cognitive Control
Cognitive control can be defined as a multifaceted construct that encompasses several 
cognitive operations crucial for successful goal-directed behavior (e.g., Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), such as response inhibition, memory updating, 
task switching and selective attention (e.g., Niendam et al., 2012). Choosing advantageously 
from different choice alternatives partly depends on the successful implementation of 
top-down cognitive control over behavior (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011), as reflected by 
brain activity in lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) (e.g., Volkow et al., 2009) and particularly, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) that has been found to modulate value signals 
encoded in vMPFC, thereby reflecting the implementation of cognitive control over 
decisions in a way that promotes optimal decision making (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 
2009). Factors that may reduce cognitive control capacity in healthy individuals are 
negative mood (Gray, 2001; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011), fatigue (Lorist, Boksem, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005) and distraction (Engle, 2002). Diminished cognitive control may 
result in impulsive actions and may induce a preference for short-term small rewards 
over larger, delayed rewards (Dalley, et al., 2011). 
According to the expected value of control (EVC) theory, the allocation of cognitive 
control is driven by a cost-benefit analysis of the rewards and costs associated with a 
given task, that also takes into account the costs of exerting control (Shenhav, Botvinick, 
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& Cohen, 2013). Computation of the EVC has been proposed to depend on the present 
state of an individual (processing capacity, task demands, and motivation) and the value 
of (potential) outcomes. In this framework, the recruitment of cognitive control involves 
selecting the type of control signal that is required (e.g., “respond to a blue-colored 
stimulus”), and with what intensity this control signal should be engaged, in a way 
that maximizes future reward (Shenhav et al., 2013). On a neural level, the identity and 
strength of the resulting control signals are proposed to be modulated by the Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC). The role of the ACC in performance monitoring and control 
signal specification should be distinguished from valuation processes generated by other 
brain regions from which it receives input (e.g., OFC/vmPFC), and regions responsible 
for the implementation of cognitive control, to which it provides output, such as lateral 
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004; Shenhav et al., 2013). In relation to 
risky behaviors, diminished cognitive control has been associated with reckless driving, 
substance abuse, risky sexual behavior and excessive gambling (Barkley, Murphy, 
Dupaul, & Bush, 2002; De Wit, 2009; Marazziti et al., 2008; Pharo, Sim, Graham, Gross, 
& Hayne, 2011; Romer et al., 2011) and with increased risky decision making in lab 
studies (Brand, Roth-Bauer, Driessen, & Markowitsch, 2008; Helfinstein et al., 2014). 
Affect
According to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, cognitive evaluations of and affective 
reactions to risk often diverge (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Whereas cognitive evaluations 
of risk take into account probability and outcome value, affective reactions may occur 
without cognitive processing involved. Early research has already demonstrated that 
immediate and automatic affective reactions may precede cognitive evaluations of risk 
(Zajonc, 1980), thereby influencing subsequent decision making. In addition, affect may 
indirectly influence behavior by modulating cognitive evaluations. A classic finding is 
that people in a positive mood make optimistic judgments whereas people in a negative 
mood make pessimistic judgments (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
In addition, individuals tend to be less sensitivity to probability information of decisions 
involving ‘affect-rich’ outcomes as compared to decisions that are relatively ‘affect-poor’, 
(Pachur & Galesic, 2013; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). For example, a small probability 
to obtain a specific outcome appeared to be overweighed when this outcome induced 
positive affect (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). 
In their review of the literature, Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) also made a 
distinction between anticipated affect and anticipatory affect in relation to risk (see also 
Schwarz, 2000). Anticipated affect refers to emotions that are expected to be experienced 
as a consequence of a risky choice. Anticipatory affect refers to immediate affective 
reactions to risk at the time of the decision. For example, the fear to fall or lose control may 
withhold a skier to descend from a steep slope. Although anticipatory affect is evidently 
involved in many real-life risk taking behaviors, affective responses present at the time 
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of the decision seem to be mostly neglected in the decision-making literature (Bechara 
& Damsio, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz, 2000). A theoretical framework 
that has particularly focused on the role of anticipatory affect in risk perceptions and 
behaviors is called the “the affect heuristic” (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000). According to the affect heuristic, mentally represented objects or events are tagged 
to a varying degree with affect. This “affective pool” is used as a source of information 
to make quick and efficient evaluations (see also Slovic et al., 2005). 
Finally, a distinction should be made between relevant and irrelevant affective responses 
in decision making. Whereas irrelevant or irrational anticipatory affective responses 
may hamper adequate decision making (Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Keltner, 2000) relevant 
affective responses actually appear to improve decision making (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Gray, 2004). Multiple studies showed that patients who were emotionally impaired 
due to ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions, displayed suboptimal decision making on 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as compared to normal controls (e.g.,Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). In addition, as measured by galvanic skin conductance 
responses (GSR), healthy individuals experienced increased anticipatory arousal prior to 
high-risk choices that seemed to promote subsequent advantageous decision making 
(Bechara et al., 1997). These observations led to the formulation of the somatic marker 
hypothesis. This theory holds that anticipatory affective responses to events, which 
are activated by prior similar experiences, guide subsequent decisions in risky and 
uncertain contexts (Bechara et al., 1999; 2000). Similar to the affect-heuristic (Finucane 
et al., 2000) the somatic marker hypothesis posits that especially when decision 
making is complex, or when resources are limited, anticipatory affect may facilitate 
the process of making fast and advantageous decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
External States
In addition to internal states, external states are also relevant for the representation of a 
given decision problem and the potential courses of action that can be taken (Rangel et 
al., 2008). The degree of risk seeking behaviors may depend on the context or the domain 
in which it takes place (; Blais and Weber, 2001; Hanoch et al., 2006). For example, a 
smoker is more likely to take risks in the health domain than a gym member (Hanoch 
et al., 2006). With regard to financial decisions, it has been observed that people tend 
to be risk averse for high-probability gains and low-probability losses, and risk seeking 
for low-probability gains and high-probability losses, which has been described as the 
fourfold patterns of risk attitudes (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).To illustrate, risk 
seeking behavior for low-probability gains may explain gambling behavior, whereas risk 
aversion for low-probability losses may contribute to the attraction of insurance. Conversely, 
risk aversion for high-probability gains may explain a preference for certainty, whereas 
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risk seeking behavior for high-probability losses may account for the phenomenon that 
people take risks to avoid sure losses (Fox & Poldrack, 2009, p. 148). In addition, risk 
taking propensity also depends on how a decision problem is framed (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). For example, decisions about medical treatments have been found to 
depend on whether potential outcomes were described in terms of survival or mortality 
rates (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982). With regard to the developmental phase 
of adolescence, it is well-known that adolescents take more risks with peers around 
(Gardner & Steinberg, 2005) or when frequently exposed to risk-glorifying media (Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Vogrinic, & Sauer, 2011). Also, emotions induced by a specific 
context may trigger risk seeking or risk averse behavior (Gray, 2004), which is relevant when 
investigating risky behavior because many real-life risk taking behaviors (e.g., speeding, 
gambling or recreational risks) involve affective processes (Lupton & Tulloch, 2002). 
Valuation
Value-based decision making entails the evaluation of the expected value of different 
courses of action and the probability with which the associated outcomes will occur. The 
expected value of an outcome (positive, negative) and its variance (degree of uncertainty) 
are key elements that influence the subjective value of options (Ernst & Paulus, 2005; 
Doya, 2008). Positive outcomes (rewards) are generally approached, negative outcomes 
(punishment) avoided. When the probability of an outcome associated with a specific 
choice is p = 0.5, uncertainty is said to be maximal (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003). 
During the second stage of valuation, competition may arise among different valuation 
systems (Rangel et al., 2008). For example, for someone who just quit smoking, the habit 
to smoke a cigarette in the morning is assigned a high value by the habitual system. 
At the same time, the goal-directed system attaches a low value to the same behavior 
when one is determined to quit smoking. Competition may also occur within a single 
valuation system. For example, a goal directed choice to buy an ice-cream may induce 
competition between different and equally liked flavors to choose from. 
Brain areas that have been robustly associated with value-based decision making are 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex/ medial orbitofrontal cortex (VMPFC/mOFC) (Gläscher 
et al., 2012; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Plassman, O’Doherty, 
& Rangel, 2007; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton & Behrens, 2011; Tom, Fox, 
Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) and the striatum (Delgado, 2007; Knutson, Delgado, & Phillips, 
2009; Lau & Glimcher, 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Samejima, Ueda, Doya, & Kimura, 
2005). These regions have been identified as important structures for the encoding, 
anticipation and evaluation of subjective values and probabilities of choices and actions. 
19
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Action selection  
At the third stage of value-based or risky decision making (Rangel et al., 2008), 
the course of action with the highest value assigned to it needs to be selected. It is 
still unclear how this selection process is executed in the brain. Most advances in this 
respect have been made in the area of perceptual decision-making research based on 
two-alternative choice tasks (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). According to the Drift Diffusion 
Model (DDM) and other formal models that successfully explained perceptual decision 
making during such choice tasks (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; 
Gold & Shadlen, 2002; Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009) , evidence in support of 
two alternatives is integrated in a relative value signal that represents the accumulated 
difference of evidence in support of those two mutually exclusive alternatives (e.g., the 
difference in activity from two pools of neurons). This relative value signal drifts at a 
certain rate towards either of two thresholds that represent the correct and incorrect 
decision. Finally, this decision process ends when sufficient evidence has accumulated in 
favor of one alternative over the other (Bogacz et al., 2006). Although the signal typically 
moves in the direction of the correct alternative, mistakes may occur due to noise in 
the process or a minimal value difference between choice alternatives. It is still unclear 
however whether formal models such as the DDM also apply to the calculations that 
underlie value-based decision making. 
Despite unresolved issues, the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) has been suggested 
to play an important role in guiding optimal value-based action selection by learning 
from and integrating past experiences into the decision-making process (Alexander 
& Brown, 2011; Kennerly, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006; Rushworth 
& Behrens, 2008; Rushworth, Walton, Kennerly, & Bannerman, 2004). The ACC has 
been found to be activated when new information is processed that is relevant to 
improve future decisions (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008) and has been associated with 
performance monitoring, including error detection (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2004), conflict 
monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder,2001), and outcome unexpectedness (Jessup, Ryan, Busemeyer, 
& Brown, 2010; Oliveira et al., 2007). Performance monitoring is crucial for being 
able to evaluate the quality of a decision with respect to one’s particular goals. 
Decision conflict
To be able to make a choice, the different values of available options need to be 
compared (Rangel et al., 2008). During the third stage of outcome selection, decision conflict 
may emerge when choices are not uniquely associated with one appropriate response 
(Botvinick et al., 2001) or have conflicting values (Rangel et al., 2008). In relation to risky 
decision making, uncertainty about the outcome of a choice (as reflected by a reduced 
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probability to obtain a desired outcome) may elicit decision conflict (Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004). On a neural level, this conflict has been proposed to be signaled by the ACC and 
together with other performance monitoring processes such as error detection, represent 
a mechanism for implementing cognitive control. According to the previously discussed 
EVC model, conflict monitoring can be used to determine the strength of the subsequent 
control signal that is needed to support processing of a given task requirement (Shenhav 
et al., 2013). Decision conflict elicits the event-related potential (ERP) N2 (van Veen & 
Carter, 2002) and an increase in mid-frontal theta activity (Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, 
& Stürmer, 2012) in the brain, which can be measured in electroencephalogram (EEG) 
studies. Specifically, EEG studies have identified an enhanced N2 component following 
stimuli that induce conflict (e.g., Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 
2003). In addition, an increase in mid-frontal theta power (oscillatory brain activity in 
the theta frequency band) has been observed in conflict situations, which is thought to 
reflect the recruitment of cognitive control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Nigbur, Ivanova, & 
Stürmer, 2011). Although the spatial resolution of EEG does not allow for pinpointing the 
exact source of observed neural activation, strong convergent evidence exists, showing 
that both the stimulus-locked N2 and mid-frontal theta activity are generated by the 
ACC (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
Outcome evaluation and learning
Rangel et al. (2008) argue that outcome evaluation in the fourth stage of value-based 
decision making depends on cognitive processes that determine expectancies and 
beliefs. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and particularly, the ACC encodes whether 
a specific outcome is better or worse than expected, with different populations of cells 
in response to positive or negative outcomes, which may indicate the direction and 
magnitude that is needed for the adjustment of the representation of action values 
(Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007). The resulting prediction errors represent 
the discrepancy between the expected and actual outcome, which can be used to 
modulate subsequent action selection (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). To illustrate, 
when people make errors, a negative-going event-related potentials emerges which 
can be recorded by means of EEG over the mid-frontal scalp. More specifically, the 
so-called error-negativity (Ne; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990), 
which is sometimes referred to as error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Goss, Meyer, 
& Donchin, 1993) occurs between 50 and 250 ms after an error has been made, thereby 
representing an internally generated error signal (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Likewise, the 
feedback-related negativity (FRN) emerges 250 ms after externally generated negative 
performance feedback (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002). According to the reinforcement-
learning model of Holroyd and Coles (2002), these ERP components reflect the same 
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performance-monitoring process generated by the ACC that uses this information to 
facilitate adaptive behavior. 
With regard to learning the subjective value of outcomes, midbrain dopamine neurons 
that project to the striatum and prefrontal regions (Haber, 2003) are known to play an 
important role. Single neuron recordings have revealed that dopamine neurons in the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra 1) increase in activity in response 
to unexpected rewards, 2) do not respond to 100% predicted rewards, 3) decrease in 
activity when predicted rewards do not occur, 4) increase in activity in response to cues 
that predict rewards (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Moreover, phasic dopaminergic 
responses to reward cues are proportional to the magnitude and probability of the predicted 
outcomes (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). Although the mPFC receives input 
from these midbrain dopamine neurons, which are thought to encode prediction errors, 
research suggests these dopamine cells only respond to positive prediction errors (Bayer & 
Glimcher, 2005). If and how midbrain dopamine neurons encode negative prediction errors 
is still under debate (e.g., Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2007). 
 
Research objectives and relevance
Before going into the separate chapters of this thesis, a short overview will be provided 
of measurements (implicit and explicit) that are frequently used to examine risky 
decision making. The pros and cons of both approaches have been shortly discussed 
in an earlier section, but will be elaborated on more extensively in the next section. 
After that, the Simulated Driving Task (SDT) that was administered in chapters 3, 4 
and 5 will be discussed. This task was developed to be able to study risky decision 
making in a dynamic and engaging setting, in an attempt to better capture the external 
processes that may influence the representation of a decision problem relevant to 
real-life risk taking behavior. To target internal processes that may modulate the 
representation of decision problems, individual differences in terms of risk-taking 
propensity (chapter 3), risk-related personality traits (chapters 4 and 6), risk-related 
disorders (ADHD, chapter 5) and risk-related developmental phase (adolescence, 
chapter 6) were addressed. Finally, the methodology of electroencephalography (EEG) 
measurements will be explained because in chapters 2 and 4, EEG measurements 
were administered to investigate the neural correlates of risky decision making. 
Measurements of risky decision making
Broadly speaking, a distinction can be made between implicit and explicit tasks 
that have been used to investigate risky decision making. In implicit tasks, probabilities 
of outcomes are not explicitly stated and thus remain unknown to the participant. On 
some implicit tasks, the optimal response strategy can be learned by experience. A 
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well-known example of an experience-based task is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; 
Bechara et al., 1994). This task involves selecting cards from 4 decks, with decks A 
and B being associated with higher immediate gains as compared to decks C and D, 
but also with higher long-term losses. Choosing from these decks is therefore deemed 
risky. On other implicit tasks such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et 
al., 2002), trials are independent which means that there is no optimal response strategy 
that can be learned. The BART involves pumping up balloons to earn money. With each 
pump, not only the amount of money that is gained increases, but also the likelihood 
that the balloon will explode, and the money gained on that trial is lost.
Implicit tasks such as the IGT and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez 
et al., 2002) have been demonstrated to predict real-life risky behaviors (Bechara et 
al., 2001; Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci, & Bellodi 2002; Fernie, Goudi, & Field, 
2010; Lejuez et al., 2002, Lejuez et al., 2003; Linnet, Røjskjær, Nygaard, & Maher, 2006; 
Weafer , Milich, & Fillmore, 2011). Implicit tasks and especially experience-based tasks 
are thought to engage affective processes more strongly than explicit tasks, because 
task information is not explicitly stated but has to be acquired through experience. This 
implies that on implicit tasks, one has to rely on feelings to a greater extent than on 
tasks where the information is explicitly stated (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Van Aken, 2014). 
Probably, implicit tasks are superior in predicting real-life risk taking because such tasks 
are affectively engaging (Schonberg et al., 2011). A drawback of implicit tasks however 
is that the underlying probability distribution of possible outcomes remains unknown 
to the decision-maker, which makes it impossible to examine the separate cognitive 
processes that are also known to modulate risky decision making, such as probability 
estimation and expected value anticipation (Schonberg, et al., 2011). 
In contrast to implicit tasks, explicit tasks are based on the principles of expected-
utility models (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). These task frequently involve 
choosing between (hypothetical) lotteries, for example, a choice between A: a 50% 
chance to gain €30 or B: €10 for sure (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002). An optimal response 
strategy in the long run requires that one should always select the option with the highest 
expected value, which in this case means selecting option A. As people generally tend to 
be risk averse in the gain domain however, the majority of people would select the safe 
option (B). In contrast to studies of risky decision making on implicit tasks, outcomes 
of these studies have not yet been successfully related to the risk taking tendencies 
people have in real life (Coppola, 2014), although see for exceptions (Barsky, Juster, 
Kimball, & Shapiro, 1997; Pennings, & Smidts, 2000). Note however that first steps have 
been taken to develop behavioral measures of risk taking that combine the best of both 
implicit an descriptive-based approaches (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; 
Plescak, 2008).
To conclude, research findings show that implicit risky decision-making tasks 
have the capacity to predict real-life risk-taking behaviors very well. However, the 
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underlying constructs important to the decision-making process resist decomposition. 
Conversely, explicit tasks are decomposable into its underlying constructs, such 
as the probability distributions and expected values of possible outcomes, which 
means that their separate impact on the decision-making process can be examined. 
A downside of this approach is that performance on descriptive-based tasks does 
not seem to predict real-life risk taking behaviors very well. It has been proposed 
that an optimal measure of risky decision making should be affectively engaging, yet 
decomposable into its underlying structure (Schonberg et al., 2011). Additionally, the 
potential influence of internal and external states that may underlie the representation 
of a given decision problem as described in the model of Rangel et al. (2008) should 
be taken into account. In this way, the interplay between affective components and 
cognitive control processes inherent to real-life risk taking may be best captured 
and optimally reflect an individual’s tendency to engage in risky behaviors in real-life. 
Simulated Driving Task
The simulated driving task (SDT) was specifically developed to better capture the 
dynamic and engaging aspects of most real-life risk taking behaviors, while at the same 
time relying on formal and explicitly stated probability distributions and outcome values 
that facilitate optimal decision making. In this way, we tried to combine the advantages 
of implicit tasks that have been found predictive of real-life risk taking, with the formal 
definition of risk as variance of outcomes that enables the examination of the underlying 
components inherent to risk. Therefore, we wanted the SDT to be engaging but at the 
same time decomposable into its underlying structure. One may argue that a simulated 
driving experience does not resemble a driving situation in real life. Indeed, the simulated 
driving task was not designed to mimic a real-life driving experience. Instead, this particular 
design was chosen because it requires active engagement in a dynamic and engaging 
setting. We reasoned that the required active engagement and online decision making in 
such a dynamic context would better capture the interplay between affective and cognitive 
processes inherent to real-life risk-taking behaviors, as compared to performance on 
a static and explicit gambling task. One may additionally argue that in real-life, exact 
probabilities of multiple outcomes are usually unknown. However, also in real life, the 
likelihood of an alternative outcome over another can usually be estimated with some 
degree of confidence. For example, if you have to choose a time to catch a train, you 
can predict that the risk of not obtaining a seat is substantially higher during rush hour 
than at any other time of the day. If the train is headed to a big city, the probability of 
not obtaining a seat increases even further. 
In all versions of the Simulated Driving Task used in our studies, the interior of a 
car from a driver’s seat perspective was displayed and positioned in the right lane 
of a simulated 2-lane road, either in virtual reality or on a large 2-d computer screen. 
Participants were able to control the direction (left/right) of the simulated car, but not 
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its speed. On each trial, participant had to decide at some point whether to overtake 
another car driving ahead (risky choice), or to remain driving in the right lane (safe 
choice). The decision to overtake involved a predetermined risk to crash into an 
oncoming car that had been pre-programmed to approach from a distance that was 
either far enough or too close for a successful overtake maneuver to take place. The 
alternative safe decision required the participant to remain driving in the right lane 
until the trial ended. Importantly, the risky option was always associated with some 
probability that a once initiated overtake attempt would succeed and in that case, 
would result in a relatively high reward value, whereas the safe choice was always 
associated with a sure small reward. Typically, participants were informed that one of 
their selected choices before and one of their selected choices after the break would 
be selected randomly by the computer. Subsequently, the sum of the values associated 
with these choices was averaged and paid in Euros at the end of the experiment. 
EEG measurements
In the studies described in chapters 2 and 4, the neural correlates of decision 
making were investigated by means of analyzing event-related potentials (ERPs) and 
oscillatory brain activity, respectively. Both ERPs and oscillatory brain activity can be 
measured by means of EEG recordings. EEG is a non-invasive method to record the 
electrical activity from the scalp surface, reflecting the summation of the excitatory 
and inhibitory postsynaptic synchronous activity of many millions of neurons that are 
spatially aligned and picked up by metal conductive electrodes (Luck, 2005; Sauseng 
& Klimesch, 2008). The main advantage of EEG is its superior temporal resolution of 1 
ms or better (Luck, 2005), at the cost of spatial precision. This means that in contrast 
to other neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) or positron emission tomography (PET), EEG records neural activity in real-time, 
instead of relying on an indirect hemodynamic response (Sauseng and Klimesch, 
2008).
ERP component reflect the voltage fluctuations evoked by neural activity 
associated with internally or externally generated stimuli (Teplan, 2002). An example 
of a well-known ERP component is the feedback-related negativity (FRN), which 
occurs approximately 250 ms after feedback, indicates that a particular outcome was 
worse than expected (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). 
ERP waveforms are time-locked to specific events such as the onset of an externally 
generated stimulus during a cognitive task and can be isolated from the EEG by 
means of signal-averaging procedures. Alternatively, oscillatory brain activity can 
be used to measure ongoing cognitive processes. An oscillation can be described 
by its frequency, its amplitude, and its instantaneous phase (Sauseng & Klimesch, 
2008). Oscillations in different frequency bands are thought to reflect different neural 
generators and cognitive processes. For example, oscillations between 8 and 13 Hz 
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represent alpha activity that has been associated with several cognitive processes, 
among which visual attention (e.g., Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & Pascual-Leone, 2006). 
Oscillations between 4 and 8 Hz represent theta activity that in midfrontal regions has 
been associated with cognitive effort, conflict, and cognitive control (Başar, Başar-
Eroglu, Karakaş, & Schürmann, 2001; Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Nigbur et al., 2012).
 
Outline of this thesis
This thesis describes four experimental studies and one longitudinal study aimed at 
gaining more insight in the determinants of real-life risk taking. Both internal (individual 
differences, cognitive control, affective processes) and external states (a dynamic 
and engaging risky decision-making context, media exposure) that may influence 
the representation of a decision problem under risk were taken into account in this 
endeavor (Rangel et al., 2008). 
The study described in chapter 2 was a first exploratory attempt to investigate the 
cognitive processes underlying risky decisions in a way that comes closer to everyday 
decision making than performance on simple response-mapping tasks (e.g., Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002). To this end, a simple traffic environment was created during which 
participants’ EEG was being recorded. EEG measurements were focused on ERPs 
that reflect performance monitoring processes related to experienced conflict (conflict 
monitoring) and outcome expectancies (feedback processing) during decision making. 
The main aim of the second study described in chapter 3 was to examine on a 
behavioral level whether risky decision making in a dynamic and engaging virtual reality 
context would better predict real-life risk-taking propensity than performance on a 
standard gambling design with identical choice options. To enable the investigation 
of risky decision making in a dynamic and engaging context, the Simulated Driving 
Task was developed. 
Chapter 4 describes an EEG experiment that was designed to gain more insight in 
the cognitive processes involved in risky decision making in a way that relates to real-life 
risk-taking, but at the same time is decomposable into its underlying components (in 
terms of the probabilities and values of outcomes). To this end, the Simulated Driving 
Task was further improved. Analyses were focused on real-time oscillatory brain activity 
related to cognitive control processes and attention in the 1500 ms pre-decision period. 
It was also examined whether the well-known risk-related traits sensation seeking and 
impulsivity (Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000) modulated attention and/or cognitive 
control processes. 
The main goal of the fourth study described in chapter 5 was to examine whether 
risky decision making in a group known for the increased tendency to engage in real-life 
risk taking (adolescents with ADHD), would be better captured on an adapted version 
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of the dynamic and engaging Simulated Driving Task as compared to a more standard 
gambling task. In addition, it was investigated whether impulsive actions (impaired 
response inhibition) and impulsive choice (temporal discounting) that are known to be 
associated with ADHD (Winstanley et al., 2006) were more pronounced in adolescents 
with ADHD as compared to controls and whether these constructs were associated 
with risky decision making. 
The fifth study in chapter 6 describes a longitudinal 6-wave study that examined 
the impact of movie exposure on future real-life risk-taking behavior in a sample of 
1630 US adolescents. Specifically, the long-term unique impact of movie exposure to 
reckless driving on future inattentive and reckless driving was investigated. The analyses 
that were conducted controlled for a host of potentially confounding variables such as 
age, socio-economic status, daily television exposure and videogame play, measured 
at baseline. Individual differences in sensation seeking were also taken into account.
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Abstract
Different theoretical accounts have attempted to integrate anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) involvement in relation to conflict detection, error-likelihood predictions, and 
error monitoring. Regarding the latter, ERP studies have identified the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) component in relation to processing feedback which indicates that 
a particular outcome was worse than expected. According to the conflict-monitoring 
theory the stimulus-locked N2 reflects pre-response conflict. Assumptions of these 
theories have been made on the basis of relatively simple response-mapping tasks, 
rather than more complex decision-making processes associated with everyday 
situations. The question remains whether expectancies and conflicts induced by 
everyday knowledge similarly affect decision-making processes. To answer this question, 
EEG and behavioral measurements were obtained while participants performed a 
simulated traffic task that varied high and low ambiguous situations at an intersection 
by presenting multiple varying traffic light combinations. Although feedback was kept 
constant for the different conditions, the tendency to cross was more pronounced for 
traffic light combinations that in real life are associated with proceeding, as opposed 
to more ambiguous traffic light combinations not uniquely associated with a specific 
response. On a neurophysiological level, the stimulus-locked N2 was enhanced on 
trials that induced experience-based conflict and the FRN was more pronounced for 
negative as compared to positive feedback, but did not differ as a function of everyday 
expectancies related to traffic rules. The current study shows that well-learned everyday 
rules may influence decision-making processes in situations that are associated with 
the application of these rules, even if responding accordingly does not lead to the 
intended outcomes.
Keywords: performance monitoring; conflict monitoring; stimulus-locked N2; FRN
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Introduction
Posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMFC) and in particular anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) have been implicated in a variety of cognitive functions related to attentional 
and motivational processes (see Bush, Lee, & Posner, 2000, for a review) with recent 
research mainly focusing on the role of the ACC in monitoring and optimizing behavior. 
The ACC has been associated with processes like error detection (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002), conflict monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), and, more 
recently, error likelihood prediction (Brown and Braver, 2005; Magno, Foxe, Molholm, 
Robertson, & Garavan, 2006). These theoretical accounts implicate increased pMFC 
activity in response to erroneous responses, response conflict, or increased error-
likelihood (Botvinick, 2001; DeHaene et al., 1994; Carter et al., 1998; Nee, Kastner, & 
Brown, 2011; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). 
Event-related potential (ERP) studies have contributed extensively to the formation 
of these theories by identifying different ERP components generated in pMFC, which 
are assumed to reflect different aspects of these processes. The first described ERP 
component associated with action monitoring and error detection was the so-called 
error- negativity (Ne; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990), which occurs 
between 50-100 ms after an error has been made (also referred to as ERN; Gehring, Goss, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Later research has identified a similar component emerging 
approximately 250 ms after negative performance feedback (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997), which is frequently called the feedback-related negativity 
(FRN). In addition, ERP studies have identified the stimulus-locked N2 component 
to be increased roughly 250 ms following stimuli that induce pre-response conflict 
(i.e. conflict between to competing response tendencies; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2004; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003). For example, 
Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2003) identified the stimulus-locked N2 in response to 
infrequent stimuli, independent of trial type (go, no-go).
Several theoretical accounts have provided useful frameworks for explaining the 
emergence of these ERP components. The Ne and FRN for example, play a central role 
in the reinforcement-learning model of performance monitoring as proposed by Holroyd 
and Coles (2002). According to this view, both components reflect the same performance-
monitoring process but occur at different time points, with the Ne generated immediately 
after internal feedback signaling that an error has been made, and the FRN in response 
to negative external feedback indicating incorrect performance. In both instances, the 
ACC detects when an outcome is worse than expected and uses this information to 
facilitate the development of adaptive behavior (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Findings that 
the FRN is not sensitive to the absolute magnitude but rather to unexpected deviations 
from the reward value (Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, 
& Cohen, 2003) are in line with this contention (see also Simons, 2010). In addition, 
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functional MRI studies support the common origins of both ERP components in the 
ACC in response to internally and externally generated negative feedback (Holroyd et 
al., 2004; Mars et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, the Ne and the stimulus-locked N2 play a central role in the 
conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), which states that the ACC evaluates the 
need for cognitive control by monitoring occurrences of conflict when multiple competing 
response tendencies are simultaneously activated (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2004). In this view, both ERP components are 
reflections of the same process, but occurring at different time points, with the elicitation 
of the N2 when conflict that results from two competing response tendencies (i.e. left and 
right index finger) is detected before the actual response (resulting in correct trials) and 
the Ne reflecting detection of the same conflict after execution of an erroneous response 
(Carter et al., 1998; Van Veen & Carter, 2002; Yeung et al., 2004). Indeed, several ERP 
studies implicate that the N2 and Ne rely on the ACC as a common generator (Ladouceur, 
Dahl, & Carter, 2007; Liotti, Woldorf, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; 
Van Veen & Carter, 2002). In addition, research using neuroimaging techniques such 
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has provided congruent evidence for 
this assumption. For example, Carter et al. (1998) showed that in addition to incorrect 
responses, the ACC was also activated in conditions of greater response competition 
preceding correct responses.
Importantly however, dissociations between N2 and Ne amplitudes may still occur, 
because these components are related to different aspects of task processing, namely 
target stimulus information (Ne) and irrelevant stimulus information (N2; Yeung & Cohen, 
2006). In other words, the Ne depends on the degree of processing of the target stimulus 
whereas the N2 reflects activation of distracting, irrelevant stimuli. In addition, unlike the 
Ne, N2 latency has been found to relate to response selection processes, with shorter 
latencies being associated with faster responses, independent of level of conflict (Di 
Russo, Taddei, Apnile, & Spinelli, 2006; Gajewski, Stoerig, & Falkenstein, 2008). 
Recently, Alexander and Brown (2011) have proposed a comprehensive model that 
unifies many of the above mentioned theories of mPFC function into one single account, 
which they coined the predicted response-outcome (PRO) model. Simulations of this 
model showed that a single underlying mechanism may account for the generation of 
error signals, error-likelihood, conflict etc., with maximum activity when expected events 
fail to occur, independent of the valence of the event (good or bad). 
Up until now, most studies that investigated different ERP components have used 
speeded reaction-time tasks or reinforcement-learning paradigms, in which task-specific 
strategies and instructions minimally associated with real-life decision making, have to 
be incorporated and applied for successful performance-monitoring. However, many 
daily routines and choices people have to make are strongly coupled with particular 
outcome-expectancies and conflict. For example, when you cross a road as soon as 
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the traffic light has turned green, you expect other traffic from competing directions to 
wait, as their traffic light should be red. On the other hand, approaching an intersection 
while the traffic light turns orange may induces conflict, because depending on distance 
and speed, one has to decide to stop or proceed. 
In the current study we wanted to investigate performance-monitoring processes and 
accompanying ERP components during more everyday life experience-based decision 
making. To accomplish this, we designed a task in which, to a certain extent, everyday 
expectancies and conflict-inducing situations were integrated. Participants had to 
engage in a two-choice reaction-time traffic task, during which both behavioral and ERP 
measurements were obtained. On each trial, both the participant and another road user - 
controlled by the computer - had to concurrently decide whether to cross or not to cross 
an intersection. In addition, traffic lights colored green, orange, or red were positioned 
at the intersection next to each road user. To investigate whether knowledge of traffic 
lights and associated rules would influence the decision-making process independent 
of task conditions, all combinations of green, orange and red were presented during the 
task. Obviously, this approach is somewhat artificial, as in real life, the colors displayed 
by traffic lights from opposing directions are not visible, (although probably implicitly 
inferred). This trade-off however was implemented to assure that participants based their 
decision making on the same, explicit information. Also, the execution of the crossing 
was not displayed on screen. Instead, the outcome of this response (i.e., whether the 
crossing was successful or not) was indicated by the feedback. The frequency of positive 
and negative feedback was equally distributed within each condition, independent of 
traffic light colors. In this way, abidance of traffic rules was not explicitly hinted at nor 
rewarded during the execution of the task. Although in real life road users usually abide 
by traffic rules, this approach allowed us to investigate if conflict and expectancies were 
induced by everyday knowledge of traffic light rules (i.e., a green light means cross, while 
an orange light indicates “prepare to stop” and a red light prohibits traffic to proceed) 
and whether these aspects of the decision-making process were still incorporated and 
consequently reflected in behavioral response patterns and the ERP components.
Based on previous work involving reinforcement learning (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002), we hypothesized that the degree of unexpectedness based 
on real-life action-outcome coupling would be reflected in the negativity of the FRN. 
More specifically, we predicted that negative feedback in response to crossings that 
in real life are expected to be successful (for example, crossing an intersection with a 
green traffic light, while the other road user has a red light) would result in larger FRN 
components than to crossings that in real life generally are unsuccessful (crossing an 
intersection with a red light, while the other road user has a green light) or ambiguous 
traffic light combinations (e.g., both traffic lights are orange). Likewise, in line with 
previous research on conflict-monitoring, (Barch et al., 2000; Yeung et al., 2004), we 
expected that ambiguous traffic light combinations are weakly associated with a particular 
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response (e.g., both traffic lights have the same color and you have to decide to cross or 
not) and would result in more pre-response conflict compared to the situation in which 
traffic lights are strongly associated with a particular response (e.g., not crossing an 
intersection when your traffic light is red and the traffic light for the other road user is 
green), as reflected by an enhanced N2 component.
To summarize, the current study aimed at investigating performance-monitoring 
processes during everyday life experience-based decision making. At a behavioral 
level, we expected daily-life knowledge and expectations to be reflected in an increased 
number of crossing responses for situations that are associated with allowed driving (i.e., 
a green traffic light while the traffic light for road users from competing directions is red) 
compared to situations that are associated with prohibited driving (i.e., a red traffic light 
while the traffic light for road users from competing directions is green) or are ambiguous 
(similar color displays for both traffic lights). Also, we expected reaction times to be 
prolonged for ambiguous and hence, conflict inducing traffic light combinations (e.g., 
Fan, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). On an electrophysiological level, we expected the 
FRN to be more pronounced for everyday unexpected outcomes (i.e., a collision while 
the traffic light color indicated right of way) compared to everyday expected outcomes 
(i.e., a collision while the traffic light color prohibits proceeding). Similarly, we predicted 
ambiguous traffic light combinations to result in more conflict before a decision was 
made, as reflected by an enhanced N2. 
Methods
 
Participants
Fifteen participants were recruited at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Participants 
were compensated €10 per hour for their participation and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. One participant was removed from the dataset because of excessive 
EEG artifacts. As a result, data on the remaining 14 participants (12 women, mean age 
= 22.0, SD = 4.8 years) were analyzed and reported. 
Design and procedure
The aim of the task was to cover an as large as possible distance during a simulated 
traffic task. To engage participants in the task, they were told that of all participants, 
the 3 with the highest scores on total covered distance would receive an additional 
€5 for their performance. On each an intersection was presented that displayed one 
rectangular shape at the lower end of the intersection, which represented the participants’ 
vehicle, and another rectangular shape was either positioned at the right or left side 
of the intersection, representing the computers’ vehicle. (see Figure 1). In addition, on 
each trial traffic lights were displayed as colored circles, one at the right side of the 
participants’ shape and one at the right side of the computers’ shape. 
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Figure 1. Set-up of the two-choice traffic task with an example of a correct crossing 
(a) and an incorrect crossing (b). The participant was represented by the rectangular 
shape (blue) at the lower end of the intersection, whereas the other road user (computer) 
was represented by the rectangular shape (grey) at either the left or right side of the 
intersection. After presentation of the intersection (pictures depicted in the middle) 
participants had to press a designated button if they decided to cross the intersection 
and another designated button in case they decided not to cross the intersection. After 
a response associated with crossing, feedback indicated whether the response was 
correct (+50 m) or incorrect (-30 m). After a response associated with not crossing, 
feedback indicated that the covered distance remained unchanged (+0 m).
A correct response B incorrect response
Presentation 
     fixation cross
     (750-1000 ms)
Intersection 
      presented
       (max. 3000 ms)
     Feedback
      presented
      (1500 ms)
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To be able to contrast behavioral and electrophysiological results associated with 
realistic and unrealistic traffic light combinations, all combinations of green, orange and 
red display were possible, resulting in 9 different traffic light combinations. Participants 
were instructed to decide on each trial whether they wanted to cross the intersection or 
not, while the other road user would concurrently make a similar decision. Participants 
had to respond by pressing one of two buttons on a button box with a response accuracy 
of 1 msec, which was developed by the technical support group at the social science 
faculty of the Radboud University. One designated response button was associated 
with the response to cross whereas another designated button was associated with 
the response not to cross. Participants were informed that, in case both the computer 
and the participant decided to cross at the same trial, this would result in a collision and 
hence, an unsuccessful crossing for the participant. Conversely, if the participant decided 
to cross the intersection while at the same trial the computer decided not to cross, this 
would result in a successful crossing for the participant. Importantly, without specifying 
the prerequisites for a successful crossing, participants were instructed to try to make 
as many meters as possible by crossing the intersection, while at the same time taking 
into account the presence of the other road user. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the task was programmed such that for each traffic 
light combination the participant decided to cross, the other road user was programmed 
to cross the intersection half of the trials and not to cross the intersection on the other 
half of the trials, counterbalanced over its position (right, left) and traffic lights colors (all 
possible combinations of green, orange, and red). In each condition, the presentation 
of positive and negative feedback was equally distributed over the crossing trials. This 
way, the occurrence of positive and negative feedback was 50% for each condition, so 
traffic light colors were in fact uninformative. Consequently, the decision to cross or not 
should be equal over conditions if everyday-based knowledge of traffic lights was not 
taken into account during the task. After each successful crossing response, feedback 
was presented indicating that 50 meters were added to the total of covered distance. 
Conversely, after an unsuccessful crossing, feedback indicated that 30 meters were 
subtracted from the total of covered distance. If the participant decided not to cross 
by pressing the designated button, feedback would display an addition of zero meters, 
indicating that the total covered distance did not change on that particular trial. The 
asymmetry between reward (+ 50 meters) and penalties (-30 meters) was necessary to 
ensure that the total covered distance after each block would be more than zero. 
Each of the nine traffic light combinations occurred on a total of 42 trials, with the 
position of the other road user counterbalanced over these trials (21 trials positioned left, 
21 trials positioned right), resulting in 18 different conditions (9 traffic light combinations, 
2 positions of the other road user) which were evenly distributed over three blocks of 126 
trials each, adding up to a total of 378 trials (For a schematic overview for all traffic light 
combinations, response options and feedback types, see Figure 2). Intersections were 
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displayed for a maximum duration of 3000. If participants failed to press a button within 
3000 ms, feedback would indicate that the response was too slow. Neutral, positive 
and negative feedback were presented as follows: If participants pressed the button 
designated as the response not to cross, feedback was shown with the text: “+ 0 meter”. 
If participants choose to press the button designated as the response to cross, feedback 
would indicate “+ 50 meters” for successful crossings and “-30 meters” for unsuccessful 
crossings. After a button press, the intersection remained on screen unchanged for 
1000 ms before the feedback screen was presented by depicting the amount of added 
or subtracted meters at the centre of the screen, positioned in the middle of an empty 
intersection. Feedback was displayed for 1500 ms, after which the next trial would start 
with the presentation of a fixation cross. Trial duration ranged between a minimum of 4250 
ms and a maximum of 6000 ms, depending on the reaction time (RT) of the participant. 
After each block with duration of approximately 10 minutes, progress on the task was 
indicated by displaying the cumulative amount of covered distance in meters for a duration 
of 5000 ms, after which the participant could take a 5-minute break before continuing with 
the next block. The total experiment lasted 1.5 hours, including preparation and breaks. 
Figure 2. Schematic overview of all traffic light combinations, possible response options 
and feedback types. 
Please note that all possible traffic light combinations of green, orange and red 
were included in the experiment. However, a first inspection of the data revealed that 
responses (cross, not cross) were not equally distributed over conditions, resulting in a 
number of conditions with too few responses of either type to conduct reliable separate 
‘Cross’
+ 50m 
- 30 m 
+ 0m
+ 50 m
+  0 m
Green-green
Green-orange
Green-red
Orange-orange
Orange-green
Orange-red
Red-green
Red-orange
Red-red
      Conditions              Response options        Feedback type
‘Cross’
‘No cross’
- 30 m
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displayed for a maximum duration of 3000. If participants failed to press a button within 
3000 ms, feedback would indicate that the response was too slow. Neutral, positive 
and negative feedback were presented as follows: If participants pressed the button 
designated as the response not to cross, feedback was shown with the text: “+ 0 meter”. 
If participants choose to press the button designated as the response to cross, feedback 
would indicate “+ 50 meters” for successful crossings and “-30 meters” for unsuccessful 
crossings. After a button press, the intersection remained on screen unchanged for 
1000 ms before the feedback screen was presented by depicting the amount of added 
or subtracted meters at the centre of the screen, positioned in the middle of an empty 
intersection. Feedback was displayed for 1500 ms, after which the next trial would start 
with the presentation of a fixation cross. Trial duration ranged between a minimum of 4250 
ms and a maximum of 6000 ms, depending on the reaction time (RT) of the participant. 
After each block with duration of approximately 10 minutes, progress on the task was 
indicated by displaying the cumulative amount of covered distance in meters for a duration 
of 5000 ms, after which the participant could take a 5-minute break before continuing with 
the next block. The total experiment lasted 1.5 hours, including preparation and breaks. 
Figure 2. Schematic overview of all traffic light combinations, possible response options 
and feedback types. 
Please note that all possible traffic light combinations of green, orange and red 
were included in the experiment. However, a first inspection of the data revealed that 
responses (cross, not cross) were not equally distributed over conditions, resulting in a 
number of conditions with too few responses of either type to conduct reliable separate 
‘Cross’
+ 50m 
- 30 m 
+ 0m
ERP analyses. Considering power issues, we decided to restrict our ERP analyses 
to conditions with at least 10 cross response trials per participant. Three ‘crossing’ 
conditions of interest met these requirements, with each participant having enough 
responses to cross for the intersection types green-red (M = 35.5, SD = 7.75, range: 
20-42), green-orange (M = 35.5, SD = 5.43, range: 27-42) and orange-orange (M = 
28.07, SD = 9.62, range: 10-40). However, for the FRN analyses these three conditions 
had to be further subdivided into feedback-type (positive, negative), which resulted in 
three participants having less than 10 feedback trials to analyze. To resolve this issue, 
these three participants were included in the N2 analyses (N = 14) but excluded from 
FRN analyses (N = 11). 
With regard to the ‘no cross’ responses, only the conditions with a red traffic light 
for the participant appeared to reach the minimum number of trials to analyze, however, 
close inspection revealed that in each condition (red-green, red-orange, red-red) 1-4 
participants had less than 10 ‘no cross’ responses. Also, the involved participants 
were not always the same individuals for each ‘red traffic light’ condition. In addition, 
since feedback for “no cross” responses (+ 0 meter) did not reveal the decision the 
other road user had made (cross, not cross), expectations could not be formed on 
basis of these trials, which made investigations of these trials also less interesting 
in the current task design. Based on these issues, we decided to do ERP analyses 
only on the crossing responses for the three above-mentioned crossing conditions, 
and to do behavioral analyses on both the response to cross and the response not 
to cross for the same three conditions. In this way, it was still possible to investigate 
response differences in conflict and expectancies as a function of traffic light ambiguity, 
ranging from unambiguous (green for the participant, red for the other road user) 
to semi-ambiguous (green for the participant, orange for the other road user) and 
ambiguous (orange for both the participant and the other road user1) combinations. 
Electrophysiological recordings and data analyses
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with 27 active electrodes (Acticap, 
Brain Products, Munich, Germany) mounted in an elastic cap and arranged according 
to an extended version of the 10-20 system. Signal impedance was kept below 5 kΩ. 
All signals were referenced to the left mastoid and later offline re-referenced to the 
average of both mastoids. The vertical electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded with 
electrodes placed above and below the right eye. Horizontal EOGs were recorded 
with electrodes at the outer canthi of both eyes. All signals were digitized with a 
sampling rate of 500 Hz, and filtered offline with a .50 Hz high-pass filter and a slope 
of 24 dB/oct and a 20 Hz low-pass filter and also a slope of 24 dB/oct. After removal 
of artifacts with signals that exceeded ± 75 µV, the minimum number of segments 
per participant was 18 in the green-red condition, 26 in the green-orange condition 
and 10 in the orange-orange condition (1 participant). Eye movement artifacts were 
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rejected using Independent Component Analysis (Jung et al., 2000), with the built-in 
ICA toolbox of Brain Vision Analyzer. 
EEG signals for trials with correct and incorrect feedback were time-locked to 
feedback onset and were analyzed separately for positive and negative feedback for 
each participant, relative to a 200 ms interval preceding feedback onset. FRN amplitude 
was determined by the difference between the most negative peak between 200 and 
350 ms after feedback onset and the preceding most positive peak, and analyzed at 
the midline electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz. 
EEG signals for cross trials with different intersection set-ups were time-locked to 
stimulus onset and also analyzed separately for each traffic light combination relative 
also to a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. The N2 was then defined as the most negative 
deflection between 200-350 ms after stimulus onset and also analyzed at the midline 
electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz. 
Percentages of crossing responses between conditions were investigated by 
entering the difference scores of crossing percentages (cross - not cross) for each 
condition (green-red, green-orange, orange-orange) as within-subject variables in a 2 x 
3 repeated measures general linear model (GLM). To examine reaction-time patterns, a 
similar GLM was conducted with crossing response (cross, not cross) and intersection 
type (green-red, green-orange, orange-orange) as within-subject variables. Additionally, 
to investigate differences in response selection processes, correlations between N2 
latencies and RTs for the three different conditions were investigated.
For the ERP analyses, N2 amplitudes were entered in a 3 x 3 repeated measures 
GLM with the within subject factors traffic light ambiguity (green-red, green-orange, 
orange-orange) and electrode position (Fz, FCz, Cz). FRN amplitudes were submitted 
to a 2 x 3 x 3 repeated measures general linear model (GLM) with feedback (positive, 
negative), traffic light ambiguity (green-red, green-orange, orange-orange) and electrode 
position (Fz, FCz, Cz) as within subject factors. Finally, if applicable, GreenHouse-
Geisser corrections were used. For interpretation purposes, uncorrected degrees of 
freedom are reported in all cases. 
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Results
 
Behavioral data
Frequencies. Figure 3 shows the mean percentages of crossing responses for the 
unambiguous, semi-ambiguous and ambiguous conditions. The analyses on difference 
scores of the percentages of the crossing response (cross-not cross) for each intersection 
type (green-red, green-orange, orange-orange) showed a main effect of ambiguity (F [2, 
26] = 8.20, p = .002). Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts showed that the differences 
between crossing and not crossing response percentages were significantly smaller for 
the orange-orange intersection type compared to both the green-red intersection type 
(F [1, 13] = 8.46, p = .012) and the green-orange intersection type (F[1, 13] = 10.88, p = 
.006), indicating that crossing responses as opposed to responses not to cross occurred 
more frequently for the unambiguous green-red intersection type (M = 70.29, SD = 
36.16) and the semi-ambiguous green-orange intersection type (M = 69.71, SD = 25.97) 
compared to the ambiguous orange-orange intersection type (M = 34.14, SD = 45.59). 
Figure 3. Mean percentages of crossing responses in the unambiguous (green-red), 
semi-ambiguous (green-orange) and ambiguous (orange-orange) condition.
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Reaction times. A main effect of crossing response was found; participants decided 
significantly faster to cross (M = 839.65, SD = 70.52) than not to cross (M = 955.13, 
SD = 75.98), F(1, 9) = 56.98, p <.001. Although the numerical values hinted at the 
expected pattern of slower cross responses in the ambiguous condition (810 ms) than 
in the semi-ambiguous (782 ms) and unambiguous condition (773 ms, see Table 1), 
differences in reaction times between conditions were non-significant F(2, 18) = .79, p 
= .47. RTs for the three different conditions were not significantly related to N2 latencies 
(all rs < .50, all ps > .08).
Table 1
 
Mean RTs for the ERP Analyzed Crossing Conditions. 
Traffic light 
combination
Crossing
RTs (ms)
M   (SD)
No Crossing
RTs (ms)
M   (SD)
Total
RTs (ms)
M   (SD)
Unambiguous
(greena-redb)
773 (55) 898  (71) 809 (57)
semi-ambiguous
(greena-orangeb)
782 (59) 1015 (92) 883 (71)
Ambiguous
(orangea-orangeb)
810 (56) 952 (79) 881 (54)
Note. aThe color denotes the traffic light display next to the rectangular shape of the 
participant. bThe color denotes the traffic light display next to the rectangular shape 
of the other road user. 
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Electrophysiological data
N2. The absence of a significant main effect for electrode indicated that N2 amplitude 
was not significantly different at the three midline electrode positions, F (2, 26) = 2.21, 
p = .210. Likewise, no significant interaction was found between intersection type and 
electrode sites, F (4, 52) = .22, p = .807. Importantly however, a significant main effect 
of traffic light ambiguity on N2 amplitude was identified, F (2, 26) = 3.71, p = .038 
(Figure 41). Contrasts showed that the N2 associated with the ambiguous intersection 
type (orange-orange; M = -4.70, SD = 1.19) was significantly more negative compared 
to the semi-ambiguous intersection type (green-orange; M = -3.31, SD = .99; t[13] = 
2.21, p = .045) and the unambiguous intersection type (green-red; M = -2.88, SD = 
.92; t[13] = 2.52, p = .025).
Figure 4. Grand average N2 waveforms (n=14) time-locked to stimulus onset for 
unambiguous (green-red; dashed lines), semi-ambiguous (green-orange; grey solid 
lines) and ambiguous stimuli (orange-orange; black solid lines) separately. Midline 
electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz are depicted.
FRN. Analyses on the FRN peaks revealed that overall, this component differed 
significantly between positive (M = -3.86, SD = 0.69) and negative (M = -5.93, SD = 
0.88) feedback (F [1, 10] = 5.80, p = .037) in the expected direction with increased 
amplitudes for negative feedback (Figure 5).
Neither the main effect for intersection type, nor the interaction between feedback 
type and intersection type (ambiguous, semi-ambiguous, and unambiguous) did interact, 
Fs < 1. The main effect of electrode site was not significant, F [2. 20] = 4.34, p = .052. 
Please note that correlation analyses did not reveal any correlations between ERP 
measures and behavioral measures (reaction times, frequencies of crossing responses; 
all ps > .075).
1Please note that an additional analysis on N1 amplitude at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz (latency range 100-200 ms) did 
not reveal any significant effect for the different ambiguity conditions F[2, 26] = 1,10, p = .35.
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Figure 5. Feedback-locked ERPs (n=11) measured at Fz, FCz and Cz in the unambiguous 
(green-red), semi-ambiguous (green-orange) and ambiguous (orange-orange) 
conditions, for positive (grey lines) and negative (black lines) feedback separately. 
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Discussion
 
In the current study, we investigated performance-monitoring processes during everyday 
life experience-based decision making. Results of this study are partly consistent with our 
hypotheses that expectancies and conflicts based on real life experience are reflected in 
behavioral outcomes and in ERP components known to be involved in action monitoring 
and control. First, although the valence of feedback was not dependent on the colors 
of traffic light combinations, percentages of crossing responses were higher when the 
traffic light color for the participant was green as compared to orange. Apparently, 
everyday experience with traffic situations influenced the decision-making process 
during the task, resulting in the tendency to cross the intersection in the presence of 
a signal which is strongly associated with this response. Second, as predicted, the 
amount of response conflict as reflected in the stimulus-locked N2 component was 
larger for the traffic light combination we thought was most ambiguous based on 
everyday experience (both traffic lights were illuminated orange) compared to both 
the semi-ambiguous combination (green-orange) and the unambiguous combination 
(green-red). Third, the FRN was larger for negative feedback as opposed to positive 
feedback, but was not modulated by expectancies based on knowledge of traffic rules. 
In other words, the FRN was not larger for unsuccessful crossings that are unexpected 
in everyday life (a green traffic light while the traffic light for the other road user was 
red) compared to more ambiguous traffic light combinations (a green or orange traffic 
light while the traffic light for the other road user was orange). 
Based on the results of the current study, we argue that the stimulus-locked N2 
was enhanced as a function of more crosstalk or competition between alternative 
response options. These findings are also in line with research of Barch and colleagues 
(2000), who demonstrated increased ACC involvement for nouns associated with 
more response options compared to nouns associated with less response options, 
and also in response to verbs that were weakly associated as opposed to strongly 
associated with particular nouns. Similarly, in traffic, the orange light is associated with 
proceeding if close to the crossing, but signals one should stop if the distance is still 
very large. In contrast, green or red lights are uniquely associated with the response 
to drive or stop, respectively. Apparently, knowledge of traffic rules influenced the 
decision-making process, which must have become even more confusing when traffic 
lights for both directions were illuminated orange. This notion is strengthened by the 
finding that the N2 was most pronounced in response to ambiguous (orange-orange) 
traffic light combinations. Based on previous fMRI and ERP studies (see Van Veen & 
Carter, 2002, for a review), the current findings may suggest increased ACC activity 
with increased levels of conflict.
Although the current results indicate that conflict-monitoring processes account for 
both behavioral and electrophysiological observations, it is important to mention that 
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these findings may alternatively reflect error-likelihood predictions (Brown and Braver, 
2005). According to this recent view, the ACC might not detect conflict or errors, but 
instead predict the probability of making an error. By conducting an fMRI study, Brown 
and Braver (2005) showed that the ACC was more active on trials associated with higher 
error-likelihood compared to trials associated with low error likelihood, even if trials in 
which errors were committed were excluded from analyses. 
In the present study, error-likelihood was kept similar over conditions, which means 
that participants could not have made predictions of error likelihood based on task 
conditions. However, if it turns out that the ACC is involved in predicting error likelihood 
(Brown and Braver, 2005), our findings of a more pronounced stimulus-locked N2 in the 
ambiguous condition potentially reflect error likelihood predictions based on knowledge 
of traffic rules. It is important to note that the current findings on the stimulus-locked 
N2 are equally interpretable in light of conflict-monitoring processes as error-likelihood 
predictions. To obtain more insight in the mechanisms underlying the generation of 
this component, it would be interesting to find out if well-learned everyday knowledge 
(such as knowledge of traffic rules) influences related decision-making processes either 
through conflict-monitoring processes reflecting response competition, or through 
error-likelihood predictions.
In line with our expectations based on the reinforcement model of performance 
monitoring as proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002), the FRN was more pronounced 
for negative as compared to positive feedback. Note that this finding is hard to 
reconcile with the PRO model (Alexander & Brown, 2011) that holds that the underlying 
mechanism for error-signals, conflict, and error-likelihood is insensitive to the valence of 
the outcome. Additionally, although on a behavioral level the decision-making process 
was guided by knowledge of traffic rules, the FRN was not modulated by expectancies 
based on traffic rules. 
Several other studies have found difficulties with establishing a link between the FRN 
component and expectancy. Results from a study performed by Hajcak and colleagues 
(Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007) showed that although behavioral responses 
revealed a reward bias, reward prediction errors did not result in FRN enhancement. In 
a second experiment (Hajcak et al., 2007), participants had to make predictions both 
before and after their response choice. The FRN was found to be more pronounced when 
losses were preceded by two separate lose/win predictions, compared to losses after 
win/lose predictions. This indicates that the focus on the second prediction overruled 
the impact of the first prediction and resulted in an increased action-outcome coupling. 
In the current study, implicit predictions were probably only made before the decision 
to cross or not to cross and not considered thereafter, possibly resulting in a weaker 
action-outcome coupling and hence, an undifferentiated FRN as a function of everyday 
expectancies. An alternative explanation is that, although response patterns indicated 
that participants integrated their everyday knowledge of traffic situations in the execution 
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of the task, expectancies and performance monitoring processes were dominated by 
the task conditions after a response had been made (see e.g. Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, 
Mol, Hajcak, & Veltman, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). 
It is important to note that the design of the current study has several shortcomings. 
For example, the large number of conditions resulted in too few trials available to conduct 
solid analyses on. Therefore, we were unable to investigate the electrophysiological 
components in relation to responses not to cross. It would be interesting to find out 
though, if conflict also arises for responses not to cross in situations that in real life are 
associated with successful crossings (e.g., when the traffic light is illuminated green). 
In addition, in a follow-up experiment, we aim to contrast experience-based decision 
making with decisions solely based on task conditions, to get a better grasp on the 
influence of everyday experience. For example, conditions with ‘real’ traffic light colors 
could be contrasted with conditions in which the traffic lights have, in this respect, 
meaningless colors (such as blue or purple), to isolate the effects of experience with 
traffic lights on the decision-making process.
Another limitation of the current study is that feedback presented on ‘no cross’ trials 
did not indicate what the other road users’ decision had been. The task was designed 
this way because we wanted to minimize the formation of expectancies on basis of 
the task, but instead investigate the influence of everyday-based expectancies and 
conflict on the decision-making process. The drawback of this approach however, is 
that participants could not improve their performance, which might have reduced their 
motivation to do their best. To resolve this, we aim to include more informative feedback 
and restrict the number of conditions to the most crucial ones in a follow up study. This 
approach, in combination with a larger sample size will enable us to investigate if and 
how learning influences decision making based on experience. 
Finally, although we tried to integrate components (i.e., traffic rules) of everyday 
life in the simulated traffic task, the consequences of the decision-making process 
during this task were obviously very different from real-life consequences. In traffic, 
ignoring rules or making mistakes have far more serious consequences, which makes 
driving through red not a very likely action to undertake for most of us. Still, findings 
indicate that everyday well-learned elements influenced associated decision-making 
process to a certain degree, although behaving accordingly obviously did not yield the 
desired outcomes. Despite the mentioned limitations, we would like to emphasize that 
this study was, to our knowledge, the first one to integrate the influence of everyday 
knowledge in a controlled lab task and thereby contributes to the existing literature 
on decision making. 
To summarize, although the FRN was more pronounced in response to negative 
feedback as compared to positive feedback, real-life based expectancies did not 
influence post-response performance monitoring as reflected by this component. In 
contrast, pre-response conflict monitoring appeared to be affected by these everyday 
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expectations, as reflected by the enhanced stimulus-locked N2 on ‘every-day’ high 
conflict trials. This interpretation is also supported by the observed behavioral response 
patterns, which show that the bias towards the response to cross, as opposed to the 
response not to cross was much smaller for ambiguous traffic light combinations 
compared to less ambiguous traffic light combinations. Moreover, crossing responses for 
the most ambiguous traffic light combination were numerically slower than for the less 
ambiguous traffic light combinations, although this difference did not reach significance. 
To gain more insight in the underlying processes in the generation of the stimulus-
locked N2, future ERP studies should attempt to disentangle the role of conflict and error-
likelihood predictions in relation to this particular ERP component. In addition, findings 
on the FRN suggest that outcome predictions were based on task conditions instead 
of knowledge with regard to traffic rules, or alternatively, that outcome expectancies 
influenced decision making before, but not after the response (Hajcak et al., 2007). 
Follow-up research is needed to investigate the specific role of experience-based 
expectancies both before and after a decision is made.
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Abstract
In examining risk-taking behavior, economic models have focused on the impact of 
the underlying constituents of risky decision making, such as the evaluation of expected 
utility, and explicit probability estimations of (variance in) possible outcomes. As an 
alternative approach, behavioral tasks in which the underlying probabilities are implicit 
have been frequently used to examine risk-taking tendencies in the field of psychology. 
Whereas the first approach provides explicitly stated probabilities and magnitudes 
of outcomes, which makes clear on what information choices are based across 
participants, the latter approach appears to be better aligned with real-life risk-taking 
behaviors, which has been suggested to be due to the higher affective involvement 
during such tasks. The present study aims to combine these approaches by examining 
risky decision making with a standard lottery task and with a structurally identical, but 
more dynamic and affectively engaging Virtual Reality driving task and subsequently, to 
relate performance on both measures to self-reported real-life risk-taking tendencies. 
Results showed that, in contrast to the Lottery Task, performance on the Simulated 
Driving Task with identical outcome magnitudes and probabilities was related to self-
reported real-life risk-taking propensity. This finding demonstrates that the investigation 
of decision making under risk can be improved by capturing the dynamic and affectively 
engaging aspects inherent to real-life risk taking, while maintaining a strong reliance 
on formal and explicit definitions of the underlying constituents of the choice process.
Keywords: real-life risk taking, risky decision making, Virtual Reality, DOSPERT, affective 
engagement
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Introduction
Risk taking is a widely studied phenomenon across different research domains 
such as (clinical) psychology and (neuro) economics. Frequently studied “real-world” 
risky behaviors include excessive drinking, smoking, reckless driving, gambling (e.g., 
Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000), extreme sports (Self et al., 2007) and financial risk taking 
(Grable, 2000). In addition, lab studies have focused on the processes that may instigate 
these behaviors by focusing on the underlying constituent components of decision 
making under risk. For example, experiments in the field of decision making inspired by 
economic models typically use description-based tasks (see for a review, Weber, Shafir, 
& Blais, 2004) with real or hypothetical choices and explicitly stated probabilities and 
magnitudes of associated outcomes (e.g. Schram & Sonnemans, 2011; Masclet et al., 
2009; Wang & Johnston, 1995). The advantage of this approach is that the information 
on which choices can be based is explicitly stated and always presented in the same 
way to participants. However, findings using this approach do not always translate 
very well to real-life risk-taking behavior (Coppola, 2014). Alternatively, in the field of 
psychology risky decision making is frequently studied with implicit tasks in which 
probabilities of outcomes are unknown to the participant (Lejuez et al., 2002; Bechara 
et al., 1994). These implicit tasks have the advantage of a relatively high predictive value 
of real-life risk-taking behaviors (Bechara et al., 2001; Cavedini et al.,, 2002; Lejuez et 
al., 2002, Lejuez et al., 2003; Linnet et al., 2006), but suffer from intractability of the 
actual parameters that subjects base their choices on.
In the present study, we seek to obtain the best of both worlds by integrating a 
description-based risky decision-making task into a dynamic, affectively engaging, and 
life-like virtual driving context. In this manner, the risky decision-making task that will 
be administered will be more ecologically valid, but at the same time consist of clearly 
defined probabilities and magnitudes of outcomes that are identical across participants. 
Ultimately, we expect that such a measure will better capture real-life risk-taking 
tendencies, which will be examined in this study by self-reported real-life risk-taking 
propensity (DOSPERT; Blais and Weber, 2006). 
Examples of implicit measurements to assess risky decision making include tasks 
such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) or the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). The BART involves pumping up balloons to earn money. 
With each pump, not only the amount of money that is gained increases, but also the 
likelihood that the balloon will explode, and the money gained on that trial is lost. The 
IGT involves selecting cards from 4 decks, with decks A and B being associated with 
higher immediate gains as compared to decks C and D, but also with higher long-term 
losses. Choosing from these decks is therefore deemed risky (Bechara et al., 1994). In 
the long run, choosing a card from decks C or D is the most advantageous strategy. 
It has been proposed that implicit tasks are superior in predicting real-life risk taking 
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because such tasks are affectively engaging, thereby mimicking the affective aspects 
of real-life risk taking (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Van Aken, 2014; Figner & Weber, 2011; 
Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Indeed, performance on the 
BART and IGT successfully predict self-reported real-life risk-taking behaviors such 
as smoking, seatbelt usage, alcohol consumption, substance use and pathological 
gambling (Fernie et al., 2010; Lejuez et al., 2002, Lejuez et al., 2003; Linnet et al., 2006; 
Bechara, Damasio, & Anderson,  2000; Bechara et al., 2001; Cavedini et al., 2002; 
Weafer , Milich, & Fillmore, 2011). 
Although the predictive power of these implicit tasks with regard to real-life risk 
taking behaviors is relatively high, the probability distributions of possible outcomes 
are not explicitly stated but have to be learned or guessed, which makes it difficult to 
identify on what information choices are based (see for a review, Schonberg et al., 2011; 
Fox & Tannebaum, 2011). Another limitation of these tasks is that outcome probability 
and expected value are often confounded, as both change concurrently across trials. 
In contrast to implicit measures, the components underlying risky decision making 
in descriptive-based tasks are explicitly and formally defined in accordance with utility-
based models (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Researchers that rely on these 
formal behavioral models often conceptualize risky decision making as a choice between 
lotteries that have clearly defined probability distributions, with risk seeking behavior 
defined as the preference for a high variance prospect over a sure outcome of equal or 
higher expected value (Fox, & Poldrack, 2009). The strength of this description-based 
approach is that the information about probabilities and magnitudes of outcomes 
are explicitly stated and do not have to be learned or guessed, which means that all 
participants can make well-informed choices on basis of the same information. Despite 
these advantages, few of these description-based approaches have been successfully 
linked to real-life risk taking (Coppola, 2014), although see for exceptions (Barsky et 
al., 1997; Pennings & Smidts, 2000).  
Research indicates that in real life, risk taking depends on both cognitive and 
affective/motivational processes (Gray, 2004; Koeneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009; 
Somerville & Casey, 2010). A drawback of explicit lottery tasks is that performance 
predominantly relies on executive functions (Brand et al., 2004; Brand et al., 2006), 
which means that the affective component of risk taking is not necessarily present 
during performance on these tasks. This may explain why such tasks have a relatively 
low predictive value of real-life risk taking. 
To summarize, risky decision making as measured by affectively engaging tasks 
such as the IGT and BART correlates well with real-life risk taking, but it is difficult to 
identify the information on which decisions on such tasks is based. Description-based 
lottery tasks, on the other hand, are perfectly tractable but correlate less well with risky 
behaviors in real life, probably due to the absence of affective involvement during task 
performance. Obviously, a measure of risk taking is required that has both advantages: 
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it should be clear on what information choices are based, but at the same time it should 
have predictive value with regard to real life risk-taking (Schonberg et al., 2010). Such a 
measure should be dynamic and affectively engaging, because real-life risk taking also 
occurs in dynamic contexts and often involves affective processes (e.g., exceeding the 
speed limit while driving or the decision to engage in unsafe sex). At the same time, 
such a task requires that the provided information about choices and outcome is clearly 
and explicitly stated and does not vary across participants.
 Recently, first steps have been taken to develop behavioral measures of risk taking 
that might meet these requirements (Figner et al., 2009; Plescak, 2008). The Colombia 
Card task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009) involves turning over cards from a deck of 32 cards in 
total. The task consists of an affectively engaging ‘hot version’ with immediately provided 
feedback after each card selection. A given trial ends when a “loss” card is encountered 
or when the participant decides to quit and collect the accumulated gain associated 
with the selected “gain” cards. This version is contrasted with a more abstract ‘cold 
version’ in which participants have to decide on the total number of cards they want 
to draw from each deck and feedback on the outcomes is not provided until after task 
completion. Importantly, the underlying probability distribution and associated values 
of the possible outcomes on this task are explicitly stated but its predictive value of 
real-life risk taking has not yet been determined.  
Another example is the Angling Risk Task (ART; Plescak, 2008) that was developed 
to address difficulties with interpreting performance on the BART. In the so-called 
“sunny day, catch-and-release” version, participants can choose to fish out of a clear 
pond with a visible distribution of 9 good yellow-colored fish and 1 bad red-colored 
fish. On each trial, participants can choose to fish or cash out. In contrast to the BART, 
the distribution of good and bad fish remains constant across trials. Optimal decision 
making on this version of the task was found to be negatively associated with real-life 
risk taking as measured by the DOSPERT (Congdon et al., 2013). 
In the present study, we contribute to these efforts with a behavioral measure 
that is dynamic and affectively engaging, yet with explicitly stated information on 
which choices can be based, to avoid outcomes that are the result of differences 
in learning or guessing. To this end, we developed a VR task, namely the Simulated 
Driving Task (SDT), which is designed to be a dynamic and affectively engaging risky 
decision-making measure, yet with clearly defined probability distributions of possible 
outcomes. In contrast to risk measures available to date, the virtual environment of the 
SDT establishes an immersive experience that will enhance the affective engagement 
of participants. At the same time, the choices in the SDT were constructed from a 
standard list of lottery choices with clearly defined expected values and probability 
distributions. The main distinguishing feature of the SDT, in comparison to a standard 
lottery task, is that instead of simply choosing between two prospects that differ in 
expected value and variance (as in a standard lottery task), the SDT involves driving 
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a virtual car and deciding between overtaking or not, while running the risk that the 
overtake attempt will be unsuccessful and result in a crash. 
To be able to compare performance on the SDT with traditional risky choice measures, 
we also administered a description-based task, namely a Lottery Task (LT), in which 
expected values and probabilities of the outcomes were exactly the same as in the 
SDT. In addition, the Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale (DOSPERT; Blais and Weber, 
2006) was administered as a measure of real-life risk-taking propensity, across different 
domains (see also Congdon et al., 2013). In this way, performance on both tasks and 
their predictive value of real-life risk taking can be compared. Based on the dynamic 
VR nature of the SDT, we expect this task to be more dynamic and affectively engaging 
as compared to the Lottery task and hence, a better predictor of real-life risk taking. 
Methods
 
Participants
One hundred thirteen healthy participants (39 males) between 18 and 29 years of 
age (M = 21.13, SD = 2.45) in possession of a valid driver’s license for at least 1 month 
(Myears = 2.73, SDyears = 2.00) were recruited at the Radboud University Nijmegen and 
participated either for study credits or monetary compensation.  
Procedure
To be able to participate, participants had to subscribe with an invitation code that 
they received by e-mail after they had filled out an online version of the revised Domain 
Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT; Blais and Weber, 2006), to capture risk-taking 
tendencies in real life. This 30-item scale measures the likelihood of risky behaviors 
in five different domains in a range between 1 (extremely unlikely) and 7 (extremely 
likely): financial (e.g., “Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event”), 
health/safety (e.g., “Drinking heavily at a social function”), recreational (e.g. “Taking a 
skydiving class”), ethical (e.g., “Passing of somebody else’s work as your own”) and 
in the social domain (e.g., “Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting 
at work”). Responses on the items of the subscales (5 items each) were also summed 
to obtain a total score of risk taking tendencies
Upon arrival at the Radboud Immersive Virtual Environment Research lab (RIVERlab), 
participants were asked to show their driver’s license. Next, participants were informed 
that they would be required to complete two tasks, the LT and the SDT (described 
below). Participants were alternately assigned to one of two tasks, with about half of 
the participants (n = 58) performing the SDT first. In both tasks, participants had to 
decide between safe and risky choice options on each trial. Participants were told to 
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treat each trial independently and that they would be paid according to their choices 
in two randomly selected trials (one from each task). It is important to note here that 
the choices in both tasks were identical; the only differences between the tasks were 
the context in which choices were made (a driving simulation vs. a simple lottery task) 
and that the values of the choices were framed as meters or Euros respectively. Note 
that participants were fully informed beforehand that for each task, one trial would be 
randomly selected and that although values were represented as meters in the SDT, 
the value associated with the winning trial on this task would be exchanged for Euros 
according to a 1:1 ratio. The participant would receive the average of the values obtained 
from the two selected trials at the end of the experiment. 
To administer the SDT, participants were seated behind a table with a Logitech game 
steering wheel installed. After reading the instructions thoroughly, participants were 
asked for their informed consent. During the practice sessions and the experimental 
task, participants wore a stereoscopic head-mounted display (HMD) which is a Virtual 
Reality (VR) helmet with computer displays in it that allow the participants a 60° diagonal 
field-of-view. Wearing the HMD enables one to feel immersed in the virtual environment. 
After several practice sessions during which the participant could get used to the virtual 
environment and the handling of the steering wheel, the experimental sessions were 
completed while the experimenter was outside the room. The simulated driving task 
had a total duration of approximately 10 minutes.
To administer the LT, participants were seated behind a table with a laptop on it. 
After participants had read and understood the instruction they gave their informed 
consent and started the experimental sessions of the task while the experiment leader 
was outside the room. Although both tasks consisted of an equal number of trials, the 
less complex nature of the LT -as compared to the SDT (pressing buttons instead of 
driving on a virtual road) resulted in a shorter total duration, namely approximately 3-5 
minutes. 
After both tasks were completed, participants were shown the outcomes of the 
two randomly chosen trials. These outcomes were then averaged and, in the case the 
average was positive, subjects were paid this amount via bank transfer. In case the 
average was zero, participants received nothing. After that, participants were thanked 
for their participation and received their study credits or alternatively, were compensated 
€15 for their participation.
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Figure 1.  Schematic overview of the choice options in the SDT (A) and the LT (B). 
 
Experimental Tasks
Simulated Driving Task. The displays of the HMD showed a straight 2-lane road on 
which the participant had to drive a virtual car with a steering wheel typically used for 
gaming. Before the start of the task, participants would complete a variable number of 
practice sessions depending on how fast they became skilled in controlling the virtual car. 
On each trial of this task, driving started automatically. Once driving, the participant 
would gradually approach a car driving in front of him/her in the same lane. At a fixed 
distance from this car which was reached after approximately 15 seconds, a beeping 
sound would indicate that the participant had to decide within 30 seconds to overtake 
or not. These decisions represented the risky (A) and safe (B) option respectively (Figure 
1). During the decision phase, both the participant’s car and the car in front of him/
her were programmed to maintain equal speed to keep the distance between both 
cars constant. The potential gains and probabilities associated with the two options 
(overtake or not) were displayed in the lower part of the screen during the entire trial.
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The risky option (option A) was represented by the decision to overtake the car, 
which was associated with a 50% chance to gain 30 m and a 50% chance to gain 0 
m. An overtaking attempt was initiated by pressing the left lever behind the steering 
wheel, after which the participant’s virtual car would accelerate automatically and the 
participant had to use the steering wheel to move to the left lane, overtake the car and 
after that, return to the right lane. At the same time this lever was pressed however, a 
car approached on the left lane from the opposite direction, with a 50% chance that the 
distance was either far enough or too close for the overtake attempt to be successful. 
A successful overtake attempt resulted in a gain of 30 m, whereas a crash resulted in 
0 m. The task was programmed in such a way, that on trials in which the participant 
decided to overtake and the distance of the approaching car was too close, a crash 
was unavoidable. In this case the trial immediately ended after the crash, which was 
accompanied by a crashing sound and feedback that displayed “+ 0 m” in the lower 
part of the screen for approximately 5 s. For successful overtake attempts, feedback 
was again displayed (“+ 30 m”) for approximately 5 s. after the approaching car had 
passed the participant by 100 m, which took, depending on the starting position of the 
approaching car, about 8.5 or 11.5 s after the lever had been pressed. 
The safe option was represented by the decision to keep driving behind the car on the 
right lane, and was associated with a sure gain between 3 and 30 m that varied across 
trials with intermediate steps of 1.5 m, as depicted on the lower part of the screen. The 
decision to stay in the right lane had to be indicated by pressing the right lever behind 
the steering wheel. In this case, the car of the participant was programmed to maintain 
the same speed and distance from the car driving in front of him/her. Feedback was 
presented in the lower part of the screen for a duration of approximately 5 s after the 
approaching car had passed the participant by 100 m, which took, depending on the 
starting position of the approaching car, about 8.5 or 11.5 s after the participant had 
pressed the lever. After feedback presentation the trial ended and was followed by the 
next trial. On each trial the driving simulation started from the same position after which 
the car accelerated from standstill to full speed again until it reached the car driving 
ahead and the decision phase commenced.
The SDT consisted of 19 trials presented in randomized order, in which the outcome 
of the risky option was always the result of a 50% probability to gain 30 m and a 
50% probability to gain 0 m. The outcome of the safe option was associated with a 
100% probability to gain a certain value between 3 m and 30 m, resulting in 19 unique 
randomized values across these trials with intermediate steps of 1.5 m. 
After completion of the task, the computer randomly selected one trial and that 
trial number was presented on screen, without revealing the associated outcome until 
after completion of both tasks (SDT and LT). 
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Lottery task. Trials of the LT were presented on a laptop screen. On each trial, two 
options (A and B) were presented with the exact same values and associated probabilities 
as in the SDT, but in Euros instead of meters and without the dynamic driving context 
(Figure 1). Similar to the SDT, the LT consisted of 19 trials. The probabilities and the 
values of both options were illustrated by red and blue portions of two pie charts with 
the associated values and probabilities displayed on these portions and additionally, 
in written text below each diagram. The two options were presented in the centre of 
the screen with a minimum duration of 1000 ms, until the participant chose one of the 
options by pressing one of the corresponding buttons “A” or “B” on the keyboard (self-
paced). After the response, feedback was presented for a duration of 1500 ms, after 
which a next trial would start immediately. Trials were presented in random order and had 
a total approximate duration of 2 minutes. Similar to the SDT, the outcome of the risky 
option was always the result of a 50% probability to gain €30 and a 50% probability 
to gain €0. The outcome of the safe option was associated with a 100% probability to 
gain a certain value between €3 and €30, resulting in 19 unique randomized values 
across these trials with intermediate steps of €1.50. 
After completion of the task, the trial number randomly selected by the computer 
was presented on screen, again without revealing the associated outcome. At the 
end of the experiment, outcomes of both tasks were revealed and in case of the SDT, 
converted to Euros. The final amount gained by the participant would be the average 
of the two outcomes on both tasks. 
Data analysis
To check for outliers, scores on the behavioral tasks and the self-report measurement 
were standardized to z-scores. A z-score of 3.29 was taken to constitute an outlier 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). This procedure resulted in the detection of one outlier-score 
on the DOSPERT scale, which was replaced by the subsequent highest observed score 
on this scale +1 (Field, 2009). In this way, the score remained the highest, but less 
extreme score. The main analyses were performed on the total scores of the DOSPERT 
(Cronbach’s α = .82). 
To check whether risk taking differed between tasks (SDT vs. LT), and whether risky 
choices on these tasks were related to DOSPERT scores, a repeated measures ANOVA 
on the number of risky choices was conducted with task as a within-subject factor and 
DOSPERT scores entered as a covariate. An initial check for order effects revealed 
an interaction between task performance and task order F (1, 110) = 6.93, p = .010, 
indicating that the percentage of risky decision making on the SDT when administered 
as the first task (M = 24.86, SD = 2.13) was significantly higher than when administered 
as the second task (M = 19.40, SD = 2.20). This divergence in risky decisions as a 
function of task order was not observed for the LT (M = 20.18, SD = 2.20 vs. M = 
19.78, SD = 2.12, respectively). Therefore, outcomes of a between-subject analysis to 
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compare performance on the LT (n = 54) and SDT (n = 58) when administered as first 
task (thus without the possibility of responses being influenced by a previous task) are 
also reported in the results section. For this additional analysis, risky decision-making 
scores on the tasks that were administered first were submitted to a one-way ANOVA 
with task as a between subject variable and DOSPERT scores entered as a covariate. 
Finally, bivariate correlations of risky decision making on both experimental tasks 
with the subscales of the DOSPERT that measure real-life risk taking across different 
domains (health, financial, recreational, ethical, social) are also reported. 
Results         
Within-subject analyses 
Overall, the number of risky choices was relatively low (21%) and not significantly 
different between tasks (although there was a trend for a higher number of risky choices 
on the SDT as compared to the LT (F (1, 110) = 2.58, p = .11). Note that performance on 
the LT and SDT were significantly correlated (r = .72, p < .001).  However, a significant 
interaction effect was found between task and real-life risk taking as measured by the 
DOSPERT, F (1, 110) = 4.17, p = .043 (Figure 2). Following up on this interaction with 
bivariate correlations, we found that risk-taking on the SDT was significantly related 
to DOSPERT scores (r = .30, p < .001), while performance on the LT was unrelated to 
real-life risk taking as measured by the DOSPERT (r=.16, p = .086). 
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To further illustrate the interaction between task type and real-life risk taking (DOSPERT 
scores), difference scores were computed for each participant by subtracting the number 
of risky options chosen in the LT, from the number of risky options chosen in the SDT 
(Figure 3). Bivariate correlations showed that the difference in risky choices in both tasks 
was significantly related to DOSPERT scores (r = .21, p = .03), in such a way that the 
more risky choices were made in the SDT, as compared to the LT, the higher subjects’ 
scores were on real-life risk-taking propensity, suggesting that the SDT captures an 
aspect of real-life risky decision making that is not captured by the lottery task. 
Figure 3. Frequencies of difference scores of risky choices on both the SDT and LT. 
Positive scores reflect a higher degree of risk taking on the SDT as compared to the LT.
With regard to the DOSPERT subscales, risky decision making on the SDT was also 
related to real-life risk-taking propensity in the health (r = .27, p = .004) and financial (r 
= .23, p = .014) domain. Risky decision making on the LT was only related to financial 
real-life risk taking (r = .19, p = .045). For an overview of all correlations of the DOSPERT 
subscales with performance on the SDT and LT, see Table 1. 
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Table 1
Bivariate correlations between task performances and DOSPERT subscales
DOSPERT subscales
Task Financial Health/safety Recreational Ethical Social
SDT .23*  .27** .18 .13 .12
LT .19*  .15 .05 .07 .04
Note. SDT = simulated driving task; LT = lottery task; DOSPERT = Domain Specific 
Risk Taking. * p <.05, **p < .01
Between-subject analyses
A significant main-effect of DOSPERT scores was found, F (1, 108) = 6.67, p = .011, 
indicating that increased overall risky decision making on the subset of experimental 
tasks (SDT (n = 58) and LT (n = 54)) that were administered prior to the second task 
was associated with higher scores on this self-report measurement of risk-taking. 
Although the interaction effect between task and DOSPERT scores just failed to reach 
a conventional level of significance (F (1, 108) = 2.83, p = .063), follow-up bivariate 
correlations showed that a higher number of risky decisions on the SDT was related to 
higher self-reported risk-taking as measured by the DOSPERT, r = .40, p = .002, while 
this was not the case for performance on the LT, r = .07, ns. 
In contrast to performance on the LT, risky decision making on the SDT was also 
related to scores on the subscales of the DOSPERT that represent risk-taking propensity 
in the recreational (r = .39, p = .003), health (r = .29, p = .03), and financial domain (r = 
.27, p = .041). In contrast, none of the subscale scores were related to LT performance. 
For an overview of all correlations of the DOSPERT subscales with performance on the 
SDT and LT when administered prior to the second task, see Table 2. 
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Table 2
Bivariate correlations of between-subject task performances (controlled for order) and 
DOSPERT subscales
DOSPERT subscales
Task Financial Health/safety Recreational Ethical Social
SDT  .27*  .29* .39**  .08 .03
LT  .12  .16  -.09  .05 .03
Note.To control for order effects, performances were only included when the task was 
administered first. SDT = simulated driving task; LT = lottery task; DOSPERT = Domain 
Specific Risk Taking. * p <.05, **p < .01.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate risky decision making on a task that is 
affectively engaging but at the same time allows for rational decision making based 
on explicitly stated probability distributions of possible outcomes. In this way, we were 
able to combine the strengths of the implicit approach (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002; Bechara 
et al., 2001; Defoe et al., 2014) with the advantages of the formal, description-based 
approach (e.g. Stewart et al., 2003; Weber & Milliman, 1997) resulting in a measurement 
that was motivationally salient, but also contained clearly defined underlying mechanisms 
of the choice process (Fox and Tannebaum, 2011; Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). 
We found that, in contrast to choices on the LT, choices on the SDT were significantly 
predictive of real-life risk-taking propensity as measured by the DOSPERT. In turn, this 
risk-taking propensity was significantly related to the difference in risk-taking between 
the two tasks (relatively more risky choices in the SDT as compared to the LT were 
associated with higher DOSPERT scores), suggesting that the SDT captures an aspect 
of real-life risky decision making that is not captured by the LT. Additional between-
subject analyses converged with the outcomes of the within-subject analyses, and 
were similarly in favor of the assumption that an affectively engaging task in which the 
advantages of implicit and description-based designs are combined may serve as a 
better instrument to predict real-life risk-taking propensity. 
Finally, risky decision making in the SDT was related to risk-taking propensity in 
several subdomains of the DOSPERT. This was specifically apparent in the health 
domain, but also in the financial and recreational domain when controlled for task 
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order.  Risky decision making on the LT was only related to real-life risk taking in the 
financial domain. Apparently, by examining risky decision making with the SDT, real-life 
risk-taking tendencies across different domains were better captured. 
This study provides a starting point to combine the best of both implicit and 
descriptive-based task designs in investigating the underlying mechanisms of risky 
decision making and subsequently, real-life risk taking. The importance of examining the 
role of affective engagement in risky decision making has been previously emphasized 
by several influential theoretical accounts (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007; 
Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
According to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis as proposed by Loewenstein and 
colleagues (2001), which is formulated on basis of ample findings in experimental 
psychology, people’s responses to risk depend on (1) cognitive evaluation of probabilities 
and values of outcomes and (2) emotional reactions to risk that are not necessarily 
cognitively mediated. Zajonc (1980) was one of the first to demonstrate the automaticity 
and speed of affective reactions to a stimulus, occurring prior to cognitive evaluations 
of that stimulus (e.g., a fearful reaction to unexpected noise without knowing its source) 
which may guide information processing and subsequent decision making. According to 
Loewenstein et al. (2001), affective reactions to risk are largely insensitive to variations 
in probability but are influenced by other factors, such as the vividness with which a 
specific outcome can be imagined, previous experience or time pressure. 
A similar theoretical account proposes that people frequently use an “affect heuristic” 
to guide subsequent decision making (Slovic, et al., 2005; Slovic et al., 2007). According 
to this framework, experienced affect is used as information in the decision process, 
which is specifically useful when decisions are complex and weighing all the pros 
and cons is a less efficient strategy. Variation in probability is thought to become less 
important for decisions when associated outcomes have strong affective meaning. 
Indeed,  “affect-rich” outcomes (e.g., winning a coupon worth $500 that could be 
spend on a vacation) have been shown to result in more pronounced overweighting of 
small probabilities and underweighting of small probabilities as compared to “affect-
poor” outcomes (e.g., winning a coupon to spend on tuition payments; Rottenstreich 
and Hsee, 2001). 
The importance of anticipatory affect in risky decision making has also been 
highlighted by the somatic marker hypothesis, (Damasio, 1994; Damasio et al., 1991), 
which holds that anticipatory affective responses to events, which are activated by 
prior similar experiences, guide subsequent decisions in risky and uncertain contexts 
(Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio, 1994). This theory was formulated 
based on observations of suboptimal decision making in patients that are emotionally 
impaired (primarily due to ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage) in comparison 
to normal controls, despite normal cognitive capacities (Damasio, 1994; Bechara, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 2000, Bechara and 
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Damasio, 2005). Based on their experimental studies and observations, Bechara and 
Damasio (2005) argued that knowledge and reasoning by itself are not sufficient for 
optimal decision making, but that anticipatory affect facilitates the process of making 
fast and advantageous decisions. 
Research from various disciplines indicates that in real life, balancing risk and 
rewards depends on the interaction between cognitive and affective/motivational 
processes (Gray, 2004; Koeneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009; Somerville and Casey, 
2010). As previously mentioned, risky decision making on implicit tasks is thought to 
involve affect because task information has to be derived from experience (Defoe et al., 
2014). Research has also demonstrated that explicit gambling tasks can be performed 
well by predominantly relying on executive functions and do not necessarily involve 
affective processing (Brand, Labudda et al., 2004; Brand et al., 2006). This implies that 
in principle, decisions in the SDT can be made by relying on executive functioning as 
this task has explicitly stated rules. However, this task was designed in such a way that 
decisions were to be executed in a dynamic and engaging context. Motivationally salient 
contexts may interfere with cognitive control processes, thereby modulating risk taking 
tendencies (Gray, 2004; Somerville and Casey, 2010). For example, Figner, Mackinlay, 
Wilkening, and Weber (2009) showed that risk taking was negatively associated with 
task information use, but only on the affectively engaging version of the Colombia Card 
Task (CCT), which is an explicit risky decision-making task. We believe that cognitive 
and affective processes may similarly have interacted during SDT performance.
Decision strategy preferences are known to vary across individuals (e.g., Pachur 
and Galesic, 2013) and in contexts with explicit rules may result in reliance on explicit 
knowledge of the decision-context, reliance on experience and affective responses, or 
a mixture of both (Brand et al., 2006). We expected that such individual differences in 
decision-strategies would be optimally captured by the SDT and hence, better reflect 
one’s real-life risk-taking tendencies. In our view, the results of our study provide support 
for this idea, by showing that, in contrast to a static lottery task, performance on the 
SDT was more strongly associated with real-life risk-taking propensity. 
A final relevant issue to be mentioned is that apparently, risk taking on the SDT 
differed as a function of task order. Specifically, risky decision making on the SDT 
when preceded by the LT was substantially lower than risky decision making on the 
SDT when it was administered first. Presumably, participants who had completed 
the LT prior to the SDT recognized the otherwise identical choice format, which may 
have motivated them to respond consistently, thereby dampening the impact of the 
affective engagement. This interpretation is supported by the finding that performance 
on the SDT was not related to real-life risk-taking propensity when administered as 
second task. Conversely, performance on the LT was only related to real-life risk-taking 
propensity when administered as second task (indicating that performance on this task 
was influenced by performance on the preceding SDT). To obtain a complete picture, 
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it was necessary to report both the within- and between-subject analyses. Despite 
some differences in strength, the direction of findings of the latter analysis supported 
the initial within-subject results.
To our knowledge, the present study is one of the first attempts to compare the 
descriptive-based approach to risky decision making to an identical approach embedded 
in a dynamic and affectively engaging VR context and subsequently, to examine the 
relation between performance on those tasks to real-life risk-taking tendencies. By 
making the probabilities and magnitudes of outcomes explicit and identical across 
tasks, we were able to investigate the additive effect of affective engagement by means 
of an immersive and dynamic VR driving experience, which users tend to perceive as 
comparable to real world situations (Weiss and Jessel, 1998). The present study showed 
that it is possible to investigate risky decision making with a task that is predictive in 
terms of real-life risk-taking propensity, while still being tractable in terms of parameters 
that choices are based on.

4
 
Neural mechanisms of cognitive control and attention 
underlying risky choice in a Simulated Driving Task
Based on:
Kostermans, E., Bekkering, H., & Boksem, M.A.S. (submitted) Neural mechanisms of  
cognitive control and attention underlying risky choice in a virtual driving task.
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Abstract
Everyday risk-taking behaviors are associated with potential negative consequences, 
which is especially true for risk taking in traffic. A number of real-life risk-taking behaviors 
have been associated with diminished cognitive control, including risky driving. In 
the current study, we aimed to get more insight into the cognitive processes involved 
in risk taking by recording oscillatory brain activity associated with risky and safe 
decisions in a dynamic and engaging but still well-controlled  driving task. We found 
that reduced mid-frontal theta activity was associated with making risky choices, i.e. 
overtaking with the risk of a car-crash. Trait impulsivity modulated mid-frontal theta 
activity in response to increasing risk, i.e. an increased probability of crashing: while 
low-impulsive individuals showed an increase in theta activity with increasing risk, this 
response was absent in high-impulsive individuals. The current study provides evidence 
that diminished cognitive control promotes risk-taking tendencies and suggests that 
risk-related personality traits may differentially modulate cognitive processes associated 
with risky choice.
Keywords: EEG, risky decision making, Simulated Driving Task, cognitive control, attention 
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Introduction
Everyday risk taking refers to behavior that is associated with some probability of 
undesirable consequences (e.g., Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Palmgren, & Jacobs-
Quadrel, 1993). A prime example of such behavior is reckless and risky driving. To 
illustrate, in 2010, speed-related crashes were associated with 800,000 injuries and 
10,536 fatal accidents in the US (Blincoe, Miller, Zaloshnja, & Lawrence, 2015).
Diminished cognitive control appears to be a key factor underlying the tendency to 
engage in risky driving (Barkley, Murphy, Dupaul, & Bush, 2002; Jongen et al., 2012) 
as well as other risky behaviors such as substance abuse, risky sexual behavior, or 
excessive gambling (De Wit, 2009; Marazziti et al., 2008; Pharo, Sim, Graham, Gross, & 
Hayne, 2011). Here, we aim to get more insight into the cognitive processes involved in 
risk taking by recording oscillatory brain activity associated with risky and safe decisions 
in a dynamic and engaging, but still well-controlled driving task. 
Executive functions such as response inhibition, memory updating, task switching 
and selective attention comprise the cognitive control system (e.g., Niendam et al., 2012), 
which can be described as a top-down control mechanism subserved by the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), that modulates lower level sensory, memory or motor operations in order 
to guide and improve intentional goal-directed behavior (Miller, 2000; Niendam et al., 
2012). A lack of cognitive control results in behavior driven by reflexive responses (Miller, 
2000), and a shift in balancing risk and reward in choice behavior (Gray, 2004). Indeed, 
impaired cognitive control seems to be associated with uninhibited, impulse-driven 
behavior (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, De Wit, & Ersche, 2012). 
The importance of adequate implementation of cognitive control for optimal decision 
making under risk has been demonstrated by studies in which a gambling task with 
explicit and stable rules was administered (Brand, Labudda, & Markowitch, 2006; Cokely 
& Kelly, 2009; Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2012). This Game of Dice 
Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005) requires participants to decide between alternatives with 
known probabilities of outcomes that are associated with explicitly stated values in terms 
of gains and losses. Performance on this task revealed that disadvantageous decisions 
were associated with poor cognitive control (Brand et al., 2006). For example, patients 
suffering from Parkinson’s disease who were not impaired in executive functioning made 
more advantageous decisions on the GDT as compared to similar patients with executive 
function deficits (Brand et al., 2005). Based on these findings, Brand and colleagues (2006) 
argued that for optimal decision making, cognitive control is crucial for the successful 
integration of knowledge of the underlying components of the decision-making process 
in terms of probabilities and values of outcomes, with factual knowledge in this domain 
and experience in similar situations. 
Although explicit gambling tasks have provided valuable insights in the role of 
the underlying constructs of risky decision making in terms of reward outcomes and 
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probabilities (for an overview, see Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Van Aken, 2014), there 
is scant evidence that such measures are actually predictive of real-life risk taking 
(Schonberg, Fox & Poldrack, 2011; Fox &Tannenbaum, 2011). Explicit gambling tasks 
can be performed well by predominantly relying on cognitive processes (Brand et 
al., 2006). In real life however, balancing risk and rewards typically depends on the 
interaction between cognitive control and affective/motivational processes (Gray, 2004; 
Koeneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009; Somerville & Casey, 2010). Motivationally salient 
contexts may interfere with cognitive control processes, thereby increasing risk-taking 
tendencies in these contexts (Gray, 2004; Somerville & Casey, 2010). For example, 
activity in nucleus accumbens, a subcortical brain structure that has been associated 
with reward processing and positive affect (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 
2005, Knutson, Katovich, & Suri, 2014), which has been found to increase prior to risky 
choices (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). Moreover, sensitivity to reward cues as reflected 
by increased activity in this brain structure was related to increased real-life risk taking 
(Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2007). 
Risky decision making has also been investigated by administering implicit tasks such 
as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) and the Iowa Gambling 
task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson., 1994). On such implicit tasks, 
probabilities of possible outcomes are not explicitly stated and as a consequence, 
the optimal response strategy needs to be learned or guessed. To illustrate, The IGT 
involves selecting cards from 4 decks, with decks A and B being associated with higher 
immediate gains as compared to decks C and D, but also with higher long-term losses. 
Choosing from these decks is therefore deemed risky. In the long run, choosing a card 
from decks A or B is the most advantageous strategy. Implicit tasks are thought to be 
more affectively engaging (Defoe et al., 2014) and have been proven to predict real-life 
risk taking quite well (e.g., Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003; Bechara et al., 
2001). However, a drawback of these tasks is that the underlying probability distribution 
remains unknown to the participant, which makes it impossible to examine the underlying 
mechanisms of the choice process. 
So, while explicit tasks have the benefit of being decomposable in terms of the 
underlying processes and parameters, it is not clear whether they predict risk taking in real 
life that well. In contrast, implicit tasks do seem to correspond to real-life risky behaviors, 
but choices in these tasks are difficult to decompose into the underlying processes. 
To investigate behavioral risk-taking in an ecologically valid but still controlled setting, 
we recently developed an affectively engaging Simulated Driving Task (Kostermans, 
Bekkering, Spijkerman, Engels, & Boksem, 2014), that was found to be predictive of 
real-life risk-taking propensity, yet decomposable into its underlying constructs (in terms 
of an explicitly stated probabilities and values of possible outcomes). 
In the current study, we focused on the role of cognitive control at the moment of 
risky and safe choices in the dynamic and engaging risky context of the Simulated 
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Driving Task, in which participants were required to make repeated choices to overtake 
a car driving ahead in the same lane (risky choice) or to stay in the right lane (safe 
choice). Unlike safe choices, initiated overtaking attempts were associated with a high 
reward value but also with the risk to crash into an oncoming car and gain nothing. 
Importantly, probabilities and expected values associated with risky and safe choices 
were made explicit to participants in order to guide optimal decision making and to 
be able to investigate their role in the decision-making process. At the same time, the 
simulated driving experience enables the exposure to events that are highly risky in 
real life. Increased risky decision making on this task was previously found to be more 
strongly associated with real-life risk-taking propensity as compared to risky choices 
on a less dynamic, two-choice gambling task, despite identical and explicitly stated 
expected reward values and probabilities associated with possible outcomes on both 
tasks (Kostermans et al., 2014). Decision-strategy preferences in real life (i.e., reliance 
on explicit knowledge of the decision context, reliance on experience and affective 
responses, or a combination thereof) and the cognitive control processes involved (Brand 
et al., 2006) may be optimally captured by a dynamic and engaging risky decision-making 
task such as the Simulated Driving Task.
We focused on oscillatory brain activity, specifically activity in the theta (4-8 Hz) and 
alpha (8-12 Hz) frequency bands, which have been associated with cognitive effort, attention 
and performance (Başar, Başar-Eroglu, Karakaş, & Schürmann, 2001; Klimesch, 1999). 
During active cognitive processing, alpha activity tends to decrease or desynchronize, 
whereas theta activity increases or synchronizes as a function of cognitive effort (Başar 
et al., 2001; Klimesch, 1999; Gevins, Smith, McEvoy, & Yu, 1997). Synchronization 
refers to the concurrent activation of a large number of neurons that oscillate with high 
amplitudes and relatively slow frequencies, whereas desynchronization implicates neural 
activity with lower and relatively fast-going amplitudes (Steriade et al., 1990). 
Midfrontal theta activity appears to originate predominantly from the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; Wang, Ulbert, Schomer, Marinkovic, & Halgren, 2005), a brain structure that 
is thought to play important role in decision making and specifically, control over action 
selection (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Mid-frontal theta has been suggested to signal 
the need for cognitive control (see for a review, Cavanagh & Frank, 2014) in uncertain 
situations such as during stimulus and response conflict (Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, 
& Stürmer, 2012), error processing (Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004) and decision making 
(Jacobs, Hwang, Curran, & Kahana, 2006; Womelsdorf, Vinck, Leung, & Everling, 2010). 
In relation to decision making, increases in mid-frontal theta activity has been argued to 
reflect the synchronization of goal-relevant information (e.g., task rule representation, 
outcome prediction, memories, sensory evidence) retrieved around critical decision points, 
such as prior to action selection (see for a review, Womelsdorf et al., 2010). Typically, 
theta power increases as a function of higher working memory demands (Gevins et al., 
1997; Jensen and Tesche, 2002), reflecting the heightened required effort needed for 
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optimal performance as tasks become more difficult.
Also posterior alpha band activity has been related to prefrontal brain areas that 
exert top-down control over attentional processes in posterior brain areas (Sauseng 
et al., 2005; Capotosto, Babiloni, Romani, & Corbetta, 2009). Alpha activity typically 
decreases in regions required for attention, and increases in areas that are not required 
when top-down control is applied (Banerjee, Snyder, Molholm, & Foxe, 2011; Kerlin, 
Shahin, & Miller, 2010; Van Ede, De Lange, Jensen, & Maris, 2011; Sauseng et al., 2005), 
(see for a review, Fox and Snyder, 2010). Evidence has accumulated that alpha activity 
represents active inhibition of cortical areas not relevant to a specific task (Jensen and 
Mazaheri, 2010; Foxe and Snyder, 2010). Specifically, alpha activity in occipito-posterior 
areas has been associated with visual attention processes (Klimesch, Doppelmayr, 
Russegger, Pachinger, & Schwaiger, 1998; Thut et al., 2006), with a decrease in activity 
in anticipation of visual stimuli (Romei, Gross, & Thut, 2010; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2006; Worden, Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 2000) that predicts visual 
perception performance (Hanselmayr et al., 2007), and an increase in activity in response 
to an inwardly-directed attentional focus (Cooper et al., 2003).
Taken together, previous research has demonstrated the role of both posterior alpha 
and mid-frontal theta in cognitive control processes. In our study, we aimed to investigate 
the role of these markers of cognitive effort in real-life-related risky decision making. 
Risk-related neural activity will be investigated by two separate approaches. First, neural 
activity in the posterior apha and mid-frontal theta frequency bands prior to decisions 
(to overtake or not) involving fixed risk (fixed risk trials) will be contrasted with neural 
activity prior to otherwise identical decisions, but without risk involved (control trials). 
In this way, risk-related differences in cognitive processing can be isolated. Second, 
activity in both frequency bands prior to risky decisions (overtake attempts) will be 
investigated as a function of parametrically increasing risk, by varying the probability 
that the overtake attempt will be successful (variable risk trials). Analyses of these trials 
enable us to examine potential neural differences in relation to varying levels of risk. In 
short, we expect that opting for a risky choice (overtaking) would be associated with a 
reduction of cognitive control, as compared to a safe choice (remain in the right lane) 
and would be reflected by changes in mid-frontal theta and posterior alpha activity prior 
to a risky as compared to safe choices.
With regard to the effects associated with different levels of risk, research has revealed 
quadratic effects of risk-related neural activity (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Preuschoff, 
Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006). For example, Preuschoff and colleagues (2006) showed 
that risk-related activity in the anterior insula followed a quadratic shape, with highest 
activity in anticipation of a maximal uncertain outcome (p = .5), and lowest activation 
in response to certainty (p = 0 and p = 1). Similar uncertainty-related activity during 
outcome anticipation has been observed in the ACC (Critchley, Mathias & Dolan, 2001). 
Decision uncertainty may also induce pre-response conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
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Carter, & Cohen, 2001), which is reflected by increased ACC activity prior to a choice, 
signaling a need for attentional and cognitive control (Milham et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). As the need 
for cognitive control is expected to be highest for maximum decision uncertainty, we 
hypothesize that mid-frontal theta, putatively reflecting ACC activity, will be maximal 
prior to risky choices with maximal outcome uncertainty (50%), and lowest prior to 
risky choices associated with either a very high (90%) or very low (10%) probability. We 
further expect that this heightened attentional top-down control (Sauseng et al., 2005; 
Capotosto et al., 2009) when risk is at its maximum may likewise result in a stronger 
desynchronization of posterior alpha activity, prior to maximally uncertain decisions 
(see also Miller, 2000). 
Finally, as individuals tend to differ in risk-taking propensity, the potential influence 
of risk-related personality differences on pre-decision alpha and theta activity will also 
be explored. For example, impulsivity or the tendency to act without thinking has been 
specifically linked to diminished cognitive control (Dalley et al., 2011; Robbins et al., 
2012), while individuals with high sensation seeking tendencies deliberately seek out 
stimulating or rewarding experiences, and accept potential risks for the sake of the 
experience (Roberti, 2004; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Thus, individual differences 
in risk taking may result from differential motivational and cognitive processing styles 
as reflected by these risk-related personality traits. 
Methods
Participants
Forty-six healthy participants in possession of a valid driver’s license for at least one 
month (Mmonths = 40.56, SDmonths = 36.96) were recruited from the university population 
and participated either for study credits or monetary compensation. Data of two 
participants were omitted from analyses because of equipment-failure. Three additional 
datasets were discarded due to excessive artifacts in the EEG recordings. The final 
sample consisted of 42 participants (15 males) with the Dutch (n = 34) or German (n = 
8) nationality between 18 and 34 years of age (M = 21.79, SD = 3.64).
Procedure
Participants filled out an online version of the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale 
(IMPSS; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993) prior to the day of the 
experiment. Upon arrival in the EEG lab, participants were requested to show their 
driver’s license to ensure that all participants had driving experience. After participants 
had read and understood the instructions, they gave their written informed consent. 
Next, participants were requested to fill out a short questionnaire to assess self-reported 
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subjective risk attitude (e.g., Kocher & Trautmann, 2013). After application of the cap 
and electrodes necessary for the EEG recordings, participants were seated behind a 
table with a Logitech game steering wheel installed on it in front of a 27-inch monitor. 
After several practice sessions to get used to the handling of the steering wheel and the 
driving simulation, participants performed an adapted version of the Simulated Driving 
Task (Kostermans et al., 2014) while their EEG was recorded. The aim of this task was 
to repeatedly decide between overtaking the car driving in front of the participant, 
while running the risk of crashing into an oncoming car from the opposite direction 
(risky choice) or not (safe choice). Whereas the risky choice (an overtake attempt) was 
associated with varying probabilities to obtain large rewards, the safe choice (to keep 
driving in the right lane) was associated with small but certain rewards. The values of 
rewards were framed as meters. To motivate participants to perform well, they were 
informed that the computer would randomly select one of the outcomes obtained during 
the first half of the task, and one of the outcomes obtained during the second half of 
the task. The average reward resulting from these two randomly selected trials ranged 
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 30 m. Participants were informed beforehand 
that although values were framed as meters in the Simulated Driving Task, the average 
value in meters associated with the selected trials on this task would be converted to 
Euros according to a 1:1 ratio, and in addition to standard compensation, paid out to 
the participant after task completion. Taking into account a 5-minute break in between 
the first and second half and variable decision speed, it took participants approximately 
50 minutes to complete the task.
Risk related personality differences
To examine impulsive and sensation seeking tendencies, the 19-item Impulsive 
Sensation-seeking scale (IMPSS; Zuckerman et al., 1993) was administered, with 11 
items that asses sensation-seeking and eight items that measure impulsivity. IMPSS 
scores have been associated with various real-life risk-taking behaviors (Zuckerman & 
Kuhlman, 2000). Participants had to indicate to what extent the items applied to them 
by indicating “true” (1) or “false” (0). 
Simulated Driving Task
Participants performed an adapted version of the Simulated Driving Task (Kostermans et 
al., 2014), which was designed to create a dynamic and affectively engaging risky decision-
making context that involves driving on a simulated 2-lane straight road. Acceleration 
and driving speed of the simulated car were pre-programmed, whereas the steering 
wheel was controlled by the participant. To simulate the experience of driving a car, the 
interior of the car from a driver’s seat perspective was depicted on screen throughout 
the task (Figure 1). At the start of each trial, the simulated car was positioned in the right 
lane of a 2-lane straight road and started accelerating automatically, until a speed of 85 
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km/h was reached at which the car would continue driving. Also from the beginning of 
each trial, a second car driving at the speed of 55 km/h was positioned 50 m ahead in 
the same lane. Once driving, the participant gradually approached this second, slower 
vehicle. In the experimental conditions, a third car was programmed to approach from 
the opposite direction in the left lane. This oncoming vehicle was positioned at a starting 
distance of either 156 m (close) or from 276 m (far) away from the starting point of the trial. 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of experimental trials on the Simulated Driving Task. 
The top row (a) depicts a successful overtake attempt in the variable risk condition. 
The bottom row (b) depicts a crash in the fixed risk condition. Choice information and 
feedback that were displayed during the experimental trials on the dashboard of the 
virtual car are depicted on the right side of the figure. The top images (c) depict the 
choice information and feedback (“30 meters achieved”) in the variable risk condition. 
The bottom images (d) depict the choice information and feedback (“Crash! 0 meters 
achieved”) in the fixed risk condition. 
 The simulated car was programmed to decelerate after 31.57 m, until it reached the 
same speed as the car driving ahead, with a fixed distance of 20 m in between vehicles. 
5023 ms after the start of each trial, a beeping sound and indicators lighting up on the 
dashboard would signal that the participant could decide within a time window of 30 
s to overtake the car driving ahead or not, by pulling the left or right lever positioned 
behind the steering wheel, respectively. Once the decision was made, the beeping 
sound would stop automatically. After having pulled the left lever, the simulated car 
accelerated again to 85 km/h and the participant had to steer into the left lane to pass 
the other vehicle and return to the right lane again. Conversely, participants had to pull 
the right lever to continue driving in the right lane with the same distance and speed 
relative to the other vehicle. 
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From the start of the experimental trials, the oncoming car was positioned either 
too close (156 m ahead relative to the starting point of the trial), or far enough (276 m 
ahead relative to the starting point of the trial), and was activated to approach with 85 
km/h at the time the participant had pulled either the right (stay) or left (overtake) lever. 
In case that this oncoming car was positioned too close, an overtaking attempt would 
inevitably end by crashing into this oncoming vehicle, 3414 ms after its initiation (Figure 1). 
9500 ms after the unsuccessful initiation of this overtaking attempt, feedback 
would be displayed for 3000 ms, followed by a 1500 ms interval in which feedback was 
removed from the dashboard and not replaced by new information until the start of the 
next trial. Conversely, if the oncoming car was positioned far enough, the overtaking 
attempt would end by returning the car to the right lane successfully. 8000 ms after 
the initiation of this successful overtake attempt, or after the choice to pull the right 
lever and stay in the right lane, feedback would be displayed again for 3000 ms and 
followed by a 1500 ms interval in which feedback was removed from the display, before 
the next trial would start. Note that feedback was displayed somewhat later after a 
crash, to bridge the time that the car needed to come to full speed again before the 
beginning of the next trial. All in all, total trial duration was approximately 12 to 14 s.
The task consisted of two experimental conditions, namely the “variable risk 
condition” (50 trials), and the “fixed risk condition” (75 trials) and a control condition 
(50 trials). On each trial of both fixed and variable risk conditions, the probability of a 
successful overtake attempt (risky choice) determined the position of the oncoming 
vehicle (too close or far enough), independent of the other trials. Probabilities were 
displayed on the left side of the dashboard, whereas the expected values associated 
with an overtake attempt (risky option) or the decision to stay in the right lane (safe 
option) were displayed on the right side of the dashboard, in green and blue digits 
respectively (see figure 1). The control condition served as a baseline measurement of 
decision making without risk involved. These trials were very similar to the experimental 
trials, except for different information displayed on the dashboard and the absence of 
the oncoming car, which means there was no risk involved. Importantly, trials of all three 
conditions were completely randomized and intermixed, but with the restriction that 
there were never more than 2 fixed risk trials in a row, to minimize the possibility that 
participants would figure out that the increases or decreases of the safe options in this 
condition were contingent on their previous choices on these specific trials (see below). 
Control condition. In the control condition (50 trials), participants were instructed to 
overtake the other road user on half of the trials, and to stay behind it during the other 
half of the trials. Participants were free to decide the order of these two decisions, as 
long as the frequency of occurrence was equal after task completion (ideally, 25/25). 
Participants could keep track of their decisions by looking at the dashboard that 
displayed the ratio of their choices throughout these trials. Due to the absence of 
oncoming traffic, overtake attempts were riskless in nature.
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Fixed risk condition. The fixed risk condition consisted of 75 trials (Figure 1) and 
was associated with a constant probability (50%) of the risky option and variable values 
were associated with the safe option. Values of the safe options on this task increased 
or decreased as a function of decisions made by the participant, in order to display 
choices at their individual certainty equivalent (CE). The CE refers to the certain value 
someone needs to receive to be indifferent between that value and a risky prospect 
(e.g., Kocher and Trautmann, 2013). The CE varies with an individual’s attitude towards 
risk, which means that a risk averse individual needs a higher, certain value to be viewed 
as equally desirable as a risky prospect, than a risk neutral or risk seeking individual 
would. The risky option on these trials was always associated with a 50% probability 
to overtake successfully, and a gain of + 30 m. On the first trial, the safe option was 
always associated with a gain of + 15 m. This value associated with the safe choice 
increased or decreased on the subsequent trials, depending on the previous choice 
of the participant. If the participant chose the safe (risky) option, the value associated 
with the safe option would decrease (increase) by 0.5 on each subsequent fixed risk 
trial, until the participant switched to the risky (safe) option, after which the value of the 
safe option would increase (decrease) by 0.25. The increase or decrease of the value 
associated with the safe option was further reduced with each subsequent switch 
(0.125, 0.0625, 0.03125), until a maximum of four switches, after which subsequent 
increases or decreases of this value remained constant. If participants switched less 
than four times (thus remained constant in their choice for the risky or safe option), 
the values of the safe option would continue to be decreased or increased according 
to its latest division. In this way choices on the fixed risk trials were tailored to the 
participant’s behavioral CE, or in other words, subjective risk attitude. Ideally, this 
should result in an equal number of risky and safe choices per participant. 
Variable risk condition. The variable risk condition (Figure 1) was associated with 
varying probabilities (10%, 30%, 50%, 70% or 90%) and a constant gain (30 m) for 
overtaking, and a constant probability and gain for not overtaking (100% chance of 
2 m). By varying the probabilities, neural changes as a function of increases in risk 
could be examined. The probabilities indicated the likelihood that the risky option (an 
initiated overtaking attempt) would end successfully and result in a large gain (+ 30 
m) or nothing otherwise (0 m). The safe option (continued driving on the right lane) 
always resulted in a small but certain gain (+ 2 m). 
Electrophysiological Recordings and Data Analysis
EEG was recorded with 64 electrodes (Acticap, Brain Products, Munich, Germany) 
mounted in an elastic cap and arranged according to the extended 10-20 system. 
All signals were referenced to the left mastoid and later offline re-referenced to the 
average of both mastoids. To record the horizontal electrooculogram (EOG), two 
electrodes were placed at the outer canthi of both eyes. Vertical EOGs were recorded 
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with two electrodes placed above and below the left eye. All signals were digitized 
with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Frequency analyses were performed using the Brain 
Vision Analyzer Software (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany).The data were 
first down-sampled to 250 Hz and filtered with a 0.50 Hz high-pass filter with a slope 
of 48 dB/oct., and a 120 Hz low-pass filter also with a slope of 48 dB/oct., and a 50 
Hz notch filter. EEG signals for the control, fixed and variable risk trials were time-
locked to a 1.5 sec time window prior to the response onset and analyzed separately 
for “stay” and “overtake” trials. Artifacts were detected using standard criteria and 
rejected per individual channel (i.e., only the channels that contained artefacts were 
removed from the data, not the entire segment), eye movement artifacts were corrected 
using Independent Component Analysis (Jung et al., 2000). Next, the segmented data 
were submitted to a fast Fourier transform (FFT), using a 100% Hanning window. 
Averaged spectral power within the theta (4-8 Hz) and alpha (8-12 Hz) frequency range 
were calculated for each electrode and submitted to statistical analyses. Theta power 
analyses were focused on electrode FCz where theta activity reached a maximum 
in the 1.5 s pre-decision period. Alpha power analyses were focused on electrode 
POz were alpha activity was found to be maximum in the 1.5 s pre-decision period. 
To normalize the data, both alpha and theta power values were log-transformed (a 
constant was added to the raw data to assure all generated values remained positive 
without changing its relative positions). 
Categorical responses of the IMPSS (Zuckerman et al., 1993) were reverse-scored 
when necessary, aggregated into two subscales reflecting total scores of impulsivity 
and sensation seeking separately. 
Behavioral Data. To assess differences in reaction times (RTs) between the control 
and fixed risk condition, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with 
condition (control, fixed risk) and choice (“overtake”, “stay”) entered as within-subjects 
factors.  To assess differences in RTs of risky choices in the variable risk condition, a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with probability (10%, 30%, 50%, 
70%, 90%) entered as a within-subject factor, for those participants with a minimum 
of 5 risk trials per probability level (n = 16).
Electrophysiological Data. To determine whether alpha and theta power were 
modulated in the 1.5 s pre-decision period of the fixed risk condition, activity in these 
frequency-bands measured respectively at POz and FCz were submitted to two-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs with condition (fixed risk, control) and choice (“overtake”, 
“stay”) entered as within-subject factors. 
For the variable risk condition, linear and/or quadratic modulations of parietal 
alpha-band and mid-frontal theta-band power as a function of outcome probability 
were examined in the 1.5 s interval prior to risky choices. Many participants made few 
or zero risky choices on low-probability trials. To be able to compare results across all 
probabilities and to achieve acceptable signal to noise ratios, only participants with a 
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minimum of 5 risky choices per probability level were included in these analyses (n = 
16). Activity in the alpha and theta frequency bands prior to risky choices associated 
with 5 different levels of probabilities to successfully overtake (10%, 30%, 50%, 
70%, 90%) were submitted to one-way repeated measures ANOVAs, with probability 
entered as a within subject factor. To investigate whether risk-related personality 
and/or self-reported behavioral differences modulated neural activity prior to risky 
choices, self-reported levels of impulsivity and sensation seeking were entered as 
covariates. Results of the analyses that include risk related personality differences 
that significantly interacted with pre-decision parietal alpha and/or mid-frontal theta 
activity will be reported.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
In the control condition, the majority of participants (90%) adhered to the request 
to balance their choices to stay on the right lane or to overtake, with a modus of 25 
and a range between 24 and 30. For an overview of the percentages of choices and 
crashes in the variable and fixed conditions, see Figure 2.  Note that the number of 
crashes (associated with unsuccessful overtake attempts) of the fixed risk and variable 
risk trials were for a large part dependent on the probability to crash. 
Reaction Times. When comparing reaction times in the fixed risk condition with the 
control condition, a main effect of condition was found, F (1, 41) = 4.40, p = .04. RTs in the 
control condition (M = 614.12, SD = 45.62) were significantly faster as compared to the 
fixed risk condition (M = 751.86, SD = 76.12). RTs of “overtake” and “stay” trials were not 
significantly different, F (1, 41) = .11, ns. RTs of risky choices for the different probability 
levels in the variable risk condition were not significantly different, F (4, 60) = 2.05, ns. 
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Figure 2. Percentages of overtake attempts and crashes for the separate probabilities 
of a successful overtake attempt in the variable risk condition and for the fixed risk 
condition. 
Electrophysiological Data
Fixed risk and parietal alpha power. A significant main effect of condition was 
found, F (1, 40) = 11.03, p = .002. Parietal alpha activity was lower prior to choices on 
the fixed risk trials (M = .65, SD = .06) as compared to the control trials (M = .80, SD 
= .09). In addition, alpha activity was significantly lower prior to “overtake” choices (M 
= .70, SD = .07), than prior to “stay” choices (M = .74, SD = .08),  F (1, 40) = 6.43, p  = 
.02. Condition and choice did not interact, F (1, 40) = .00, ns (Figure 3). 
Fixed risk and mid-frontal theta power. There was a significant main effect of 
condition, F (1, 40) = 4.88, p = .03. Mid-frontal theta activity was significantly lower 
prior to decisions in the fixed risk condition (M = 1.08, SD = .04) as compared to the 
control condition (M = 1.13, SD = .05). Differences in mid-frontal theta activity between 
“overtake” and “stay” trials did not reach significance, F (1, 40) = 3.57, p = .07. Most 
interestingly, a strong interaction-effect between condition and choice was found, F 
(1, 40) = 14.64, p < .001. Follow-up analyses showed that mid-frontal theta activity for 
the fixed risk “stay” trials (M = 1.14, SD = .05) was significantly larger as compared to 
the “overtake” trials  (M = 1.04, SD = .05), t(40)=3.70, p = .001 while the difference in 
control “overtake” (M = 1.13, SD = .05) and  “stay” trials (M = 1.12, SD = .05), was not 
significant, t(41)= -.25, ns. These results indicate that lower theta activity was uniquely 
associated with risky choices, see also Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Voltage differences over the scalp for “Stay” and “Overtake” trials of the Fixed 
Risk condition, for both alpha (a) and theta (b) activity that was maximum at POz and 
FCz, respectively.  Error bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM). 
Variable risk and parietal alpha-band power. The main effect of probability just 
failed to reach significance F(4, 56) = 2.47, p=  .055. However, probability was found 
to interact with sensation seeking tendencies F(1, 14) = 5.67, p=  .03;  Only those with 
high sensation seeking scores displayed a linear increase in parietal alpha activity as 
a function of probability level, which was not the case for those with low scores on 
this trait. (Figure 4).
Fixed risk condition
87
C
hapter 4 | N
eural m
echanism
s of cognitive control and attention underlying risky choice in a S
im
ulated D
riving Task
Figure 4. Topographical voltage distributions over the scalp for “overtake” trials of 
the variable risk condition (n = 16), for both alpha (a) and theta (b) activity that was 
maximum at POz and FCz, respectively (left panel). Alpha activity increased linearly 
as a function of probability (right top panel) on “overtake” trials, for those with high 
sensation seeking tendencies. Theta activity (right bottom panel) changed quadratically 
as a function of probability, with lowest values for 10% and 90% probabilities, for those 
with low impulsivity scores (a median split was performed on these personality traits for 
illustrative purposes only). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM).
Variable risk and mid-frontal theta activity. Mid-frontal theta activity displayed a 
quadratic pattern as a function of probability level, F (1, 14) = 9.43, p = .008, with low 
activity for 10% and 90% probability-levels, and highest activity for 30-70% probability, 
when uncertainty was at its maximum. Furthermore, a significant interaction was found 
between impulsivity and probability level, F (1, 14) = 8.14, p = .013. The quadratic effect 
of mid-frontal theta activity in response to probability level was only present for individuals 
with low scores on impulsivity, in contrast to those with high scores on this trait (Figure 4). 
Variable risk condition
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Discussion
In this study, neural activity was examined in real time while subjects performed 
a dynamic and engaging risky decision-making task, to obtain more insight in the 
cognitive processes involved in risky decision making as observed in real life. The 
dynamic and engaging nature of the Simulated Driving Task was expected to better 
capture the (reduced) cognitive control processes inherent to many real-life risk-taking 
situations, as compared to most standard gambling tasks (Kostermans et al., 2014).
Yet, decisions in this task could still be traced in terms of underlying probabilities and 
expected values of outcomes. 
In line with the reasoning of Brand et al. (2006) with regard to risky decision making 
in the context of explicitly defined probabilities and outcome values, decision-making 
strategies under risk can be broadly categorized as predominantly relying on cognitive 
processes (explicit knowledge of probabilities and values), predominantly relying on 
reactions to the context (based on previous experience), or based on the interaction 
between these processes. Due to the motivational salience in combination with the 
explicit rules of the decision context, we expected that individual differences in decision 
strategies (a preference for the cognitive or “experience” route, or a combination thereof) 
would be optimally captured by the Simulated Driving Task and hence, better reflect 
one’s real-life risk-taking tendencies. 
Given that real-life risk taking has been associated with a diminished implementation 
of cognitive control, we expected that mid-frontal theta activity would be reduced prior 
to risky decisions as compared to safe decisions. Our results support this prediction, 
showing that mid-frontal theta activity was reduced prior to the initiation of a risky 
choice, but not prior to a similar choice without risk involved or prior to safe choices 
(keep driving in the right lane). Importantly, this finding demonstrates that decreased 
mid-frontal theta activity was uniquely associated with preparing a risky choice, and 
not merely driven by the preparation of the required motor action involved. Mid-frontal 
theta activity has been associated with signaling the need for top-down cognitive control 
to other brain areas responsible for exerting control over actions (Cavanagh & Frank, 
2014). Therefore, our finding of diminished mid-frontal theta activity preceding risky 
choices confirms our prediction that a failure to recruit cognitive control may promote 
risk-taking behaviors. In other words, successfully engaging cognitive control may 
play an important role in the process of avoiding risk (see also Helfinstein et al., 2014). 
Indeed, Womelsdorf and colleagues (2010) reviewed evidence that theta synchronization 
prior to a choice for an alternative action over another reflects the selective retrieval 
and evaluation of choice-relevant information (e.g., task rules, the expected value 
of reward and previous similar experiences). In line with the available literature, the 
reduced mid-frontal theta activity prior to risky choices in our study may reflect a less 
elaborate evaluation of choice information, thereby promoting risk-taking behaviors. 
89
C
hapter 4 | N
eural m
echanism
s of cognitive control and attention underlying risky choice in a S
im
ulated D
riving Task
Second, attention was examined in relation to performance on the Simulated Driving 
Task, which is one of the executive functions supported by the cognitive control network 
and important for optimal task performance (Niendam, 2012). As expected, parietal 
alpha activity which is inversely related to attentional control was less pronounced 
prior to overtake maneuvers (with and without risk involved) as compared to taking no 
action (remain driving in the right lane), indicating increased recruitment of attentional 
control for choices that required most attention and control over motor actions (the 
decision to overtake required more attention and control than the decision to remain 
driving in the right lane), which is in line with the idea that goal-directed, top-down 
control may modulate the allocation of attention (Gould, Rushworth, & Nobre, 2011; 
Sauseng et al., 2005). Additionally, we expected that the higher variability of potential 
outcomes associated with the risky choice would further increase the recruitment of 
attentional resources. However, there was no significant difference in parietal alpha 
activity preceding overtake maneuvers with or without risk involved, indicating that, 
regardless of risk, reduced alpha power reflects the increase in attention for the proper 
execution of the required motor action.
Third, with regard to parametrically increasing risk in the variable risk sessions, we 
expected cognitive control and attention to follow a quadratic shape, as a function of 
outcome uncertainty. Indeed, recruitment of cognitive control appeared to be modulated 
by outcome uncertainty. Specifically, individuals with low impulsivity levels displayed 
pre-decision mid-frontal theta activity that followed a quadratic shape as a function 
of outcome uncertainty of risky choices. To be precise, mid-frontal theta activity was 
particularly enhanced prior to risky choices associated with relatively high outcome 
variability (30%-70%  probability) in these individuals. These findings indicate that 
individuals low on impulsivity recruited more cognitive control resources prior to risky 
decisions associated with highly uncertain outcomes, than prior to risky decisions 
associated with less variable outcomes. Conceivably, experienced pre-decision conflict 
was highest for decisions associated with maximal uncertain outcomes in this group. 
This finding is consistent with previous research showing that the need for cognitive 
control in conflict situations is associated with an increase in theta power (Cohen, & 
Cavanagh, 2011; Nigbur, Ivanova, & Sturmer, 2011).  In line with this, the main generator 
of theta activity, the ACC, is thought to be responsible for conflict detection and the 
subsequent signaling of the need for cognitive control to other brain areas that are 
responsible for exerting control, such as lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC), (Botvinick et 
al., 2001; Botvinick et al., 2004; Shenhav et al., 2013).  Results of the current study 
suggest that recruitment of cognitive control was optimal in individuals with low 
impulsivity scores, but hampered in highly impulsive individuals, who do not show a 
similar increase in theta response to the most uncertain situations. This finding supports 
the idea that the heightened tendency of impulsive individuals to engage in real-life 
risk taking (Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000) can be explained by decreased top-down 
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cognitive control capacities (Dalley, et al., 2011; Robbins, et al., 2012).  
With regard to modulations of attention, activity in parietal alpha activity in high 
sensation seeking individuals was parametrically enhanced as a function of an increased 
likelihood of a positive outcome, indicating a decrease in attention to highly probable 
positive events. These outcomes show that sensation-seeking tendencies may modulate 
attention as a function of risk. Interestingly, sensation seeking has been associated 
with a preference to attend to stimuli that elicit greater sensory, affective or arousing 
responses (Donohew et al.,, 2000; Palmgreen, Donohew, Lorch, Hoyle, & Stephenson, 
2001) and with relatively low levels of experienced anxiety before engaging in risky 
activities (Zuckerman, 1994). This suggests that, for individuals with a higher need for 
sensation, the decision to initiate an overtake attempt may have become less exciting or 
interesting as the probability to crash decreased, resulting in a progressively diminished 
recruitment of attentional resources. This decrease in attention was not observed for 
low sensation seeking individuals, who showed relatively high levels of engagement 
regardless of the level of risk involved. Taken together, these findings demonstrate 
that individual differences in risk-related personality traits may modulate cognitive 
processing in risky decision making. 
A limitation of the current study is that although the complete sample was used for 
the main analyses, the analyses of oscillatory brain activity as a function of parametrically 
increasing risk were based on risky decisions of individuals who made sufficient risky 
choices for all probability levels, thereby excluding the most risk averse individuals. 
Therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting the neural activity and personality 
differences associated with risky decisions in the variable risk condition. 
Taken together, the present study demonstrates the role of cognitive control and 
attentional processes in risky decision making related to real-life risk taking. Our 
main finding indicates that diminished cognitive control increases the likelihood to 
make risky choices. This finding suggests that cognitive control capacity may be an 
important determinant of (unintended) risk-taking behaviors in real life. This has already 
been demonstrated in relation to severe levels of impulsivity such as often prevalent 
in individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which is robustly 
associated with impaired cognitive control (Dalley et al., 2011; Robbins et al., 2012). 
However, lapses in cognitive control may occur to anyone in response to factors such 
as fatigue (Lorist, Boksem, & Ridderinkhof, 2005), distraction (Engle, 2002), or when 
in an emotional state (Gray, 2001). The adequate implementation of cognitive control 
is crucial for everyday complex behaviors, such as for driving safely through traffic. 
A temporary state of diminished cognitive control may easily result in poor decision 
making and unintended risk taking, such as speeding or running a red light.
Finally, individuals with low impulsivity levels showed that the recruitment of 
cognitive control was modulated by outcome uncertainty, with maximally engagement 
of cognitive control processes prior to risky choices with the highest variance in 
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outcomes. In contrast, individuals with high impulsivity levels failed to show this important 
modulation of cognitive control. In addition, high sensation seeking was associated 
with a diminished recruitment of attention for risky choices with a high likelihood of a 
successful outcome, which could be detrimental in real life because even when risk 
is low, harmful outcomes could still occur. Zooming in on individual differences may 
prove to be of great relevance in the examination of the interplay between cognitive and 
motivational processes of risky decision making related to real-life risk taking, which 
should be further addressed in future research. 
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Abstract
 
Objective: To get more insight into the underlying components of risky decision making 
in relation to ADHD in adolescents. Method: Sixty-four adolescents with ADHD (n = 
34) and controls (n = 30) aged 12-17 performed two experimental tasks to asses risky 
decision making, namely the Simulated Driving Task (SDT) and Cake Gambling Task (CGT). 
In addition, participants performed the Go/No-go task and temporal discounting (TD) 
task. Results: Adolescents with ADHD made more risky decisions that were associated 
with maximal uncertainty and relatively high reward values, than controls. No group 
differences were found for impulsive action or choice. Whereas SDT risk taking under 
maximal uncertainty was associated with all ADHD symptoms, risky decisions for the 
highest values in the CGT were related only to hyperactivity-impulsivity. 
Conclusion: The current study demonstrates that both sensitivity to high reward value 
and outcome uncertainty may increase risky decision making among adolescents 
with ADHD.
Keywords: ADHD, adolescents, risky decision making, temporal discounting, response 
inhibition
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Introduction
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a commonly diagnosed psychiatric 
disorder in children and adolescents (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Awareness 
has grown that ADHD is a heterogeneous disorder and that multiple neurobiological 
pathways may underlie deficits in both executive and motivational processes (De 
Zeeuw, Weusten, Van Dijk, Van Belle & Durston, 2012; Sonuga-Barke, Bitsakou, & 
Thompson, 2010). 
In this context, tasks designed to measure response inhibition and temporal reward 
discounting have been useful in assessing different aspects of impulsivity in relation to 
ADHD. Impulsivity often includes both “impulsive action”, or poor response inhibition, 
and “impulsive choice”, or steep Temporal Discounting (TD) (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 
2011; Winstanley, Eagle, and Robbins, 2006). Associations between ADHD and poor 
inhibition have typically been assessed with the Stop or Go/No-go task (e.g., Lijffijt, 
2005; Rubia, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). For Temporal discounting (TD), defined as the 
devaluation of rewards as the delay to delivery increases (e.g., Critchfield & Kollins 2001; 
Monterosso & Ainslie 1999), experimental research has demonstrated that children 
and adolescents with ADHD display relatively strong preferences for small immediate 
rewards resulting in steep temporal discounting functions (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, 
Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001; Scheres, Tontsch, Thoeny, & Kaczkurkin 2010). 
Besides impulsive action and choice, ADHD has been associated with another 
component which is viewed as being part of the multifaceted construct of impulsivity 
(Robbins, Gillan, Smith, De Wit, & Ersche 2012; Winstanley et al., 2006), namely the 
tendency to make decisions without much deliberation which can result in risky decision 
making (Evenden, 1999; Dalley et al., 2011; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005). For example, 
risky decision making on the Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 
& Anderson, 1994) was increased among adolescents with ADHD (Medrano, Flores-
Lázaro & Nicolini, 2015; Toplak et al., 2005).
In real life, particularly adolescents with ADHD show a higher likelihood to engage 
in risky behaviors such as substance (ab)use (e.g., Lee, Humphreys, Flory, Liu, & 
Glass, 2011), reckless driving (Ramos Olazagasti et al., 2013), and excessive gambling 
(e.g., Thompson, Molina, Pelham, & Gnagy, 2007), and are at increased risk for fatal 
accidents (Dalsgaard, Østergaard, Leckman, Mortensen, & Pedersen, 2015). Despite 
the well-established relationship between ADHD and adolescents’ real-life risk taking, 
relatively little is known about the underlying mechanisms of risky decision making. 
A recent review (Groen, Gaastra, Lewis-Evans, & Tucha, 2013) showed that only 
half of the experimental child/adolescent studies provided evidence for increased risk 
taking in ADHD. Risky decision making is often assessed by gambling tasks that offer 
choices associated with varying rewards and probabilities. On these tasks, a risky 
decision is defined as choosing the option with the higher outcome variability, usually 
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associated with higher rewards but also a higher chance of loss or no gain (Glimcher, 
Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack 2009). The mixed findings in Groen et al. (2013) might be 
due to several disadvantages of the gambling tasks applied in previous studies. 
First, in many studies implicit tasks are administered that require the inference 
and memorization of complex rules (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994). Task complexity may 
promote guessing strategies, which could obscure potential differences in risk taking 
propensities between children and/or adolescents with and without ADHD (Huizenga, 
Crone, & Jansen, 2007; Skogli, Egeland, Andersen, Hovik, & Øie, 2014). To illustrate, 
Skogli and colleagues (2014) showed that both adolescents with ADHD and healthy 
controls performed on a chance level on the Hungry donkey task, which is a child 
version of the IGT. This could indicate that the task was too complex. Research has 
shown that optimal performance on the IGT partly depends on working memory 
capacity (Pecchinenda, Dretsch, & Chapman, 2006). According to Drechsler, Rizzo, & 
Steinhausen (2008; 2010), explicitly stated and stable task rules may minimize working 
memory demands, thereby reducing the risk of guessing strategies and allowing for a 
more emotion-driven response style.
 A second drawback of standard gambling tasks is that they might not elicit affective 
engagement to a similar degree as real-life risk taking does. Emotional responses to 
risk, which are typically elicited more easily in an affectively engaging context (e.g., 
Pachur and Galesic, 2013) may strongly diverge from rational assessments of risk, and 
influence subsequent behavior (see for a review, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 
2001). A final drawback of frequently used gambling paradigms is the concurrent 
manipulation of reward value and probability (Groen et al., 2013). Choices based on 
reward value and reward probability are both important for successful decision making 
(Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008), but are coded in separate brain areas 
(Tobler, O’ Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007). As a consequence, it is unclear whether 
risk taking in adolescents with ADHD increases as a function of reward value or is due 
to impairments in probability estimation. 
To obtain more insight into the mechanisms involved in risk taking in adolescents 
with ADHD, this study examined decision making under risk in an affectively engaging 
context with explicitly stated and stable rules (Drechsler et al., 2008; 2010), and with 
independently manipulated reward value and probability. To achieve this, a recently 
developed Simulated Driving Task (SDT) was administered. In contrast to many available 
risk taking tasks in which decisions have to be made in response to static representations 
of risk information, the SDT presents risk information in a more dynamic context, namely 
an ongoing driving simulation during which decisions have to be made. In the SDT, 
the risky decision involves the initiation of an overtaking maneuver while running the 
risk of crashing into an oncoming car. This contrasts with most risky decision-making 
tasks in which risky choices are usually made by a simple button press. Based on both 
the dynamic nature of the task and the type of decision making it requires, the SDT is 
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expected to be more affectively engaging than most other risk taking tasks. Furthermore, 
since real-life risky decisions frequently involve engaging in active responses within a 
dynamic context (e.g., driving beyond the speed limit or engaging in unsafe sex), the 
SDT might better reflect the dynamic aspects of real-life risk-taking. It is important 
to note that the SDT was not designed to mimic a real-life driving experience, which 
would require participants to be in the possession of a drivers’ license. However, this 
particular design was chosen because it requires active engagement in a dynamic and 
engaging setting. We reasoned that the required active engagement and online decision 
making in such a dynamic situation would better capture the motivational and cognitive 
processes inherent to real-life risk taking than performance on a static gambling task. In 
the SDT, the value of the risky option (points received after a successful overtake attempt) 
remains constant whereas the probability of a positive outcome (a successful overtake 
attempt) varies over trials. Thus, we could examine to what extent risk taking varied 
as a function of outcome probability on this task. We also assessed risk taking within 
the more commonly utilized gambling paradigm, by administering a slightly adapted 
version of the Cake Gambling Task (CGT) (De Water, Cilessen, & Scheres, 2014). This 
task, designed for typically developing children and adolescents, was intended to be 
simple but engaging, with explicit and simple task rules (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2008) 
which makes it a preferred measure over implicit and/or complex gambling tasks. In the 
CGT, the probability of a positive outcome remained constant, whereas reward value 
varied over trials, thereby enabling us to examine risk taking as a function of reward 
value. Additionally, measurements of response inhibition and temporal discounting were 
included to simultaneously investigate the multiple dimensions of impulsivity and their 
relation to risk taking within a single sample of adolescents with ADHD. Furthermore, 
we examined correlations between all impulsivity measures and ADHD symptom 
domains and obtained subjective task evaluations to assess whether the SDT was 
indeed perceived as engaging.
We hypothesized that (1) adolescents with ADHD would make more risky decisions 
than controls on both risk taking tasks, with the SDT differentiating best between groups, 
due to its dynamic and engaging nature; (2) adolescents with ADHD would display 
impaired response inhibition and steeper temporal reward discounting than controls; 
(3) performance on both the Go/No-go task and TD task would be positively related to 
risky decisions, because both tap into impulsivity; (4) while risky decision making would 
be more strongly related to hyperactivity-impulsivity than to inattention (Castellanos, 
Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tanncok, 2006; Toplak, 2005, Scheres et al., 2010) response 
inhibition would be most strongly associated with inattention (Chabildas, Pennington, 
& Willcutt, 2001; Nigg, Willcutt, Doyle, & Sonuga-Barke, 2005); (5) the SDT would be 
more positively evaluated than all other tasks.
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Method
Participants
Adolescents were recruited at a Dutch school for pre-vocational secondary and special 
education with a required license to provide extra educational support to children with 
behavioral/learning difficulties. Parents of 144 adolescents of whom approximately half 
were known as being diagnosed with ADHD were asked to provide written consent 
for their child’s participation in the study and to indicate whether their child had been 
diagnosed with ADHD and/or other disorders. A total of 80 parents did not respond or 
indicated not to be interested in participating. The final sample included 64 adolescents 
aged 12-17 (M = 13.9, SD = 1.25); thirty-four with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD (9 females) 
and thirty without a clinical diagnosis of ADHD (13 females) or any other disorder except 
for dyslexia and PDD-NOS (see below).
Group Characteristics
Groups were matched for age and gender and the prevalence of dyslexia and PDD-
NOS was equal in both groups (Table 1). Clearly, the group without ADHD was not a 
typically developing sample, making both groups comparable on dimensions other than 
ADHD. With regard to medication use, parents of 22 (56.9%) adolescents with ADHD 
reported that their child was taking prescribed psychostimulantia (Ritalin®, Concerta®, 
Medikinet®, dexamphetamine) and one adolescent was taking atomoxetine (Strattera®). 
Of these 22 adolescents, two were taking both psychostimulants and antipsychotics 
(risperiodon® and aripiprazol®).
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Table 1
Comorbidity as reported by parents for adolescents with and without ADHD
Comorbidity
with ADHD
n = 34
without ADHD
n = 30
Dyslexia 7 (20.6%) 7 (23.3%)
PDD-NOS 3 (8.8%)a 3 (10%)
ASD 1 (2.9%) 0
ODD and LD 1(2.9%) 0
GT 1(2.9%) 0
TTM 1(2.9%) 0
Total 14 (41.2%) 10 (33.3%)
Note. PDD-NOS = Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified; ASD 
= Autism Spectrum Disorder; ODD = Oppositional Defiant Disorder; LD = Learning 
Disorder; GT = Gilles de La Tourette; TTM = Trichotillomania. aOne of these adolescents 
was reported comorbid for PDD-NOS and for Sensory Integration Dysfunction (SID).
Procedure 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the faculty of social sciences 
of the Radboud University in Nijmegen. At the start of the study, permission was 
given by the school board to ask students to participate in the study and conduct the 
assessments at school. The school counselor informed students and their parents 
about the study and asked them if the research team could approach them to ask for 
study participation. If they did not want to be approached, they could indicate this by 
e-mail or inform the school. Those parents and adolescents who did not express a 
negative response received an information letter about the study, a short questionnaire 
and a consent form by mail. After having read all provided information about the study, 
parents and adolescents who were willing to participate were requested to both sign an 
informed consent form. In addition, these parents had to fill in questions about whether 
their child had been diagnosed with ADHD, when and by whom the diagnosis of ADHD 
was made, whether their child used medication and if so, what kind of medication and 
how often it was used, whether it was possible and whether the parents agreed that 
their child abstained from it on the morning of testing. The final question referred to 
other possible diagnoses that the parent was asked to write down in case of a positive 
answer. Additionally, parents were required to fill in a diagnostic questionnaire that 
included a DSM-based checklist for behavioral symptoms of ADHD (AVL; Scholte and 
Van der Ploeg 2005).
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Adolescents and parents who had returned the mail including their written consent 
and the abovementioned requested information were kept updated by e-mail about the 
day the adolescent was required to participate. On the day of testing, study participants 
were taken out of class into the experimental room in groups of four. Participants 
who used psychostimulant medication had been requested to abstain from it during 
that day with a minimum wash-out period of 12 hours. Adolescents had to complete 
four different computer tasks and an evaluation form afterwards. The time needed to 
perform the different parts of this study was approximately one hour per participant. 
At the end of the experiment, all adolescents were compensated with a gift voucher 
of ş10 for their participation. 
Measures
ADHD Symptoms. The AVL is a commonly used screening and diagnostic instrument 
in Dutch health care settings that assesses DSM-defined behavioral symptoms of 
ADHD with 18 items on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (“not”) to 4 (“very often”) and 
targets the dimensions of attention deficits, hyperactivity and impulsivity, and scores 
high on both reliability and internal validity (AVL; Scholte and Van der Ploeg, 2005). This 
measurement was administered to check whether the ADHD-diagnosed group indeed 
displayed higher levels of ADHD-related symptoms as compared to adolescents without 
this diagnosis. The reliability of the AVL administered to the parents in this sample was 
high (Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Tasks
Simulated Driving Task (SDT). A straight 2-lane road was displayed on the 
computer screen (Figure 1). The virtual car representing the participant was positioned 
in the right-hand lane. The interior of the car was not visible, so the participant had 
a broad view of the road in front of him/her. A sound indicated the start of each trial, 
after which the car started driving automatically, quickly reaching a fixed speed of 57 
km/h. By means of a joystick participants were able to steer to the left or right, without 
being able to alter the speed of the car. Once driving, participants gradually neared a 
car driving ahead in the same lane. At a fixed distance from that car (50 m, reached 
after approximately 15 sec.) a sound indicated that participants had to decide whether 
to overtake this car (risky choice) or not (safe choice). 
On each trial, the probability that an overtaking attempt would end successfully 
was depicted in the lower part of the screen. At a fixed distance from the car ahead, 
the overtaking attempt (risky option) could be initiated. A successful overtake attempt 
was followed by displaying positive feedback (500 points) before the start of the next 
trial. A crash would have resulted in 0 points. If the participant chose to stay driving in 
the right-hand lane (safe option), the trial ended as soon as the car from the opposite 
direction had passed by, after which feedback indicated a gain of 250 points. 
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Figure 1. Screenshots of a trial on the Simulated Driving Task.
During a 10-second interval, participants had to press the joystick button to initiate 
the overtaking attempt, or withhold a response to stay behind the car. By pressing the 
button, the car accelerated and participants used the joystick to overtake the car driving 
in the right lane, and after that, return to the right lane. Participants were not able to 
break after the button was pressed, which made an overtaking attempt irreversible. 
From the start of each trial, another car approached from the opposite direction, which 
was programmed to be either far away enough or too close for a successful overtaking 
attempt to take place. This car was not visible to the participant until after an overtaking 
maneuver was initiated or in case of a safe choice, after this car had passed by. 
The aim of the SDT was to gain as many points as possible. The task consisted of 
three conditions, during which an overtake attempt was associated with either a 20%, 
50% or 80% probability to end successfully (without crashing) and a gain of 500 points. 
The decision to overtake represented the risky choice because of its higher outcome 
variability (Figner and Weber, 2011) as compared to the decision not to overtake, which 
represented the safe choice and always resulted in a gain of 250 points. As a result, 
the expected value (reward x probability) of the risky choice varied over trials and was 
either lower (p = .20 x 500 points), equal (p = .50 x 500 points) or higher (p = .80 x 
500 points) than the expected value of the safe choice. After a successful overtaking 
attempt the trial ended after approximately 22 sec. and 535 m. If participants did not 
overtake, the trial ended after 26 sec. and 485 m. When the participant tried to overtake 
but crashed into the approaching car, the trial ended immediately after approximately 
20 sec. and 412 m. 
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Throughout each trial, the probability (20%, 50% or 80%) of a successful overtake 
attempt was displayed in the lower part of the screen by means of a green and red 
colored bar, with the probabilities associated with failure and success explicitly stated 
in each colored part. The proportion of green/red was in accordance with the probability 
of a successful overtake attempt with the associated probabilities of success/failure. In 
addition, the driving speed, covered distance and total number of successful overtake 
attempts were displayed in the lower part of the screen. After trial completion, feedback 
was presented in the lower part of the screen for 5 sec. with the text: “well done, +500” 
after a successful overtaking attempt, “well done, +250” after staying positioned on 
the right lane, or “too bad, 0 points” after a crash. Each condition (20%, 50%, 80%) 
consisted of 10 trials with respectively 2, 5 or 8 overtaking attempts that, if initiated, 
were programmed to be successful. Potentially successful and unsuccessful trials were 
presented in a fixed but randomly appearing order. 
Practice sessions were administered until the participant had become skilled using 
the joystick and fully understood the aim of the task, which took approximately 5 minutes. 
Partly depending on the decision speed of participants, the experimental trials took 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. Note that during the SDT, trial outcomes were 
independent from outcomes on previous trials. In addition, probability information was 
clearly visible throughout each trial. Together, these features were expected to minimize 
working memory demands during this task. The three highest scoring participants 
received a gift voucher of ş10 in addition to the standard compensation. To assess 
risk taking the total number of overtake attempts was computed for each condition. 
Cake Gambling Task (CGT). To investigate risky decision making in a gambling 
context with low cognitive demands and with fixed probabilities and variable monetary 
rewards, the Cake Gambling task was administered (De Water et al., 2014) (Figure 2). 
On each trial, participants were required to select one of two flavors of a cake. If the 
choice of the participant matched the choice of the computer, the participant gained 
the associated monetary value. On each trial, participants were offered a high-risk 
choice with a 33.3% probability to obtain a large monetary reward and a low-risk choice 
associated with a 66.7% probability to obtain a small monetary reward. The amount 
associated with the high-risk option was €2, €4, €6 or €8 and was always twice as 
large as compared to the amount associated with the low-risk choice. On this task, 
probabilities of the high- and low risk options were held constant whereas the value 
of the reward varied over trials, resulting in equal expected values (EV) of both options 
on each trial (e.g., €8 x 0.33 = €4 x 0.67). 
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Figure 2. Set-up of the Cake Gambling Task with correct feedback. After choosing between 
the low-risk or high-risk option, the selected square was highlighted. Subsequently 
a fixation cross was presented, followed by the outcome. Incorrect feedback would 
show the selected square with a cross through it. 
 Trials started with the presentation of a cake composed of four wedges of one color 
and two wedges of another color that were either brown (“chocolate-flavored”) or pink 
(“strawberry-flavored”). Underneath the cake, two small squares with a pink and a brown 
color were positioned on the left and right side of the screen (position counterbalanced 
across trials). In the centre of each square, a variable stack of 50-eurocent coins was 
depicted, indicating the amount associated with each flavor. During cake presentation, 
participants had to decide to gamble with one of the two flavors, by pressing the 
designated computer key. After selection, the square was highlighted by a yellow 
line surrounding it. Next, a fixation cross was presented during which the computer 
randomly selected one of the six wedges of the cake. If the flavors of the selected 
wedge and the wedge chosen by the participant matched, the participant gained the 
amount associated with that color. Gain-feedback was presented by showing the 
stack of coins the participant had gambled with whereas no-gain feedback showed 
the same stack of coins but with a cross through it. The task consisted of a total 8 
practice trials and 72 experimental trials, with 18 trials for each high-risk reward (€2, 
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€4, €6, €8) that were coupled with twice as small low-risk rewards (€1, €2, €3, €4), 
with an approximate duration of 8 minutes. Risk taking was defined as the number of 
risky choices made on the task for each condition separately. 
Similar to the SDT, trial outcomes were independent from previous trials and task 
rules were not too complex and explicitly visualized, thereby minimizing working memory 
demands. In correspondence with how well they had performed, participants received 
a large, intermediate or small reward in addition to standard compensation. 
Temporal Discounting Task (TD). A hypothetical temporal discounting task (De 
Water et al. 2014) was administered to assess preferences for immediate rewards over 
larger delayed rewards (Figure 3). On each trial, participants were asked to make a 
choice between an immediate monetary reward (IR) they could receive today, and a 
larger amount they would receive after a variable delay (DR) of 2, 14, 30, 180 or 365 
days. Options were presented on the left and right side of the screen with position 
counterbalanced across trials. Participants could indicate their choice by pressing 
the designated computer key. The selected option was highlighted by a yellow line 
surrounding it, after which a fixation cross was presented. 
The DR was always €10 whereas the amount of the IR was adjusted based 
on participants’ preferences (Du, Gree, & Meyerson, 2002; Myerson, Green, & 
Warusawitharana, 2003). If the IR was chosen, its magnitude was decreased on the 
next trial. If the DR was chosen, the magnitude of the IR was increased on the next 
trial. For each of the five delay periods, the participant made six choices. For each 
delay (2, 14, 30, 180 or 365 days), the IR was always €5 for the first choice. 
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Figure 3. Set-up of the TD Task. On each trial, the participant could choose between a 
relatively small reward today or a relatively large reward with a delay (2, 14, 30, 180, or 
365 days). The delayed reward was always €10 whereas the immediate reward varied, 
with increasing value after the DR was chosen and decreasing value after the IR was 
chosen. The participants’ choice was highlighted and after presentation of a fixation 
cross, the next trial would begin.
The degree of adjustment of the IR decreased with successive choices, such that 
the IR was adjusted by half of the difference between the IR and DR on each previous 
choice. After six successive choices, the procedure started over again with a new delay 
period for the DR. Delay periods (consisting of six successive choices in a row within 
each period) were presented in a different random order for each participant. For each 
delay period, the IR that would have been presented on a hypothetical seventh trial was 
used as the estimate of the participants’ subjective value (SV) of the DR. Subsequently, 
the SV’s were used to calculate the “area under the curve” (AUC). Calculation of the AUC 
was performed by using the procedure as outlined by Myerson et al. (2001). Values of the 
AUC ranged between 0 and 1, with smaller values indicating steeper discounting of the 
DR (and an increased preference for the IR). Before the task started, six practice trials 
were presented with a delay period of one day (which were not used in the analyses), 
after which 30 experimental trials were presented with an approximate total duration 
of five minutes. 
Go/ No-go Task. To investigate response inhibition, a Go/ No-go task was administered. 
On each trial, a picture of one of two characters from a well-known animated television 
series in the US, namely “Bart” and “Lisa” from the Simpsons, was presented in the 
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middle of the screen. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as fast as 
possible in response to one of the two characters (counterbalanced across trials) and not 
to respond to the other character. After a response, the picture immediately disappeared 
and a blank screen was presented, with a total trial duration of 1500 ms + (1500 ms-
reaction time [RT]). If no response was registered, the picture would disappear after 1500 
ms after which a blank screen was presented for another 1500 ms. Commission errors 
were used to calculate the number of errors of commission, with more errors reflecting 
poorer response inhibition. Participants completed 20 practice trials after which the 
experimental task was administered, that consisted of three blocks of 48 trials each, 
in which one third (12) of the pictures displayed one character (no-go trials) and two 
thirds (36) of the pictures displayed the other character (go-trials). In between blocks, 
participants could take a short break if they wanted and continue with the next block 
by pressing the space bar. To assess response inhibition, a sum score was computed 
of the total number of commission errors on the task.
Evaluation of Tasks
Participants rated the tasks on difficulty and liking with a scale ranging from 1 (“totally 
agree”) to 5 (“totally disagree”). Higher numbers indicated higher degrees of difficulty 
and liking. Accidentally, the temporal discounting task was not included in the evaluation. 
Data Analyses 
For the SDT, a mixed ANOVA was performed with probability (20%, 50%, 80%) of 
the risky option as repeated measure, group (ADHD vs. control) as between-subjects 
factor, and percentage of overtaking attempts as dependent variable. Similarly, for the 
CGT, a mixed ANOVA was performed with value (€2, €4, €6, €8) of the risky option as 
repeated measure, group as between-subjects factor and percentage of risky choices as 
dependent variable. Note that the analyses of risky decision making were also conducted 
with age as a covariate. As the pattern of outcomes did not change, this variable was 
omitted from the final analyses. To check whether discounting took place, repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed for the groups separately, with delay as repeated 
measure, and subjective value (SV) of the delayed reward as dependent variable. 
To examine relations between ADHD and TD, an independent t-test was conducted 
with group as independent and AUC as dependent variable. Response inhibition was 
examined by conducting an independent t-test with group as independent variable and 
number of commission errors as dependent variable. As including this variable did not 
lead to a different pattern of results, age was omitted from Bivariate correlations were 
used to examine associations a) between performance on all tasks and AVL inattention 
and/or impulsivity-hyperactivity and b) between performance on the risk taking tasks, 
response inhibition and temporal discounting respectively. Finally, scores on difficulty 
and liking for each task were submitted to a one-way repeated measures MANOVA 
with task as repeated measure, and group as between-subjects factor.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Between-group matching of age and gender was successful (Table 2). AVL scores were 
significantly higher for the ADHD than the control group. Thus, the group stratification 
was supported by the data of a standardized screening instrument (AVL) that was the 
same for all participants. 
Table 2
 
Participant characteristics
Group
Total
n = 64
with ADHD
n = 34
without ADHD
n = 30
Chi-square
(X2)
% % %
 Percentage boys 65.6% (n = 42) 73.5% (n = 25) 56.7% (n = 17) 2.01
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) t
Age 13.9 (1.25) 13.8 (1.20) 14 (1.31) .37
ADHD symptoms 25.03 (16.43) 35.58 (14.12) 13.07 (8.97) -7.50**
Note. **p < .001. ADHD symptoms were defined by the sum score on the AVL questionnaire.
Reward probability, reward value and risk taking
Simulated Driving Task. Mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of probability, F (2, 
61) = 75.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .71. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed that 
all three conditions differed from one another, ps < .001, with an increasing number of 
risky choices with increasing probability. The main effect of group was not significant, 
F (1, 62) = 2.93, p = .092, ηp
2 = .05, and the interaction between group and probability 
just fell short of significance, F (2, 61) = 3.09, p = .052, ηp
2 = .09. Simple effects tests 
showed that this marginal interaction was driven by a significant group difference in 
the 50% probability condition, F (1, 62) = 4.60, p = .036, with more overtake attempts 
for the ADHD group than the control group but no differences in the 20% (F [1, 62] = 
1.95, p = .167), or 80% probability condition, (F [1, 62] = .83, p = .366), see Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Mean percentages of overtaking attempts on the SD task as a function 
of reward probability, for adolescents with and without a reported ADHD diagnosis 
separately. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Cake Gambling Task. Unexpectedly, the main effect of value was not significant, F 
(3, 59) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp
2 = .07, indicating that risk taking did not increase as a function 
of reward value. Also, the main effect of group was not significant, F (1, 61) = 2.59, p 
= .113, ηp
2 = .04. The interaction between value and group was significant, F (3, 59) 
= 3.39, p = .013, ηp
2 = .17, with the ADHD group making significantly and borderline 
significantly more risky choices than controls for the two highest reward values (8 and 
6) (F [1, 61] = 7.74, p = .007 and F [1, 61] = 3.89, p = .053 respectively), but not for 
the lowest two values (4 and 2), F (1, 61) = 2.18,  p > .05 and  F (1, 61) = .10,  p > . 05 
respectively (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Mean percentages of high-risk gambles on the Cake Gambling Task as a 
function of reward value, for adolescents with and without a reported ADHD diagnosis 
separately. Error bars represent standard errors.
Impulsive Choice and Action 
Temporal Discounting. As expected, the subjective value of the DR decreased 
as a function of delay for ADHD-diagnosed adolescents (F [4, 30] = 31.64, p < .001) 
and controls (F [4, 25] = 15.91, p < .001), indicating that both groups demonstrated 
temporal discounting (see Figure 6). Contrary to expectations, AUC did not differ 
between groups, t(61) = 1.20, p = .24, r = .15. To further examine group differences 
for each delay period, an additional Mixed ANOVA with the subjective values of the 
delay periods (2, 14, 30, 180, 365 days) entered as a within-subject variable and group 
(ADHD vs. control) as a between-subject variable revealed that the overall interaction 
between group and delay was not significant (F [4, 58] =.64, ns).
Response Inhibition. Expected group differences on commission errors on the Go/
No-go task did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (M = 6.35, SD = 
4.53 for the ADHD group; M = 4.59, SD = 3.45 for controls; t (61) = -1.72, p =. 08, r = .21.
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Figure 6. Subjective value of the delayed reward as a function of delay duration in 
days, for adolescents with and without a reported ADHD diagnosis separately. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
Correlations 
Table 3 presents correlations between all task measures and ADHD symptoms. In 
contrast to all other tasks, performance on the SDT was related to both hyperactivity-
impulsivity and inattention. Also notable is that commission errors on the Go/No-Go 
task correlated significantly with hyperactivity-impulsivity but not inattention, suggesting 
a specific relation that was not revealed when comparing the ADHD group as a whole 
to the non-ADHD group. A similar pattern was observed for the relation between 
AUC on the TD task and hyperactivity-impulsivity, although the relation fell short of 
significance (p=.076).
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Table 3
 
Bivariate Correlations between Task Performance and ADHD Symptoms for all Participants
Conditions
ADHD 
symptoms
Simulated  
Driving task
Cake  
Gambling Task
Temporal
Discounting
Task
Go/no-go  
Task
20% 50% 80% €2 €4 €6 €8 AUC
Commission 
errors
Hyperactivity-
impulsivity
.09 .34** -.03 -.02 .17 .25* .31* -.23  .26*
Attention .42 .29* -.12 .03 .14 .23 .24 -.13  .14
 
Note. * p < .05.**p < .01. ADHD symptoms were defined by the total scores on the 
subdomains (Hyperactivity-impulsivity and Attention) of the AVL Questionnaire. 
Overall risk taking on both the SDT and CGT was not related to impulsive choice 
on the TD task, (ps > .05). However, the number of overtaking attempts on the SDT 
correlated with the number of commission errors on the Go/No-go task (r = .32, p = 
.01), indicating a positive relation between impulsive action and risk taking on this task. 
Impulsive action (Go/No-go) and impulsive choice (TD) were uncorrelated (p = .73).
Evaluation of tasks
Both the CGT (M = 3.06, SD = 1.09) and the SDT (M = 2.80, SD = 1.01) were rated 
as more difficult than the Go/no-go task (M = 2.05, SD = .88), ps < .001, whereas ratings 
for the CG task and the SDT did not differ (p = .42). Reported liking was highest for 
the SDT (M = 4.37, SD = .83) followed by the CGT (M = 3.31, SD = .99) and the Go/
no-go task (M = 3.27, SD = .80), F [2, 122] = 53.43, p < .001, ηp
2 = .47). As expected, 
the SDT was liked more than the other tasks, (ps < .001), whereas ratings for the CGT 
and Go/No-go task did not differ (p = 1.00). There was no main effect of group, nor an 
interaction between group and task evaluation, all ps >.01.
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Discussion
This study aimed at obtaining more insight into the mechanisms involved in the 
risk taking propensity of adolescents with ADHD, by examining decision making under 
risk in a dynamic and affectively engaging context (Simulated Driving Task) next to the 
commonly used gambling paradigm (Cake Gambling Task). Both tasks have explicitly 
stated and simple rules and do not require learning from experience, which implies 
that both tasks were relatively low in working memory demands. With these tasks, 
two components important for risky decision making were examined separately, 
namely reward probability and reward value. To obtain a more complete picture of the 
multiple dimensions of impulsivity within a single sample of adolescents with ADHD, 
measurements of response inhibition and temporal reward discounting were included.
As predicted, adolescents with ADHD made more risky decisions on the SDT than 
controls, but only in the condition with maximally uncertain outcomes (50% probability). 
This finding indicates that adolescents with ADHD made more risky choices when 
positive and negative outcomes were equally likely to occur. In the literature, this 
type of uncertainty refers to the variance of possible outcomes, which is quadratic 
in reward probability because it is said to be maximum at p = .5 and absent at the 
extremes of p = 1 and p = 0 (e.g., Bland and Schaefer, 2012; Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 
2003; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006). Furthermore, adolescents with ADHD 
were more risk seeking for the two highest reward values (ş6 and ş8) on the CGT as 
compared to controls, but not for the lower values. Together with the outcomes of the 
SDT, these results suggest that adolescents with ADHD were especially likely to make 
risky decisions under high levels of (1) uncertainty and (2) reward value. Importantly, 
similar to decisions under maximum uncertainty (50% probability) in the SDT, all risky 
and safe choices in the CGT had an equal average outcome. In other words, although 
the expected values of risky and safe choices in both the maximum uncertain condition 
of the SDT and all conditions of the CGT were equally large, adolescents with ADHD 
displayed a higher preference for the more variable (thus more risky) option than 
their non-ADHD counterparts. Combined, these findings build on previous research 
including tasks with stable and explicit rules revealing a similar tendency to choose 
larger, but less likely rewards in adolescents and children with ADHD (Drechsler, et al., 
2008; 2010). The present study contributes to the existing literature by examining both 
reward value and probability separately in relation to ADHD and showing that both 
constructs may independently influence risky decision making in adolescents with 
ADHD. Interestingly, the displayed sensitivity to uncertainty in adolescents with ADHD 
in our study has also been demonstrated in previous work on the neural correlates of 
risk and reward (e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). 
To illustrate, in a study at the neural level of primates, Fiorillo and colleagues (2003) 
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found that independent of the typical phasic increase of activity in dopamine neurons 
in response to increases in expected reward, outcome uncertainty triggered sustained 
activation of midbrain dopamine neurons which was maximal for cues that predicted 
rewards with a 50% likelihood. Based on these findings, the authors suggested that both 
reward value and uncertainty may independently promote risk seeking behaviors (see 
for a review, Platt and Huettel, 2008). A similar distinction has been found in humans, 
with linear increased activation in ventral striatum and other subcortical structures as 
a function of expected reward, and differential activation  in ventral striatum that varied 
as a function of uncertainty, with maximum activity at p = 0.5 (Preuschoff et al., 2006). 
Given that ADHD is thought to be associated with deviations in phasic and/or tonic 
dopamine functioning (Sagvolden, Johansen, Aase, & Russel, 2005; Tripp & Wickens, 
2008; Volkow et al., 2009), future research could provide further insight into this issue 
by addressing the neurological basis for the distinction between risky decision making 
based on maximal uncertainty and high reward value in adolescents with ADHD. 
Against our predictions, group differences were not more pronounced in the SDT than 
in the CGT. Furthermore, SDT risk taking under maximum uncertainty was associated 
with both hyperactivity-impulsivity and inattention, whereas risky decisions for the 
highest values in the CGT were only related to hyperactivity-impulsivity. This suggests 
that the SDT, specifically its 50% probability condition, is perhaps more sensitive than 
the CGT. Further research is needed to confirm this assumption.
Although group differences were in the expected direction, no significant differences 
were found between adolescents with and without ADHD on the Go/No-go task (impulsive 
action), or on the TD (impulsive choice). This is in line with previous research on ADHD 
showing only small to moderate effect sizes for cognitive control deficits as measured 
by the Go/No-go paradigm (Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005) and 
for motivational processes as measured by the TD (Wilson, Mitchell, Musser, Schmitt, 
& Nigg 2011). The heterogeneity of ADHD could also explain these results, as ADHD-
related deficits are not necessarily always present in every single individual (De Zeeuw, 
et al., 2012; Sonuga-Barke et al., 2010). This explanation is further supported by our 
finding that performance on the Go/No-go task was only related to a specific dimension 
of ADHD and not to the overall diagnosis. Our finding that performance on the Go/No-
go task related to hyperactivity-impulsivity and not to inattention contrasts, however, 
with our prediction that poor response inhibition would be specifically associated with 
inattention (Chabildas et al., 2001). According to a recent meta-analysis (Willcutt, 2012), 
impairments were more strongly associated with inattention than hyperactivity-impulsivity 
for most cognitive function domains, except for response inhibition. For the latter domain, 
impairments were present to the same extent in both symptom domains. This might 
explain the inconsistent findings between individual studies such as ours and the one 
by Chabildas et al. (2001). The lack of group differences in temporal discounting may 
be explained by the hypothetical nature of the task, as previous research has shown 
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that only choices on real discounting tasks were significantly associated with ADHD 
symptoms (Scheres, Lee, & Sumyia, 2008). 
Response inhibition (Go/No-go task) was positively associated with risky decision 
making on the SDT, but not on the CGT. Due to its engaging nature, the SDT may place 
a greater demand on inhibitory control than the CGT. This interpretation is supported 
by the finding that participants liked the SDT better than the other tasks. In contrast, 
impulsive choice (TD) was not associated with risky decision making on either task. 
Likewise, De Water et al. (2014) found temporal discounting and risk taking to be 
unrelated, which could be due  to differences in task demands, such as the unique 
involvement of a time dimension in the TD task. 
Despite interesting results, we should also mention some limitations to the current 
findings. First, group categorization was based on parents’ reports of an ADHD diagnosis 
by a specialized health professional. While we did use a standardized screening 
instrument (the AVL) in this study, it would have been stronger to use a (semi) structured 
interview as well. Nonetheless, AVL scores clearly distinguished the groups and therefore 
supported the group stratification as was used here. Second, the control group was 
not a typically developing sample but included same-aged peers without ADHD and 
other disorders except for dyslexia and PDD NOS from the same school. Although 
this increased comparability on other factors than ADHD (such as dyslexia) and thus 
provided a conservative test, it also implies that we should be careful with generalizing 
the behavioral results of this control group. Finally, although the SDT and CGT enabled 
us to study reward value and probability separately, we acknowledge that to measure 
the impact of these constructs independent of other potentially influencing factors, 
future research should manipulate both reward value and probability orthogonally within 
a single task. Including the independent manipulation of risk and reward in the SDT 
could be a useful adaptation to further investigate risky decision making in a dynamic 
and engaging context. Furthermore, the TD task included hypothetical instead of real 
rewards, which could have led to less involvement of motivational processes. Despite 
these limitations, this study demonstrates that both reward probability and reward value 
may play an important role in risky decision making among adolescents with ADHD. A 
follow-up study should include the orthogonal manipulation of risk and reward value 
in a single task to obtain more insight in the relative influence of these components in 
risky decision making by adolescents with ADHD. 
To summarize, compared to their non-ADHD counterparts, adolescents with 
ADHD were more inclined to make risky decisions when the outcome was maximally 
uncertain, and when associated with relatively high reward values. Furthermore, risky 
decision making in the maximally uncertain condition of the SDT was related to all 
ADHD symptoms, which makes an adapted version of the SDT a potentially suitable 
measurement to capture different aspects of ADHD in everyday risk taking behavior.
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Exposure to Movie Reckless Driving in 
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Abstract
Objective: We examine the association between exposure to depictions of reckless 
driving in movies and unsafe driving, modeling inattentive and reckless driving as 
separate outcomes.
Methods: Data were obtained by telephone from 1,630 US adolescents aged 10 
to 14 years at baseline who were drivers at a survey 6 years later. Exposure to movie 
reckless driving was measured based on movies seen from a randomly selected list 
of 50 movie titles that had been content coded for reckless driving among characters. 
Associations were tested with inattentive and reckless driving behaviors in the subsequent 
survey--controlling for baseline age, sex, socioeconomic status, parental education, 
school performance, extracurricular activities, daily television and video/computer game 
exposure, number of movies watched per week, self-regulation and sensation seeking. 
Results: Exposure to movie reckless driving was common, with approximately 10% 
of movie characters having driven recklessly. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed a 
significant distinction between items tapping reckless and inattentive driving at the 6th 
wave. Age and exposure to movie reckless driving at baseline were directly associated 
with wave-6 reckless (but not inattentive) driving. Additionally, growth in sensation 
seeking mediated a prospective relation between the total number of movies watched 
per week at baseline and reckless driving, independent of exposure to movie reckless 
driving.  Males and high sensation seekers reported lower seatbelt usage and more 
reckless driving, whereas lower self-regulation predicted inattentive driving.    
Discussion: In this study, exposure to movie reckless driving during early adolescence 
predicted adolescents’ reckless driving, suggesting a direct modeling effect.  Other 
aspects of movies were also associated with reckless driving, with that association 
mediated through growth in sensation seeking.  Predictors of reckless driving were 
different from predictors of inattentive driving, with lower self-regulation associated 
with the latter outcome. Making a clear distinction between interventions for reckless 
or inattentive driving seems crucial for accident prevention. 
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Introduction
In the USA, road traffic crashes are the leading cause of death for 15-to-20-year-
olds; in 2008, 2,739 drivers in this age group were killed and an additional 228,00 were 
injured in motor vehicle crashes (NHSTA, 2010).  Compared to any other group, the risk 
to be in a fatal crash is substantially higher for 16- to 19-year-olds (IIHS, 2013).  Among 
youth, the high rate of traffic accidents result from inexperience (Mayhew, Simpson, & 
Pak, 2003; McKnight & McKnight, 2003) and a higher tendency to drive recklessly (e.g., 
speeding, following too closely), (Blows, Ameratunga, Ivers, Kai Lo, & Norton, 2005; 
Smart & Vasallo, 2012). In fact, reckless driving accounted for approximately 51% of 
the total economic crash costs ($230.6 billion) of all 16.4 million U.S. motor vehicle 
collisions in 2000 (Blincoe et al., 2002)
To reduce the number of (fatal) traffic accidents among adolescents, expansion of 
the current knowledge of risk factors is crucial.  Risk factors for reckless driving known 
so far include male gender, younger age, and higher sensation seeking tendencies 
(Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman, 2005; Jonah, Thiessen, & Au-Yeung, 2001; Oltedal 
& Rundmo, 2006; Rhodes & Pivik, 2011; Trimpop & Kircaldy, 1997; Williams, 2003).
In addition to individual characteristics, positive feelings towards driving have been 
associated with reckless driving tendencies (Dahlen et al., 2005). These positive driving-
related emotions are enhanced by the marketing of automobiles that focus on the pleasure 
and fun of driving (Ferguson,  Hardy, & Williams, 2003).A meta-analytic review ( Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Vogrinic, & Sauer; 2011) demonstrated positive associations 
between risk-glorifying media and risk taking behaviors for a number of health related 
risky behaviors such as smoking, alcohol consumption and reckless driving, both on the 
short and long term and across different research methods (experimental, correlational, 
longitudinal).  Effects were strongest for active (video games) versus passive media 
consumption (advertisement, movies, music) and when there was a match between media 
content and type of risk taking. With regard to reckless driving, nearly all studies focused 
on active media consumption (racing games), and showed that playing racing games is 
associated with risk taking in simulated traffic situations (Fischer  et al., 2009; Fischer, 
Guter, & Frey, 2008; Fischer, Kubitzki, Guter, &  Frey, 2007)  and self–reported reckless 
driving (Buellens, Roe, & Van den Bulck, 2011a; Hull, Draghici, & Sargent, 2012). One 
study (Fischer et al., 2008) demonstrated a short-term positive link between watching 
risk glorifying movie scenes and risky driving on a racing game (Need for Speed, EA 
Games). Importantly, these experimental studies demonstrated a link from exposure 
to risk –positive cognitions, emotions and risk-taking behaviors (Fischer et al., 2012).
Fischer and colleagues (2012) proposed a theoretical framework that extends socio-
cognitive models of learning (Bandura, 1986) and the more recent General Learning Model 
(Buckley & Anderson, 2006)  and explains elevated levels of risk taking in relation to media 
exposure not only through priming effects of risk-positive cognitions and emotions, but 
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also through changes in the self-concept, due to (1) situational cues in the media that 
risk taking is rewarding instead of potentially dangerous, (2) through habitation processes 
and changes in risk-related social norms, and (3) through identification processes that 
are stronger in active vs. passive media consumption. 
 In addition to active media consumption (video games), passive media such as 
movies, television shows (Vitaglione, 2012)  and automobile commercials (Shin, Hallet, 
Chipman, Tator , &  Granton, 2005) frequently contain portrayals of reckless driving and 
may even reach a broader public than videogames, which are played more commonly 
by males (Lucas and Sherry, 2004). To illustrate the potential impact of passive media 
consumption, Vitaglione (2012) showed that after live broadcasting of the extremely 
popular and widely viewed National Association for Stock Car Racing (NASCAR) events 
that display dangerous and risky automobile racing, the number of driving accidents and 
traffic injuries caused by aggressive driving  increased, but only after 5 days following the 
broadcast. Vitaglione suggested that this delayed increase could be due to accumulating 
priming effects during the consecutive days after the broadcast and only after a certain 
threshold had been passed, influenced dangerous driving behaviors.
Few studies have focused on the long-term relation between exposure to passive 
forms of risk-glorifying media consumption and driving behavior. Buellens, Roe, and 
Van den Bulck, 2011a; 2011b) demonstrated indirect long-term associations between 
viewing action movies or music videos and reckless driving attitudes and intentions. 
However, these studies did not control for socioeconomic status or parenting style 
and failed to formally link exposure with behavior by testing for mediation processes 
between attitudes and reckless driving. Additionally, reckless driving has not been 
examined in relation to driving-related passive media that occurs well prior to driving 
debut. Therefore, the present study examines the long-term role of reckless driving-
related movie exposure, while controlling for important background variables and also 
testing for mediation processes. 
Teenage drivers are not only more willing to take risks in traffic, but are also more 
likely to engage in distracted and inattentive driving (Jonah , Thiessen, & Au-Yeung, 
2001; Neyens & Boyle, 2005;  Simons-Morton, Lerner, & Singer, 2008). Therefore, we also 
determine whether an existing measure of unsafe driving may be used to model reckless 
and inattentive driving separately, since both may contribute to traffic accidents by 
different mechanisms (Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman, 2005; Smart & Vassallo, 2012).
To differentiate the processes underlying unsafe driving behavior in this study, a 
distinction was made between inattentive and reckless driving outcomes. Inattentive 
driving is not volitional-it involves a failure to notice and respond appropriately to a key 
element in the traffic environment due to distractions inside or outside the car (Fonagy 
& Target, 2002; Tay & Knowles, 2004). Inattentive driving was therefore hypothesized 
to be associated with lower levels of self-regulation, of which a key component is the 
ability to maintain focused attention (Fonagy  & Target, 2002). On the other hand, reckless 
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driving is intentional—involving, for example, the decision to speed or weave in and 
out of traffic. These types of decisions were hypothesized to be associated with higher 
levels of sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1994). In line with the theoretical framework 
on the impact of risk-glorifying media exposure on risk taking inclinations of Fischer 
and colleagues (2012), we hypothesized that higher passive exposure to risky driving 
movie depictions during early adolescence will predict reckless but not inattentive 
driving. Similar to previous research (Stoolmiller, 2010), we expected that increases 
in sensation seeking will mediate the relation between watching reckless driving and 
engaging in the behavior. 
 
Method
 
Participants and procedure
We surveyed 6,522 U.S. adolescents between the age of 10 to 14 years by telephone 
in 2003 and followed them forward in 5 additional survey waves (Sargent et al., 2001). 
Adolescents were recruited using random-digit dialing and surveys conducted by trained 
interviewers who using computer-assisted telephone interviews. All aspects of the 
study were approved by Dartmouth IRB. Basic demographics such as socioeconomic 
status, race/ethnicity and census region for the baseline sample mirror those for U.S. 
adolescents between 10 and 14 years of age (Sargent et al., 2005).  Three consecutive 
follow-up measurements (waves 2-4) were conducted at 8-month intervals, and about 
2 years separated waves 4,  5 and  6, with sample retention at wave 4 being 4,574 
(70%), 3,055 (47%) at wave 5, and 2,322 (36%) at wave 6. To minimize differences in 
driving experience, we selected as the analytic sample those teens (N = 1,647) who 
reported driving experience at both waves 5 (M = 16.08, SD = 1.27) and 6 (M = 18.22, 
SD = 1.31). Of these teens, 17 were dropped from the analysis due to missing wave 1 
data, so modeling results are based on 1,630 teens. 
 
Outcome: Unsafe driving behavior 
At wave 6, all drivers were asked about their unsafe driving practices using 9 
dichotomous (yes/no) items drawn from The National Survey of Speeding and Other 
Unsafe Driving Actions, conducted by the National Traffic Safety Administration in 1998 
(NTSA, 1998). Inspection of the items suggested that some measured inattentive driving 
(e.g., failed to yield) and others reckless driving (e.g., weaved in and out of traffic ), 
(Braitman, Kirley, Ferguson, & Chaudhary, 2007; Jonah, Thiessen, & Au-Yeung, 2001). 
Further evidence of a distinction is included in the analysis section.
 
Exposure: Movie reckless driving exposure
Adolescents’ exposure to movie reckless driving was assessed by using the previously 
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validated Beach method (Sargent et al., 2001). Top box office hits released in the 5 
years prior to the baseline survey were content analyzed for reckless driving, measured 
by enumerating all characters in each movie and assessing which frequently engaged 
in “fast, careless” driving. Krippendorf alpha for content coding of character reckless 
driving on a 10% sample of double-coded movies (1,868 major characters) was 0.99. 
Adolescents were asked whether they had seen each movie title on a unique list of 50, 
randomly selected from the larger pool.  Based on movies the adolescent had seen, 
movie reckless driving exposure was calculated as the proportion of the characters 
they had seen that had engaged in reckless driving and trimmed at the 95th percentile 
to limit high outlier influence Hanewinkel & Sargent, 2008).
 
Mediators
Sensation seeking was measured using a previously validated scale (Crohnbach’s alpha 
= 0.60), (Sargent, Tanski, Stoolmiller, & Hanewinkel, 2010) that included items identified 
by Zuckerman (1994) and the Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking (e.g.,“ I like to do 
dangerous things,”), (Arnett, 1994).  Self-regulation was measured with four items based 
on the Kendall Wilcox scale (e.g., “I am good at waiting my turn”) (Kendall & Wilcox, 1979) 
 
Covariates
The analysis controlled for variables that could be associated with exposure to 
reckless driving in movies and also with reckless driving.  Covariates including sex, 
age, socioeconomic status, and parental education, self-reported school performance, 
extracurricular activities, daily television exposure, number of movies watched per 
week, and the number of hours a day spent playing video or computer games. 
Socio-economic status (SES) was determined by combining the variables parent 
education and household income into a standardized SES score. Parenting style was 
assessed by the Authoritative Parenting Index (Jackson, Henriksen, & Foshee, 1998). 
Rebelliousness was measured using a composite 4-point Likert-type scale of six 
items assessing tendency toward antisocial behavior (Dal Cin, Stoolmiller, Sargent, 
2011; Pierce, Farkas, & Evans, 1993), (e.g., ‘‘I like to break the rules,’’, ‘‘I argue a lot 
with other kids’’). All questions capturing the covariates are presented in Table A1. 
Data analysis
First, we assessed whether the Unsafe Driving Behavior outcome could be split 
into two domains using factor analysis.  Based on the literature and conceptual 
interpretation, we made a distinction between intentional unsafe driving behaviors 
such as speeding or tailgating (Blows et al., 2005; Smart & Vassallo, 2012) and driving 
behaviors that are more likely to result from inattentive or distracted driving, such as 
failing to yield right of way (Werneke, & Vollrath, 2012) or driving through stop signs 
(Kass, Cole, & Stanny, 2007). 
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Table A1. 
Overview of Wave 1 Control Variables.
Variable Survey Question(s) Response Options
Parent education a What is the highest grade or year of 
school that you completed?
Up to 8th grade
9th to 11th  grade
12th grade but no diploma
HS diploma/ equivalent  Voc/
Tech after HS, no diploma 
Voc/Tech program after HS  
Some college but no degree 
Associates degree (A.A., A.S.) 
Bachelor’s degree (B.A., B.S.) 
Some grad/professional, no 
degree
Master’s degree (M.A., M.S.) 
Professional degree beyond 
bachelors (MD, DDS, JD, LLB)
Household income a In studies like this, households are 
sometimes grouped according to income. 
Please tell me which group best describes 
the total income of all persons living in 
this household over the past year? Please 
include income from all sources, such as 
salaries, interest, retirement, or any other 
source for all household members. Would 
you say…
≤ $10 000
$10 000-$20 000
$20 000- $30 000
$30 000- $50 000
$50 000-$75 000 
≥ $75 000
School performance How would you describe your grades in 
school?
Below average
Average
Good
Excellent
Watched movies per week About how many movies do you usually 
watch each week? Please include movies 
you see in movie theatres, on videotape or 
DVD, and on television.
None
One to two
Three to four
Five or more
Television exposure  
per day
On school days, how many hours a day 
do you usually watch TV? Please do not 
include the time you use the TV to play 
video games.
None
Less than one hour
Three to four hours
More than four hours
Hours a day spent playing 
video or computer games
On school days, how many hours a day 
do you usually spend playing video or 
computer games?
None
Less than one hour
Three to four hours
More than four hours
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Note. a Refers to items that were combined to compute socioeconomic status.
Variable Survey Question(s) Response Options
Parental support (9-item 
index; Cronbach’s α = .74).
She/He is pleased with how I behave
She/He listens to what I have to say
She/He makes me feel better when I am 
upset
She/He wants to hear about my problems
She/He likes me just the way I am
She/He is too busy to talk to me
She/He makes rules without asking what I 
think (reversed)
She/He is always telling me what to do 
(reversed)
She/He tells me when I do a good job on 
things
Not like him/her
A little like him/her
A lot like him/her
Just like him/her
Parental Control (7-item 
index; Cronbach’s α = .72)
She/He checks to see if I do my 
homework 
She/He makes sure I tell her/him where 
I’m going
She/He knows where I am after school 
She/He tells me times when I must come 
home She/He has rules that I must follow 
She/He makes sure I go to bed on time 
She/He asks me what I do with my friends
Not like him/her
A little like him/her
A lot like him/her
Just like him/her
Extracurricular activities How often do you participate in 
team sports were there is a coach?                           
How often do you participate in 
other sports without a coach?                                 
How often do you attend church 
or other religious activities?                                                                
How often do you go to music lessons, 
choir, dance, or band practice?                                                     
How often do you participate in 
school clubs or activities like math or 
science clubs or the school paper?                                   
How often do you participate in other 
clubs like the Boy or Girl Scouts, 4-H, or 
the Boys or Girls Clubs of America?
Almost everyday
1 to a few times a week
1 to a few times a month
Never
Sensation seeking (4-item 
index; Cronbach’s α = .59)
I like to do scary things 
I like to do dangerous things                                         
I often think there is nothing to do 
I like to listen to loud music
Not like you 
A little like you 
A lot like you 
Just like you
Rebelliousness (6-item 
index; Cronbach’s α = .69)
I get in trouble in school                                              
I argue a lot with other kids 
I do things my parents wouldn’t want me 
to do 
I do what my teachers tell me to do 
(reversed) 
I argue with my teachers                                             
I like to break the rules
Not like you 
A little like you 
A lot like you 
Just like you
Self regulation (4-item 
index; Cronbach’s α = .41)
I am good at waiting my turn                                        
I get my homework done first so I can 
have fun later I bother other students 
when they are trying to work  I have to be 
reminded several times to do things
Not like you 
A little like you 
A lot like you 
Just like you
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The reckless factor was defined a priori by the items of speeding, tailgating, weaving, 
passing on a double yellow line, speeding through a yellow light and not wearing a seat 
belt. The inattentive factor was defined a priori by the items of failing to yield, ignoring 
a stop sign and running a red light. It should be noted that the items “speeding through 
a yellow light” and “running a red light” are obviously closely related, as deliberately 
speeding through a yellow light increases the chances of unintentionally running a red-
light as well. In so-called “dilemma zones”, drivers are too late to stop their vehicle in 
time but are also too late to enter the intersection before the light turns red (Burkey & 
Obeng, 2004; Elmitiny, Yan, Radwan, Russo, & Nashar, 2010). Whereas the first item 
unambiguously captures deliberate behavior, the latter item is more ambiguous. Previous 
research (Bonneson, Brewer, & Zimmerman, 2001; Green, 2003) suggests that red-
light running can be categorized both as “intentional”, referring to deliberate red-light 
running to avoid delays or out of frustration, or “unintentional”, referring to drivers that 
do not see the red light because of distractions, inattentive driving, or obstructed sight 
(e.g., sun glare, vegetation). In the majority of cases, red-light running appears to be 
unintentional (Bonneson, Brewer, & Zimmerman, 2001). Therefore, we choose to regard 
the item “speeding through a yellow light” as intentional, and “running a red light” as 
primarily unintentional. We also hypothesized that a model with 2 correlated factors (one 
for reckless driving and one for inattentive driving) would fit better than a 1 factor model.
If this were true, the two latent factors would serve as the ultimate outcomes in a 
structural equation model that also included sensation seeking measured at wave 4 as 
a potential mediator of the wave 1 risk factors of movie reckless driving and sensation 
seeking and the wave 1 control variables. The structural equation model was specified 
as a standard, linear model with all latent variables assumed to be normally distributed. 
The unsafe driving items were connected to the wave 6 latent factors via probit or 
logistic regressions. Because the model included both linear and logistic or probit 
regressions simultaneously, estimation was carried out using numerical integration 
available in Mplus 7 (Muthén, & Muthén, 2007). After model fitting, we computed the 
following types of effects for wave 1 risk factors on the wave 6 unsafe driving items: 
direct, indirect through a w6 latent construct, and double indirect through both wave 
4 sensation seeking and a wave 6 latent construct. For wave 4 sensation seeking, we 
computed direct and indirect effects through a wave 6 latent construct. All effect sizes 
were computed on the odds scale to provide a familiar metric. These computations 
were carried out using nonlinear constraints in Mplus, which uses the delta method to 
obtain standard errors. A priori hypotheses about direct and indirect effects were tested 
using a p value of .05 or less.
For parsimony, the model incorporated 2 broad sets of simplifying assumptions. 
First, except as noted in the introduction for sensation seeking, movie reckless driving 
and self-regulation, we assumed that the rest of the effects of the wave 1 and wave 
4 risk factors and covariates would be the same on both latent factors. Second, we 
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assumed that all wave 1 and wave 4 effects on the unsafe driving items were indirect 
through the two wave 6 latent factors. Both sets of assumptions were checked and 
relaxed if there was strong evidence (using a more stringent p value of .001 due to the 
number of tests involved) that they were inappropriate, and all models were estimated 
using robust maximum likelihood. 
Table A2.
Descriptive Statistics for Adolescent and Social-Environmental Characteristics 
Characteristic Total 
(n = 1647)
Prevalence (W1)
Age (years)
10 
11 
12 
13 
14
18% 
20% 
21% 
21% 
20%
Parent education
Very low (1-3)
Low (4)
Average (5-7)
High (8-9)
Very high (10-13)
17% 
23% 
21% 
27% 
12%
Household income (per year)  
≤ $10 000                                              
$10 000-$20 000                                   
$20 000- $30 000                                        
$30 000- $50 000                                     
$50 000-$75 000                                       
≥ $75 000
8%
10%
12%
21%
19%
30%
School performance
Average or below                                   
Good                                             
Excellent
22%              
41%              
37%
Note. The scores for sensation seeking, rebelliousness, self-regulation and the parenting 
style subscales ranged between 1 and 4, with higher scores reflecting higher average 
levels on these scales.  aSES was determined by combining the variables parent 
education and household income into a standardized score, ranging between  -.1.85 
and 1.39, with higher values indicating higher socioeconomic status.
Characteristic Total 
(n = 1647)
Watched movies per week          
None
One to two
Three to four
Five or more
3%                 
39%            
31%                  
28%
Television exposure per day
None
Less than one hour
One to two hours
Three to four hours
More than four hours
6%                  
21%             
48%                 
19%           
6%
Hours a day spent playing 
video/computer games
None
Less than one hour
One to two hours                    
Three to four hours               
More than four hours
29%           
39%
25%               
5%                
2%
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Parenting style
Responsiveness
Demandingness
                                       
3.30 (.45)     
3.33 (.48)
SES a                                    .32 (.65)        
Extracurricular Activities 2.82 (.48)
Sensation seeking 1.96 (.59)
Rebelliousness 1.33 (.43)
Self-regulation 2.99 (.47)
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Results
 
Descriptive Statistics
Table A2 reports descriptive statistics for all covariates for the analytic sample (n = 
1647) at baseline. Adolescents from each age group and household SES stratum were 
present. Few had little-to-no exposure to TV and movies. Approximately 10% of the 
characters in the 532 movies drove recklessly. Adolescents had seen a mean of 16 
(SD = 7.26) of the 50 movies on their individualized list, through which they received 
a mean exposure proportion 0.09 (interquartile range, 0.06 to 0.12) for proportion of 
characters that drove recklessly. 
Table 1. 
Self reported unsafe driving behaviors at wave 6.
Think about your driving in the past year. 
Have you ever done any of the following 
while driving? Have you…
(Response options were “yes” or “no”)
Percentages of 
all adolescents 
(n =1647) that 
responded “Yes”
Percentages of 
boys (n = 856) 
that responded 
“Yes”
Percentages of 
girls (n = 791) 
that responded 
“Yes”
… exceeded the speed limit?a 84.1% 83.3% 85.0%
… tailgated?a 31.1% 31.9% 30.2%
… failed to yield?b 23.9% 25.8% 21.9%
… weaved in and out of traffic?a 27.7% 29.1% 26.2%
… ran one or more red traffic lights?b 21.7% 20.9% 22.5%
… ignored stop signs?b 19.7% 22.7% 16.4%
… passed on a double line?a 13.6% 16.2% 10.7%
… sped through a yellow light?a 75.3% 75.5% 75.1%
… driven without your seatbelt fastened?a 29.0% 34.6% 22.9%
Note. aRefers to items that capture reckless driving.  bRefers to items that capture 
inattentive driving.
Table 1 also gives response percentages on the separate items of reckless and inattentive 
driving. Adolescents reported a mean of 2.61 (SD = 1.43) of the 6 reckless driving items 
(interquartile range, 2 to 3) and a mean of .65 (SD = .86) of the 3 inattentive driving items 
(interquartile range, 0 to 1). Some, such as exceeding the speed limit, were present in 
a substantial majority of respondents, whereas some (e.g., passing on a double line) 
were present in only a small minority. 
Factor analysis of unsafe driving
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using a probit link function. 
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We used the Weighted Least Squares Mean Adjusted and Variance Adjusted (WLSMV) 
probit model primarily because the probit model output and diagnostics are richer than 
the corresponding ML logit model for dichotomous indicators. We replicated the final 
CFA model using both approaches because ultimately, we wanted to focus on odds 
ratios as effect sizes, which are only available using the logit model. 
WLSMV probit results showed that the fit of the two dimensional model was reasonable 
(χ² [df = 26, n = 1,647] = 119.25, CFI = .956, RMSEA = .047). Modification indices for 
covariances among measurement errors suggested that allowing the items “run one 
or more red lights” and “speed through a yellow light” to correlate would substantially 
improve the model fit (and it also made sense conceptually that these two items were 
related). This additional path improved the fit (χ² [df = 25, n = 1,647] = 90.47, CFI = 
.969, RMSEA = .040). Although that model still had several large modification indices of 
around 20, none made conceptual sense and adding the largest made the model more 
difficult to interpret so we stopped considering additional changes to the hypothesized 
model. To test the fit of a one-factor solution as compared to the proposed two-factor 
solution, we forced the correlation between the two factors to be 1.0. Results show that 
the fit of the model deteriorated as compared to the two-factor solution; (χ² [df = 26, 
n = 1,647] = 154.54, CFI = .939, RMSEA = .055). A nested chi-square test comparing 
the one vs. two factor model indicated that the 2 factor model (correlation = .69, 95% 
CI = .61, .77) fit significantly better than a single factor model (nested χ² [df = 1, n = 
1,647] = 54.34, p < .001). 
To further examine the concurrent validity of the two risky driving constructs, we 
regressed wave 6 subject reports about being involved in a crash or being pulled 
over on the 2 latent constructs simultaneously. In the ML logit model, reckless driving 
significantly predicted both crashing (85% increase in odds) and being pulled over (224% 
increase in odds), net of inattentive driving but inattentive driving predicted neither, net 
of reckless driving. Results were similar in the corresponding WLSMV probit models.
Structural Equation Model
The most important direct and indirect effects discussed below are highlighted in Figure 1.
Direct effects model. Simple, bivariate correlations between wave 1 predictors and wave 
6 outcomes are provided in Table A3. All of the direct effect models were estimated as 
WLSMV probit models. To set up the first model, we forced the latent variables reckless 
and inattentive driving to be perfectly correlated; we imposed equality constraints so 
that each wave 1 predictor had the same effect on both latent constructs; we specified 
all wave 1 predictor effects on the wave 6 indicators as indirect through the latent 
constructs (no specific direct effects); we included the correlated error term mentioned 
previously between “run one or more red lights” and “speed through a yellow light” so 
results would correspond to the measurement model discussed above. The fit of this 
baseline model, model 1, was marginal: χ² [df = 146, n = 1,630] = 317.53, CFI = .910, 
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RMSEA = .027. Perhaps more importantly, the effect of movie reckless driving on the 
single latent variable was not significant.
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Path diagram of structural equation model including direct and indirect effects. 
Numbers on pathways represent standardized effects; * .01 < p <= 0.05, ** .001 < p 
<= 0.01, ***p <= 0.001
In the second step, we freely estimated the correlation between the two latent 
variables, which substantially improved the fit of model (χ² [df = 145, n = 1,630] = 
272.78, CFI = .933, RMSEA = .023) similar to results discussed above for the CFA 
measurement model. The nested chi-square was 37.72, df = 1, p < .001. The latent 
variable correlation was .68 (95% CI = .60, .77).
In the third step, we conducted a priori tests concerning differential relations of w1 
predictors with both latent constructs using a p value of .05. More specifically, the 
effect of the wave 1 predictor on reckless driving had to be significantly different at 
p < .05 than the corresponding effect on inattentive driving. Following the a priori 
tests, we considered relaxing the equality constraints on the relations of other wave 
1 predictors with both latent constructs, starting with the predictor that resulted in the 
greatest improvement of fit provided the modification index indicated the improvement 
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was significant at a more stringent p level of .001 or less. We stopped relaxing equality 
constraints when no more wave 1 predictors would improve the fit of the model. 
Hypothesized direct effects on wave 6 latent reckless or inattentive driving. 
As hypothesized, in model 3, wave 1 movie reckless driving had a significant positive 
effect on reckless driving (β = .074, p = .014) and a non-significant negative effect on 
inattentive driving (β = -.035, p = .354) and the difference in effects was significant. 
(χ² (1) = 7.57, N = 1,630, p = .006). As hypothesized, wave 1 self-regulation had a 
significant negative impact on inattentive driving (β = -.145, p = .002) but a non-
significant negative impact on reckless driving (β = -.052, p = .163) and the difference 
in effects was marginally significant (χ² (1) = 3.64, N = 1630, p = .056). 
For the post hoc tests, age predicted reckless driving (β = .212, p < .001) but not 
inattentive driving (β = .070, p = .070) and the effects were significantly different (χ² 
(1) = 12.62, N = 1630, p < .001). All other predictors similarly affected reckless and 
inattentive driving, of which socioeconomic status (SES) and sensation seeking had 
the strongest effects (β = .224, p < .001; β = .218, p < .001, respectively), followed by 
extracurricular activities, which was negatively related to both constructs (β = -.075, p 
= .010). Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no evidence that the effect of sensation 
seeking was different for reckless driving as compared to inattentive driving.  Thus, 
we could not reject the hypothesis of equal magnitude effects on both reckless and 
inattentive driving (χ² (1) = 0.13, N = 1630, p = .722). The same pattern of results held 
true for the effects of wave 4 sensation seeking. These steps led to a better fit for model 
3; χ² [df = 142, n = 1630] = 247.80, CFI = .944, RMSEA = .021. The nested chi-square 
for model 3 compared to the model 2 was 24.04, df = 3, p < .001.
In the final step, in model 4 we investigated specific direct effects of w1 predictors, 
over and above their indirect influence through the latent constructs on individual risky 
driving indicators. We used a more stringent p value of .001 for significance for these 
post hoc tests. Lack of seatbelt use was predicted by sensation seeking (β = .18, p < 
.01) and by male gender (β = .13, p < .01). Adding these two effects to the previous 
model, model 3, did not alter the pattern of significance for the other parameters. 
The chi-square for the model was 212.67, df = 140, n = 1630, CFI = .962, RMSEA = 
.018. The nested chi-square for comparison of model 4 to the model 3 was 37.04, 
df = 2, p < .001. 
In summary, we added 6 parameters to our initial simplest model, 3 to test a priori 
hypotheses and 3 based on post hoc inspection of results to arrive at the final model. 
The overall improvement in model fit was highly significant (nested chi-square = 99.92, 
df = 6, p < .001).Complete results of the final direct effects model are shown in Tables 
A4 and A5.
Indirect effects model. In this model, we investigated the potential mediating role 
of the personality trait sensation seeking (at wave 4). To test our prediction that reckless 
driving was not only directly, but also indirectly affected by exposure to movie reckless 
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driving through wave 4 sensation seeking, we added pathways in the model between 
wave 1 predictors and wave 4 sensation seeking, and between wave 4 sensation 
seeking and reckless driving and inattentive driving. This model fit the data well, χ² [df 
= 148, n = 1,630] = 238.903, CFI = .960, RMSEA = .019]. The effect of w4 sensation 
seeking on reckless driving and inattentive driving was strongly significant (β = .09, p 
< .001) and we found no evidence that the effect on reckless driving was different than 
the effect on inattentive driving.
Hypothesized direct effects on w4 sensation seeking. Not surprisingly, wave 
1 sensation seeking was strongly related to wave 4 sensation seeking (β = .46, p < 
.001). Contrary to our hypothesis, the wave 1 movie reckless driving effect on wave 4 
sensation seeking was not significant (β = .03, NS.). Consistent with previous research 
(Stoolmiller, 2010) but not a focus of this work, we found that the number of movies 
per week was a significant predictor of wave 4 sensation seeking (β = .06, p = .005). 
Other predictors with significant effects on wave 4 sensation seeking included: male 
gender (β = .05, p = .04), lower SES (β = - .08, p = .007), higher rebelliousness (β = .06, 
p = .01), and lower parental support (β = -.06, p = .005).  
Hypothesized indirect effects on w6 latent reckless driving through w4 sensation 
seeking. Contrary to our hypothesis, the indirect effect of wave 1 movie reckless driving 
on wave 6 reckless driving through wave 4 sensation seeking was not significant (β = 
.004, p = .171).  As noted previously, however, the direct effect was significant. 
Although it is not the focus of this work, because we have shown in previously 
published work that the number of wave 1 R-rated movies viewed significantly predicted 
growth in sensation seeking from wave 1 to wave 4 (Stoolmiller, 2010), we decided 
to examine the indirect effect of movies per week on reckless and inattentive driving 
through w4 sensation seeking. The indirect effect was significant (β = .007, p = .023). 
Non-hypothesized direct effects on w6 indicators of reckless or inattentive 
driving. Male gender and wave 1 sensation seeking had significant positive effects on 
failure to use seatbelts. With the addition of wave 4 sensation seeking to the model, we 
decided to perform an additional post hoc test of its effect on failure to use seatbelts 
and found that the effect was positive and significant (β = .136, p < .001). The effect for 
wave 1 sensation seeking was reduced slightly but still strongly significant (β = .119, p 
= .003) and the effect of male gender increased slightly (β = .125, p < .001). No other 
effects were significant at p < .001.
To put the effect sizes for the hypothesized associations on wave 6 reckless 
driving into perspective, we re-ran the final model using logistic regressions (for the 
connections between the wave 6 indicators and the wave 6 latent variables) to obtain 
odds ratios (OR) for the indirect effects of wave 1 predictors on the individual wave 6 
reckless driving items. 
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Results are shown in Table 2. The OR contrasts a high to a low score on the wave 1 
risk factor (95th compared to 5th percentile). The indirect effects are either through just 
the wave 6 reckless driving latent factor or through both wave 4 sensation seeking and 
then the wave 6 reckless driving factor (double indirect). Consistent with the lack of 
direct effect of wave 1 movie reckless driving on wave 4 sensation seeking, only the 
direct effects of wave 1 movie reckless driving on the wave 6 reckless driving items 
were significant and the adjusted odds ratios ranged from 1.16 to 1.98. In contrast, 
wave 1 sensation seeking had both significant indirect effects ranging from 1.55 to 3.37 
and significant double indirect effects ranging from 1.12 to 1.59. Effects of sensation 
seeking were uniformly larger than the corresponding effects for movie reckless driving.
Discussion
This study demonstrates a direct long-term relation between early exposure to 
reckless driving in movies and reckless driving behaviors among US adolescents with 
driving experience. Moreover, this relation was evident while controlling for many other 
important background variables. In contrast, movie reckless driving exposure was not 
associated with inattentive driving. Although the long-term relation between reckless 
driving and video game play has been established (Buellens  et al., 2011; Hull et al.,, 
2012) this study is the first, to our knowledge, to show a direct long-term relation 
between passive exposure to reckless driving content in movies and reckless driving 
among adolescents. Although not specifically tested, these findings are in line with early 
socio-cognitive models of learning through experience or observation (Bandura, 1986; 
Mischel, 1973) the notion that repeated exposure to risk-glorifying media may instigate 
risk taking behaviors by the activation of positive risk-related cognitions, beliefs and 
behavioral scripts (Buckley & Anderson, 2006) and additionally, through changes in 
the self-concept related to risk-taking (Fischer et al., 2012). 
The main finding, suggesting that exposure to movie reckless driving may program 
behaviors scripts for later reckless driving raises questions about what might be done. 
Firstly, movie producers should be aware that behaviors depicted in movies can influence 
adolescent behaviors. This has been shown decisively for movie smoking, for which the 
US Surgeon General states that exposure is one cause of adolescent smoking (HHS, 
2004) Movie smoking is now incorporated into some ratings systems but reckless driving 
is not—it could be.  Parents may also play a role, as many previous research studies 
have found that parental R-rated movie restriction is associated with lower rates of 
adolescent substance use (Hanewinkel, Morgenstern, Tanski, & Sargent, 2008; Sargent 
et al., 2004; Sargent,  Dalton, Heatherton, & Beach, 2003; Sharif & Sargent, 2006; Tanski, 
Dal Cin, Stoolmiller, & Sargent, 2009), presumably as a result of decreased exposure. 
Parents should understand that adolescents model behaviors they see in movies and 
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should restrict children and adolescents in the number and types of movies they are 
allowed to watch each week.
Previous research was replicated by showing that high sensation seeking tendencies 
are important risk-factors for unsafe driving behaviors (Dahlen et al., 2005; Jonah et al., 
2001).  Moreover, weekly frequency of movie exposure was indirectly related to these 
behaviors through sensation seeking. These results are consistent with the conclusion that 
reckless driving in movies directly impacted adolescent future reckless driving practices, 
whereas frequent overall screen exposure may have stimulated reckless driving through 
exposure to a variety of other risk-taking behaviors such as excessive drinking, movie 
violence and their cumulative impact on sensation seeking tendencies (Carson, Pickett, 
& Janssen, 2011; Stoolmiller, 2010). Previous research indicates that adolescents, who 
frequently watch R-rated movies, rated such for portraying higher levels of risk taking 
behavior and violence (Stoolmiller, 2010) show increases in sensation seeking over 
time (Sargent et al., 2002). Adolescents with poor self-regulation reported higher rates 
of inattentive but not (intentional) reckless driving. This finding is in line with the notion 
that the capacity to maintain focused attention is an important mechanism underlying 
self-regulatory functioning (Fonagy & Target, 2002).  A major distraction mentioned by 
teenage drivers is the presence of passengers (Heck & Carlos, 2008) which has been 
shown to increase the risk of fatal crashes among 16 and 17 year-old drivers (Chen, 
Baker, Braver, & Li, 2000). Inexperienced drivers may be easily distracted; graduated 
licensing laws may prohibit newly licensed drivers from carrying passengers. 
Conforming with prior literature (Jonah et al., 2001; Lerner et al., 2001), males and 
adolescents with high scores on sensation seeking were less inclined to use seatbelts 
than their female and lower sensation seeking counterparts. Although not using a 
seatbelt could be inattentive, these results suggest that it is volitional. Since seatbelt 
use appears to be one of the most effective measures to reduce injuries in motor 
vehicle crashes (Dinh-Zar et al., 2001), interventions to use seatbelts should be aimed 
at males and high risk takers in particular, and based on the premise that nonuse is 
volitional rather than forgetful.
One of the potential limitations of this longitudinal study is attrition bias due to 
eligible teens (with driving experience) that dropped out before wave 5. Although we 
know how many teens dropped out by wave 5, we do not know which of the dropouts 
had driving experience. If the relations among the study variables are quite different for 
these teens, our results could be biased compared to the full population. 
Another issue that should be mentioned here is the omission of a potentially important 
covariate, namely, number of miles driven during the year (Trowbridge & McDonald, 
2008) We selected only teens with driving experience by wave 5 for inclusion to make 
sure that by wave 6, all teens included in the analysis could report on a full year of 
driving exposure, but this does not necessarily mean that all teens drove the same 
number of miles in the exposure year. The probability of endorsing some of the unsafe 
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driving items could be increased by miles driven, simply because more driving allows 
for more opportunities to engage in unsafe (reckless or inattentive) driving behaviors. 
Indeed, population crash rates are different when miles driven are figured into the 
denominator (Shope & Bingham, 2008). To some extent, this might explain why older 
age and higher SES (both of which are proxies for miles driven (Ehsani, Bingham, & 
Shope, 2011; Pucher & Renne, 2003; Trowbridge & McDonald, 2008)) had relatively 
strong positive effects on unsafe driving. The fact that we controlled for proxies for 
miles driven (age and SES) and selected only those with driving experience by wave 
5 should mitigate these concerns to some extent. 
The strength of this study is that a unique part of adolescents’ reckless driving was 
demonstrated to be affected by exposure to reckless driving in movies, exposure that 
was measured well before these adolescents ever got behind the wheel of a car. This 
association was found to be independent of various potential confounding variables 
(e.g., the reported frequency of watching movies) and sensation seeking tendencies. 
Therefore, the results of this study are consistent with the idea that seeing reckless 
driving on screen is one cause of reckless driving. More observational and experimental 
studies are needed to make a definitive causal statement in this area.
Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of making a distinction between 
adolescents’ reckless driving and inattentive driving because each requires different 
prevention strategies. Inattentive driving is related to poor self-regulation, suggesting 
that attention deficits and high distractibility are substantial risk factors of unsafe driving 
practices among adolescents.  Reckless driving is related to risk taking propensity, 
male gender, videogame use and exposure to reckless driving in movies. Interventional 
researchers should address both issues and related risks.  
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Conclusion
Besides replicating previous findings on well-known unsafe driving-related risk-
factors such as male gender and sensation seeking (Dahlen et al., 2005; Jonah et 
al., 2001), this study shows that exposure to reckless driving in movies may increase 
future tendencies to drive recklessly in adolescents. Whereas risky health behaviors 
such as excessive smoking or drinking primarily pose a threat to one’s own health, risk 
taking in traffic may also potentially harm others. In light of traffic injury prevention, 
the specific mechanisms that make adolescents drive more recklessly when they have 
been exposed to reckless driving in movies should be further examined.
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Table A3
Correlations of wave 1 predictors with wave 6 unsafe driving composites. 
Unsafe Reckless Inattentive
Movie Reckless Driving  0.05*    0.07**  -0.01    
Self-regulation -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.12***
Age  0.18***  0.20**  0.08**  
Sensation Seeking  0.22***  0.22***  0.14***
Socioeconomic Status  0.13***  0.12***  0.08**  
Extracurricular Activities -0.05    -0.05*   -0.02    
Male Gender  0.08**   0.07**   0.05*   
Parent Education  0.06*    0.06*    0.04    
School Performance -0.05    -0.04    -0.04    
Rebelliousness  0.11***  0.09***  0.09***
Movies Per Week  0.05     0.06*    0.01    
TV Hours Per Day  0.00     0.01    -0.02    
Video Games Per Day  0.01     0.02     0.00    
Parental Support -0.08**  -0.08*** -0.03    
Parental Control -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.03    
Note. Unsafe driving is based on all 9 items. Pairwise sample size varies between 1642 and 1647 due to missing 
data.* .01 < p <= .05, ** .001 < p <= .01, *** 0 < p <= .001
Table A4
Parameter estimates for measurement portion of final direct effects model.
Estimate Est./S.E. p
Factor Loadings Reckless Driving
Speeding 0.784 19.347 0.000
Tailgating 0.680 22.970 0.000
Weaving In and Out 0.624 20.324 0.000
Cross Double Yellow Line 0.472 11.573 0.000
Speed through Yellow Light 0.679 20.836 0.000
Fail to Use Seatbelts 0.372 9.826 0.000
Factor Loadings Inattentive Driving
Fail to Yield 0.755 17.764 0.000
Run Red Light 0.493 11.813 0.000
Ignore Stop Sign 0.599 14.377 0.000
Indicator Thresholds
Speeding 1.624 2.044 0.041
Tailgating 1.732 2.427 0.015
Weaving In and Out 1.618 2.196 0.028
Cross Double Yellow Line 1.344 1.663 0.096
Speed through Yellow Light 1.186 1.695 0.090
Fail to Use Seatbelts 0.568 0.789 0.430
Fail to Yield 0.838 1.120 0.263
Run Red Light 1.280 1.744 0.081
Ignore Stop Sign 1.339 1.727 0.084
Correlations
Reckless with Inattentive Driving 0.669 15.943 0.000
Speed through Yellow Light with Run Red Light 0.259 5.430 0.000
Appendix
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Table A6
Estimates for probit indirect effects model.
Estimate Est./S.E. p Std. Estimate
Reckless Driving
Over Speed Limit 0.779 19.306 0.000 0.806
Tailgated 0.677 22.823 0.000 0.709
Weaved in and out of traffic 0.623 20.304 0.000 0.656
Cross double yellow line to pass 0.474 11.658 0.000 0.506
Sped through a yellow light 0.676 20.838 0.000 0.708
Failed to use seatbelt 0.359 9.437 0.000 0.368 
Inattentive Driving
Failed to yield 0.760 17.817 0.000 0.783 
Ran red light 0.479 11.493 0.000 0.504
Ignored stop sign 0.597 14.482 0.000 0.623
Reckless Driving on
Age 0.183 6.872 0.000 0.217
Male Gender 0.095 1.493 0.135 0.043
Parent Education -0.066 -1.711 0.087 -0.073
School Performance 0.029 0.671 0.502 0.020
SES 0.397 5.477 0.000 0.236
Rebelliousness -0.054 -0.679 0.497 -0.021
Self-regulation -0.111 -1.278 0.201 -0.047
Movies per week 0.027 0.769 0.442 0.022
TV hours per day -0.029 -0.882 0.378 -0.025
Video games hours per day -0.057 -1.660 0.097 -0.050
Extracurricular Activities -0.163 -2.517 0.012 -0.072
Parental Support 0.074 0.971 0.332 0.030
Parental Control -0.011 -0.158 0.875 -0.005
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.293 3.942 0.000 0.159
Movie Reckless driving exposure 1.922 2.320 0.020 0.071
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.169 2.676 0.007 0.097
Inattentive Driving on
Age 0.061 1.899 0.058 0.073
Male Gender 0.095 1.493 0.135 0.044
Parent Education -0.066 -1.711 0.087 -0.075
School Performance 0.029 0.671 0.502 0.020
SES 0.397 5.477 0.000 0.242
Rebelliousness -0.054 -0.679 0.497 -0.021
Self-regulation -0.321 -3.026 0.002 -0.140
Movies per week 0.027 0.769 0.442 0.022
TV hours per day -0.029 -0.882 0.378 -0.026
Video games hours per day -0.057 -1.660 0.097 -0.051
Extracurricular Activities -0.163 -2.517 0.012 -0.073
Parental Support 0.074 0.971 0.332 0.031
Parental Control -0.011 -0.158 0.875 -0.005
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Estimate Est./S.E. p Std. Estimate
Inattentive Driving on
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.227 2.579 0.010 0.126
Movie Reckless driving exposure -1.047 -1.050 0.294 -0.039
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.227 3.128 0.002 0.133
Failed to use seatbelt
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.202 2.755 0.006 0.113
Male Gender 0.266 3.570 0.000 0.125
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.243 3.878 0.000 0.143
Sensation seeking wave 4
Age -0.011 -1.092 0.275 -0.023
Male Gender 0.056 2.028 0.043 0.045
Parent Education -0.002 -0.124 0.902 -0.004
School Performance -0.015 -0.785 0.432 -0.018
SES -0.080 -2.709 0.007 -0.083
Rebelliousness 0.081 2.528 0.011 0.055
Self-regulation -0.047 -1.499 0.134 -0.035
Movies per week 0.044 2.785 0.005 0.061
TV hours per day 0.014 1.000 0.317 0.021
Video games hours per day -0.007 -0.463 0.644 -0.010
Extracurricular Activities -0.018 -0.646 0.518 -0.014
Parental Suppor -0.088 -2.769 0.006 -0.064
Parental Control -0.031 -1.019 0.308 -0.023
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.483 19.856 0.000 0.460
Movie Reckless driving exposure 0.480 1.503 0.133 0.031
Correlation: Reckless driving with inattentive driving 0.660 15.555 0.000 0.660
Correlation: Sped through yellow with run red light 0.266 5.574 0.000 0.266
Intercepts
Sensation seeking wave 4 1.593 6.248 0.000 2.558
Thresholds
Over Speed Limit 1.833 2.306 0.021 1.741
Tailgated 1.914 2.664 0.008 1.839
Weaved in and out of traffic 1.785 2.414 0.016 1.725
Cross double yellow line to pass 1.471 1.813 0.070 1.442
Sped through a yellow light 1.368 1.947 0.051 1.315
Failed to use seatbelt 1.053 1.462 0.144 0.991
Failed to yield 1.114 1.487 0.137 1.076
Ran red light 1.453 1.969 0.049 1.432
Ignored stop sign 1.555 2.003 0.045 1.522
Residual Variances
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.256 28.268 0.000 0.659
Reckless driving 1.000 0.842
Inattentive driving 1.000 0.880
R Squared
Over Speed Limit 0.649
Tailgated 0.503
Weaved in and out of traffic 0.431
Cross double yellow line to pass 0.256
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Estimate Est./S.E. p Std. Estimate
R Squared
Sped through a yellow light 0.502
Failed to use seatbelt 0.249
Failed to yield 0.613
Ran red light 0.254
Ignored stop sign 0.388
Table A7
Estimates for logit indirect effects model.
Estimate Est./S.E. p
Reckless Driving
Over Speed Limit 2.397 7.354 0.000
Tailgated 1.657 10.986 0.000
Weaved in and out of traffic 1.391 11.127 0.000
Cross double yellow line to pass 0.864 8.105 0.000
Sped through a yellow light 1.521 10.528 0.000
Failed to use seatbelt 0.523 6.563 0.000
Inattentive Driving
Failed to yield 1.871 7.834 0.000
Ran red light 0.867 7.996 0.000
Ignored stop sign 1.300 8.403 0.000
Reckless Driving on
Age 0.189 7.206 0.000
Male Gender 0.093 1.479 0.139
Parent Education -0.073 -1.828 0.068
School Performance 0.036 0.808 0.419
SES 0.442 5.905 0.000
Rebelliousness -0.046 -0.571 0.568
Self-regulation -0.116 -1.355 0.175
Movies per week 0.029 0.827 0.408
TV hours per day -0.029 -0.856 0.392
Video games hours per day -0.059 -1.759 0.079
Extracurricular Activities -0.165 -2.584 0.010
Parental Support 0.090 1.235 0.217
Parental Control -0.017 -0.237 0.813
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.290 3.818 0.000
Movie Reckless driving exposure 1.880 2.324 0.020
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.160 2.448 0.014
Inattentive Driving on
Age 0.059 1.844 0.065
Male Gender 0.093 1.479 0.139
Parent Education -0.073 -1.828 0.068
School Performance 0.036 0.808 0.419
SES 0.442 5.905 0.000
Rebelliousness -0.046 -0.571 0.568
Self-regulation -0.362 -3.685 0.000
Movies per week 0.029 0.827 0.408
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Estimate Est./S.E. p
Inattentive Driving on
TV hours per day -0.029 -0.856 0.392
Video games hours per day -0.059 -1.759 0.079
Extracurricular Activities -0.165 -2.584 0.010
Parental Support 0.090 1.235 0.217
Parental Control -0.017 -0.237 0.813
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.247 2.844 0.004
Movie Reckless driving exposure -1.208 -1.205 0.228
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.236 3.095 0.002
Failed to use seatbelt on
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.459 3.820 0.000
Male Gender 0.433 3.699 0.000
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.465 4.083 0.000
Sensation seeking wave 4
Age -0.011 -1.067 0.286
Male Gender 0.056 2.000 0.045
Parent Education -0.001 -0.077 0.938
School Performance -0.011 -0.560 0.575
SES -0.073 -2.234 0.025
Rebelliousness 0.086 2.015 0.044
Self-regulation -0.046 -1.328 0.184
Movies per week 0.044 2.804 0.005
TV hours per day 0.014 0.886 0.376
Video games hours per day -0.006 -0.402 0.688
Extracurricular Activities -0.017 -0.600 0.549
Parental Support -0.087 -2.393 0.017
Parental Control -0.029 -0.962 0.336
Sensation Seeking wave 1 0.483 18.455 0.000
Movie Reckless driving exposure 0.466 1.476 0.140
Correlation: Reckless driving with inattentive driving 0.653 13.540 0.000
Correlation: Sped through yellow with run red light 1.310 4.809 0.000
Intercepts
Sensation seeking wave 4 1.593 5.782 0.000
Thresholds
Over Speed Limit 3.432 2.056 0.040
Tailgated 5.781 5.026 0.000
Weaved in and out of traffic 5.161 5.382 0.000
Cross double yellow line to pass 4.513 7.114 0.000
Sped through a yellow light 2.713 2.607 0.009
Failed to use seatbelt 4.542 10.105 0.000
Failed to yield 2.142 1.577 0.115
Ran red light 1.626 2.600 0.009
Ignored stop sign 2.072 2.215 0.027
Residual Variances
Sensation seeking wave 4 0.256 26.192 0.000
Reckless driving 1.000
Inattentive driving 1.000
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Summary
The main aim of this thesis was to gain more insight in the underlying decision-making 
process of real-life risk-taking behaviors. To achieve this goal, the separate studies 
focused on internal and external states that play a role in constructing the representation 
of a given decision problem, in addition to the riskiness of the associated choices 
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Internal factors included individual differences 
in risk-related traits such as impulsivity and/or sensation seeking (chapters 4, 5, 6), 
individual differences in risk taking propensity (chapter 3) due to a psychiatric disorder 
(chapter 5) and due to developmental phase (chapter 6). External factors that were 
taken into account were differences in context, particularly static versus dynamic and 
engaging (chapters 3 and 5) and risk-promoting media (chapter 6). The EEG studies 
described in chapters 2 and 4 provided more insight in the real-time cognitive processes 
involved during risky decision making when it is presented in a way that relates to 
real-life risk taking.
In a review of the literature that set the stage for part of the studies described in this 
thesis (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011) the shortcomings and benefits of different 
existing approaches to investigate risk taking behavior were extensively discussed. 
The authors of this review argued that future tasks should combine the best of both 
implicit and explicit risky decision-making tasks. These future tasks should predict 
real-life risk taking like most implicit tasks do, and similar to explicit measures, should 
provide more insight in the underlying choice process. Performance on such tasks is 
expected to better reflect real-life risk taking without losing sight of the impact of the 
underlying components (probability estimation and valuation) on the choice process. 
A second aim of the research described in this thesis in service of the first was to 
examine the impact of internal and external factors on the decision-making process. 
These factors influence the construction of the representation of the decision problem 
and subsequently, valuation and action selection in the course of value-based decision 
making (Rangel et al., 2008). By taking into account a selection of these internal and 
external factors, the undertaken studies were expected to be more sensitive to individual 
differences in decision-making strategies in real-life situations that involve risk.
Multiple studies were undertaken to achieve these goals. In the first exploratory 
EEG study described in chapter 2, we started by examining with a computerized 
simple traffic task whether decisions based on everyday experience (knowledge of the 
significance of traffic light colors) involved similar cognitive processes as decisions in 
most simple response-mapping tasks (e.g., Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Usually, during 
such response-mapping tasks, action-outcome associations are learned during the task 
and not based on real-life experience. Translating this assumption to the experimental 
context of our study, we questioned whether  an orange traffic light would generate 
more cognitive conflict about the correct response (stop or go) than a green or red traffic 
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light because in real life, an orange traffic light is less uniquely associated with a single 
correct response than a green traffic light. We predicted that conflict and expectancy 
violations as reflected by the ERP components N2 and FRN respectively would be 
modulated by such everyday knowledge.  This prediction was partially confirmed. 
Indeed, the N2, an ERP component that is known to signal cognitive conflict on a 
neural level (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004) was enhanced for ambiguous traffic 
light combinations. This observation was consistent with the behavioral data, showing 
that the most ambiguous traffic light combination was less uniquely associated with 
one specific response as compared to the less ambiguous traffic light combinations. 
In contrast, the FRN component that signals on a neural level whether an outcome is 
worse than expected (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002) was not modulated by experience-
based expectancies. In other words, the FRN was not larger for unsuccessful crossings 
that are unexpected in everyday life (a green traffic light while the traffic light for the 
other road user was red) compared to more ambiguous traffic light combinations. 
Still, this component was overall more pronounced in response to negative feedback 
as compared to positive feedback, which is in line with the literature indicating that 
the FRN signals when an outcome is worse than expected and that behavior needs 
to be adjusted (e.g., Boksem, Kostermans, & De Cremer, 2010; Gehring & Willoughby, 
2002). Taken together, the results of this first explorative study showed that situations 
that in real life are associated with conflict, induce similar neurocognitive processes 
as conflicting stimuli on simple response mapping tasks.  These findings indicate that 
controlled lab tasks may provide more insight in cognitive processes involved in real-
life decision making.  
The second study described in chapter 3 addressed whether a dynamic and 
engaging risky decision-making task in a virtual reality (VR) environment would better 
capture the underlying processes involved in real-life risk taking than more standard 
risky decision-making tasks. Indeed, this behavioral study revealed that in a healthy 
sample of young adults, performance on the Simulated Driving Task better predicted 
real-life risk-taking propensity than choices in a static risky decision-making context 
(lottery task) with identical choice options. Moreover, risky decision making on the 
SDT was related to real-life risk taking in several subdomains (financial, health-related, 
recreational), whereas risky decision making in the lottery task was only related to 
risk-taking in the financial domain. These findings confirm the idea that a dynamic and 
engaging risky decision-making context may better capture the cognitive and affective 
processes involved in decision making (Bechara &loewloewenstein Damasio, 2005; 
Gray, 2004; Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009) and real-life risk taking (Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Lupton & Tulloch, 2002). 
In the third study described in chapter 4, an updated version of the Simulated 
Driving Task suitable to administer in combination with EEG recordings was aimed at 
obtaining more insight in the real-time cognitive processes involved in risky decision 
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making in a dynamic and engaging context. Results showed that in contrast to safe 
choices, risky choices were preceded by decreased mid-frontal theta activity, reflecting 
reduced cognitive control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). In addition, the personality traits 
sensation seeking and impulsivity, respectively modulated attention and cognitive 
control in response to variable risk. Specifically, for decreasingly risky choices, high 
sensation seeking was related to an increase in pre-decision parietal alpha activity. 
This finding indicates diminished recruitment of attention for decreasingly risky actions 
in high sensation seeking individuals. Probably, less attention is recruited for decision 
making in this group as risky choices become less exciting (and more likely to result in 
a reward). This linear relation was not observed in low sensation seeking individuals. 
With regard to impulsivity, only in low impulsive individuals, recruitment of cognitive 
control as reflected by pre-decision mid-frontal theta activity followed a quadratic 
shape, with maximal activity for risky choices associated with the least predictable 
outcomes (30% and 50% probability). These results indicate that cognitive control was 
most needed for risky decisions associated with highly uncertain outcomes. Probably, 
options associated with maximally uncertain outcomes induce decision conflict and 
thus a higher need for cognitive control (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). This result 
is in line with studies showing that cognitive demands in conflict situations lead to an 
increase in theta activity (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011; Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, & 
Stürmer, 2012). The flexible recruitment of cognitive control as observed in low impulsive 
individuals was not observed in highly impulsive individuals. 
The final two studies were aimed at investigating dynamic and engaging risky 
decision making and risky behaviors of groups known for their increased propensity 
to engage in real-life risk taking.  Specifically, the fourth study described in chapter 5 
was focused on risky decision making in a group of adolescents with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Among other measurements, a simplified version of the 
Simulated Driving Task (SDT) and the Cake Gambling Task (CGT) were administered. 
Results demonstrated that risky decision making in adolescents with ADHD was 
increased as compared to their non-ADHD counterparts for risky choices associated 
with maximal uncertainty (risky choices associated with outcomes that were least 
predictable, namely with a 50% probability) and for risky choices associated with high 
reward values. Although the dynamic and engaging SDT did not better differentiate 
between adolescents with and without ADHD than the CGT, the risky decisions made 
in the most uncertain condition of this task were associated with all ADHD symptoms 
(hyperactivity-impulsivity and inattention) whereas the risky decisions in the high reward-
value conditions on the Cake Gambling Task were associated with hyperactivity-impulsivity 
only. In addition, diminished response inhibition as measured by the Go/No-go task 
was associated with risky decision making in the SDT but not with risky decisions in 
the CGT. Note that although the expected values of risky and safe choices in both the 
maximally uncertain condition of the SDT and all conditions of the CGT were equally 
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large, adolescents with ADHD displayed a higher preference for the more variable (thus 
more risky) option than their non-ADHD counterparts. Possibly, the SDT-version that 
was administered in this study was more sensitive to aspects that contribute to real-life 
risk taking in adolescents with ADHD, as risky decision making in the most uncertain 
condition of this task was more strongly associated with both attention-related and 
hyperactive-impulsive symptoms than risky choices in response to high reward values 
on the CGT. However, further research is needed to confirm this assumption. 
The final study described in chapter 6 was focused on the long-term impact of 
exposure to reckless driving in movies on reckless driving behavior in a large sample 
of adolescents. While controlling for a host of background variables, early exposure to 
movie reckless driving directly predicted adolescents’ future reckless driving behaviors, 
but not their inattentive driving. In turn, inattentive driving was predicted by poor self-
regulatory control. Adolescents with high scores on trait sensation seeking were more 
likely to engage in future unsafe driving. Males and high sensation seeking adolescents 
were found to be less inclined to use seatbelts. This study confirms that in addition to 
individual differences in cognitive processes, external factors such as positive portrayals 
of risky behaviors in the media may influence real-life risk-taking behaviors (Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Vogrinic, & Sauer, 2011) and specifically, reckless driving 
(see also Hull, Draghici, & Sargent, 2011).
Discussion
In the following sections, the main findings presented in this thesis will be discussed 
in light of the theoretical model proposed by Rangel and colleagues (2008). The model 
describes four stages, i.e. (1) construction of a representation of a given decision problem, 
which depends on internal and external states, (2) value assignment and comparison of 
the available courses of action to come to a decision, (3) action selection, (4) evaluation 
of the benefits of the selected action by the brain to update the processes at the 
different stages in subsequent decision making (learning). The focus of the discussion 
will be on the first and third stage of value-based decision making, because the internal 
and external states that were examined in this thesis were expected to influence the 
first stage (the construction of the representation of a decision-problem) and to result 
in behavioral differences that can be measured at the third stage of action selection. 
 The internal and external factors examined in this thesis were: (1) individual differences 
in trait sensation seeking and impulsivity, (2) decision conflict (based on experience 
and uncertainty), (3) cognitive control and (4) affective and motivational processes. 
Whereas the first and fourth factor are thought to be predominantly involved in the first 
stage of value-based decision making, the second and third factor are expected to 
predominantly play a role during its third stage (Rangel et al., 2008). After the discussion 
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of these internal and external states, the assessment of risky decision making in this 
thesis will be discussed. Next, limitations of our studies and suggestions for future 
directions will be elaborated on. Finally, the chapter will close with concluding remarks 
and implications of our research findings.
Sensation seeking and impulsivity 
Trait sensation seeking and/or impulsivity were associated with risk-taking propensity 
in the studies described in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Together, these findings are consistent 
with the literature indicating that elevated levels of trait sensation seeking and impulsivity 
promote risk taking behaviors (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000; Roberti, 2004). Impulsivity 
seems to predominantly reflect deficits in cognitive control (Dalley, Everitt, & Robins, 
2011; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, De Wit, & Ersche, 2012; Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 
2006), which may promote risk-taking due to less elaborate cognitive processing 
of a given situation. Note that impulsivity is a personality trait that varies in healthy 
individuals, but in extreme forms is a component of numerous psychiatric disorders, 
including ADHD. Severe impulsivity reflects deficits in cognitive control and particularly, 
decreased inhibitory control (Robbins et al., 2011; Winstanley et al., 2006). The observed 
low levels of cognitive control that did not fluctuate as a function of the probability level 
of a risky choice in highly impulsive individuals may indeed reflect a less deliberate 
processing style. In contrast to diminished cognitive control, sensation seeking seems 
to predominantly reflect the need for exciting and rewarding experiences (Roberti, 
2004). In our study, we found some evidence for this contention by demonstrating that 
attention decreased in anticipation of decreasingly risky and therefore probably less 
exiting choices in individuals that scored relatively high on sensation seeking tendencies. 
Finally, in chapter 6, sensation seeking was associated with unsafe driving (reckless and 
inattentive), whereas poor self-regulation was only associated with inattentive driving. 
Similar to the study described in chapter 4, both cognitive control (operationalized as 
impulsivity in chapter 4 and as self-regulation in chapter 6) and reward sensitivity (as 
reflected by sensation seeking in both chapters 4 and 6) turn out to be important but 
partially distinct components of risk taking behaviors. Results presented in chapter 6 are 
also consistent with the literature showing that particularly the period of adolescence is 
associated with both impulsive behavior and increased sensation seeking tendencies 
(Steinberg, 2008). 
Together, our findings suggest that the risk-related personality traits sensation seeking 
and impulsivity both influence a person’s construction of the representation of a decision 
problem under risk (Rangel et al., 2008), albeit through different cognitive and motivational 
pathways. Whereas impulsive risk taking may predominantly reflect a lack of consideration 
of possible harmful consequences, risk taking in sensation seekers may predominantly 
reflect a deliberate choice for an exciting experience that possibly involves some risk. 
Risky decision-making tasks that tap into both pathways are probably more sensitive 
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to individual differences that play a role in real-life risk taking than more static gambling 
tasks. To be able to target potentially harmful risky behaviors, it is important to know 
whether the behavior is mainly driven by the rewarding properties of the risk, or is simply 
the result of a lack of cognitive control. Experimentally controlled and motivationally 
salient lab tasks such as the SDT may provide more insight in these processes and 
the determinants of specific risky behaviors across individuals and across conditions. 
Decision conflict and experience
The study described in chapter 2 showed that decision conflict (as reflected by the 
enhancement of the stimulus-locked N2) was highest for the most ambiguous traffic-
light color combination. The decision conflict observed in this study may reflect conflict 
between different valuation systems, such as between the habitual and goal-directed 
system (Rangel et al., 2008). Take for example driving on the right side of the road, 
which is mandatory in most countries. For people familiar with this situation, relying 
on the habitual system is the most optimal strategy. However, when you are driving in 
another country where you are supposed to drive on the left side of the road, it is better 
to switch to the goal-directed system to prevent ending up in an accident. In other words, 
well-learned action-outcome associations (crossing an intersection when the traffic light 
turns green) may promote optimal decision making in familiar circumstances, but may 
hamper this process in unfamiliar environments with different rules. In such situations, 
the experience of decision conflict and the subsequent increased recruitment of cognitive 
control may prevent one from taking unnecessary risks (see also Helfinstein et al., 2014).
Decision-conflict and uncertainty
Examination of decision making under varying degrees of risk as described in chapter 
4 showed that mid-frontal theta activity was highest prior to risky choices associated 
with the least predictable outcomes, indicating relatively high decision conflict and 
recruitment of cognitive control under highly uncertain circumstances. Uncertainty 
and decision-conflict have been found to elicit overlapping activity in the posterior 
medial frontal cortex (mPFC) of which ACC is a part (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Mid-frontal theta activity that is thought to reflect ACC activity may 
represent a mechanism for the recruitment of cognitive control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014) 
and has previously been shown to increase in response to cognitive control demands 
in conflicting situations (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011; Nigbur, Ivanova, & Stürmer, 2012). 
Conflict monitoring has been proposed as one of several mechanisms (in addition to 
error detection, negative feedback etc.) that generate ACC activity to signal the need 
for cognitive control to other brain areas that are responsible for exerting control over 
behavior, such as the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC ; Kouneiher et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004; Shenhav et al., 2013).
Note that the increase in mid-frontal theta activity for risky choices associated with 
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high uncertainty as described in chapter 4 was not observed in impulsive individuals, 
who tend to have problems with adequately recruiting top-down cognitive control 
(Dalley et al., 2011; Robbins et al., 2012). Interestingly, high decision conflict has 
been previously associated with risk-minimizing choices and as a consequence, with 
suboptimal decision making (Nowlis, Khan, & Dar, 2002). Apparently, not only too few but 
also too much cognitive control can be disadvantageous sometimes (see also Rangel 
et al., 2008). The studies in chapters 2 and 4 and the study by Nowlis and colleagues 
(2002) suggest that both too few and too much decision conflict may hamper optimal 
decision making. However, more research is needed to confirm this assumption as in 
both studies experienced decision conflict and behavioral performance were unrelated.
Another interesting finding in relation to this topic was that uncertainty appeared to 
promote risk seeking behavior in adolescents with ADHD (see chapter 5). Processes 
related to uncertainty have been dissociated from processes related to expected value 
in the brain (e.g., Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 
2006). Whereas phasic midbrain dopamine increases as a function of an increase in the 
expected value of an outcome, sustained midbrain dopamine activity has been found 
to be highest for cues that predict reward with a 50% likelihood and lowest for certain 
rewards or no rewards (Fiorillo et al., 2003). The question remains whether individuals 
who take risks under uncertain circumstances are more tolerant of uncertainty, or that 
uncertainty in itself has rewarding properties (e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003; McCoy & Platt, 
2005). Probably, both explanations may account for the tendency to engage in risk-taking 
behaviors. As suggested before, risk taking under uncertain circumstances could be 
the result of a lack of experienced decision conflict, especially for impulsive individuals 
who are known for their tendency ‘to act without thinking’ (Dalley et al., 2011; Robbins 
et al., 2012). However, it could also be the case that uncertainty has the same rewarding 
properties as novelty (Bevins et al., 2002) to individuals with a heightened sensitivity to 
reward. To illustrate, Lupton and Tulloch (2002) showed that some participants in their 
study associated risk with properties such as danger and uncertainty, but attached a 
positive value to these properties under specific circumstances. It would be interesting to 
dissociate in future research if and under what conditions tolerance to or the rewarding 
properties of uncertainty promote risky behaviors in contexts associated with maximally 
uncertain outcomes. 
Cognitive control
In both chapters 4 and 5, the relevance of adequate cognitive control recruitment in 
the process of risky decision making has been demonstrated. When comparing neural 
activity prior to risky and safe choices in the study described in chapter 4, mid-frontal 
theta activity was lower prior to risky decisions than prior to safe choices. This finding 
indicates that lapses in cognitive control may promote risk taking behavior (Helfinstein et 
al., 2014). In addition, the behavioral findings described in chapter 5 provided (indirect) 
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evidence for the relevance of cognitive control in risky decision making, by showing that 
under conditions of uncertainty and high reward value, adolescents with ADHD displayed 
an increased inclination to make risky choices. Importantly, a key component of ADHD is 
impaired cognitive control capacity (Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005), 
which, among other factors (such as motivational components), may have promoted 
risk taking in this group. Finally, diminished response inhibition and increased risky 
decision making during the dynamic and engaging driving simulation were found to be 
related. This finding further stresses the link between cognitive control and risk-taking. 
Response inhibition is one of several executive functions underlying the cognitive control 
system (Niendam, 2012).
Cognitive control capacity also appeared to play a role in part of the results of 
the longitudinal study described in chapter 6. In this study, poor self-regulation was 
associated with adolescents’ inattentive driving behaviors. Successful self-regulation is 
known to depend on the implementation of top-down cognitive control over behavior, 
as reflected by lPFC activity (e.g., Volkow et al., 2010). Results of the study described in 
chapter 6 indicated that a lack of top-down cognitive control accounted for adolescents’ 
inattentive driving, whereas movie exposure to reckless driving and sensation seeking 
accounted for deliberate risky driving behavior.  
Taken together, the results of chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 suggest that decision conflict and 
cognitive control capacity are important and sometimes interrelated determinants of risk-
taking behaviors. According to the expected value of control (EVC) theory (Shenhav et al., 
2013), the ACC integrates information concerning the expected pay-off from controlled 
processing, the amount of control needed to obtain that pay-off and the cost of exerting 
cognitive effort. In this framework, decision conflict has been suggested as one of the 
mechanisms signaling that the intensity of allocated cognitive control should be increased. 
Presumably, when decision conflict and/or cognitive control are low, a decision problem 
and its possible consequences are less thoroughly evaluated. Shallow or less deliberate 
processing may result in a poor or incomplete construction of the representation of 
the decision problem, described as the first phase of value-based decision making by 
Rangel and colleagues (2008). Under specific circumstances, shallower processing and 
low levels of experienced decision conflict may promote risk-taking behaviors, as the 
potentially negative consequences are less thoroughly considered. On the other hand, 
focusing too much on what possibly could go wrong may instigate too much decision 
conflict and too much exertion of cognitive control, which may promote overly cautious 
behavior. Our research indicates that it is important to realize that the degree of cognitive 
conflict and control may differ across individuals and situations during risky decision 
making. Taking into account the degree to which these cognitive factors are involved 
during risky decision making in an engaging setting may help to better understand the 
conditions under which real-life risk-taking behaviors take place. 
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Affective and motivational processes
Most explicit risky decision-making tasks do not require active engagement and 
may therefore be experienced as less exciting or motivationally salient as compared to 
most real-life risk-taking behaviors. To address this issue, the dynamic and engaging 
Simulated Driving Task (SDT) as described in chapters 3, 4, and 5 was administered. 
Although not directly tested, the dynamic context in combination with the possibility 
to obtain monetary rewards was expected to make the SDT motivationally salient and 
affectively engaging. We reasoned that the context and task demands of this task 
would better reflect the cognitive and affective processes involved in real-life risk taking 
than standard risky decision-making tasks. In the final study described in chapter 6, 
the impact of risk-glorifying media on adolescents’ real-life risk-taking behaviors was 
investigated. The emphasis on the rewarding aspects of risky behaviors observed in 
movies could motivate adolescents to engage in the risky behaviors themselves.
If and how affective/motivational processes are involved in risky decision making 
has been addressed in previous research. For example, Brand, Labudda, and Markowitz 
(2006) propose that during risky decision making, components of the decision situation 
(probability distributions and outcome values) are represented in working memory, 
and together with retrieved personal experiences and information from long-term 
memory determine a decision strategy. In addition, affective responses to a given 
decision situation are suggested to potentially influence a particular decision strategy 
or alternatively, even guide decision making without a strategy (Brand et al., 2006). To 
illustrate, Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, and Weber (2009) found that risk taking was 
negatively associated with task-information use, but only on the affectively engaging 
version of the Colombia Card Task (CCT). Recordings of electrodermal activity showed 
that emotional arousal was higher in the affectively involving version of the CCT than 
during the ‘cold’ version of this task. The authors argued that the affective system 
overruled more deliberate processing in this particular context.
 Decision-making research with emotionally impaired patients suggests that emotions 
or somatic markers generated by the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex may 
be essential for optimal decision making, by biasing decisions in an advantageous 
manner (Bechera & Damasio, 2005; Brand et al., 2004). However, both positive and 
negative somatic states may hamper decision making when unrelated to the task at 
hand (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Bechera & Damasio, 2005) and may bias decisions 
by prioritizing short-term goals (Gray, 1999). In relation to risk-taking behaviors, “risk 
seeking” behavior and “risk aversion” are also argued to be modulated by somatic 
states (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
Part of the results obtained in our studies suggest that performance on the SDT 
better reflected real-life risky decision making than more static risky decision-making 
tasks. For example, the study described in chapter 3 showed that SDT risky decision 
making was more strongly associated with real-life risk-taking propensity than a static 
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lottery task with identical choice options and outcome values. In chapter 5 however, the 
SDT did not better differentiate between adolescents with and without ADHD than the 
Cake Gambling Task (CGT) did. It should be noted that the CGT was initially developed 
to be an engaging gambling task (Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008), which 
means that the comparison in risky decision making on both tasks actually served as 
a conservative test. Still, risky decision making on the SDT was more strongly related 
to ADHD symptoms, which suggests that this dynamic task was more sensitive to 
the mechanisms that contribute to risky decision making in this group than a static 
gambling task. 
The higher preparedness of adolescents diagnosed with ADHD to take risks for 
relatively high potential rewards as observed in the study described in chapter 5 
may reflect elevated reward sensitivity (Luman, Oosterlaan, & Sargent, 2005; Luman, 
Tripp, & Scheres, 2009), which may have increased their motivation to engage in risky 
behaviors for the sake of the potential reward involved. The nucleus accumbens (a 
component of ventral striatum), appears to modulate the motivational aspects of an 
action (e.g., Ernst et al., 2004; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001). Possibly, 
the observed hyporesponsive ventral striatum during reward anticipation in individuals 
with ADHD (Plichta & Scheres, 2014; Scheres, Milham, Knutson, & Castellanos, 2007) 
increases reward-seeking behavior, to compensate for the low levels of activity in this 
brain structure (Robbins & Everitt, 2009). The interplay between altered motivational 
and impaired cognitive processes (De Zeeuw, Weusten, Van Dijk, Van Belle & Durston, 
2012; Sonuga-Barke, Bitsakou, & Thompson, 2010) may promote risky behaviors in 
adolescents that have been diagnosed with this disorder.  
Although the SDT did not better differentiate between adolescents with and without 
ADHD with regard to risky decision making,  task evaluations in chapter 5 indicated that 
the SDT was preferred over the other administered measures, among which a more 
typical risky decision-making task. This positive evaluation suggests that the task was 
more affectively engaging than the other administered tasks. Further improvements 
to this version of the SDT, for example by adding more variation to task conditions 
that make the task even more dynamic and engaging may eventually yield a sensitive 
instrument to examine risky decision making in individuals with ADHD.
        Finally, motivational processes may have contributed to the increased reckless 
driving behaviors in adolescents who had been frequently exposed to reckless driving 
in movies, as described in chapter 6. Risk-taking portrayals in the media are usually 
more strongly focused on its rewarding aspects instead of the potentially dangerous 
consequences (Fischer et al., 2012). To illustrate, the James Bond character in the similarly 
named movies frequently drinks alcoholic beverages, but apparently without negative 
consequences to his cognitive or physical performance. Likewise, extremely reckless 
driving pursuits in movies typically do not end with heavily injured main characters, 
which under similar circumstances in real life would be a very likely outcome. In addition 
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to other factors, the early and frequent exposure to rewarding risk-taking behaviors in 
movies may have motivated adolescents to engage in reckless driving themselves by 
the time they got their driver’s license. 
In movies and videogames, the positive components of risk-taking behaviors are 
typically highlighted while the potentially harmful consequences are downplayed. Frequent 
exposure may contribute to an unrealistically positive evaluation of the observed risky 
behavior and may increase the likelihood to engage in similar risk-taking behaviors. 
Sensation seeking tendencies and associated reward sensitivity are enhanced during 
adolescence as compared to adulthood (Steinberg, 2008). At the same time, adolescents 
have more opportunities to engage in risky behavior than during childhood (such as 
drinking and reckless driving). Exposure to risky activities to which the adolescent 
has access may promote the engagement in these behaviors, particularly during this 
vulnerable developmental phase. The study in chapter 6 suggests that, in addition to 
internal factors such as impulsivity and sensation seeking, external factors such as 
exposure to risky behaviors in the media may also influence the construction of the 
representation of  a given decision problem (the first stage of a value-based decision-
making; Rangel et al., 2008). Taken together, motivation and accompanying affective 
states (Elliot & Trash, 2002; Lang & Bradley, 2010) are likely to have influenced risky 
decision making in the studies described in this thesis, in addition to other cognitive 
processes. Findings in the described studies suggest that it is important to tap into 
both cognitive and affective processes if one wants to examine risky decision making 
in a realistic manner.
Assessment of risky decision making
An important issue in experimental (behavioral and neurocognitive) studies on risk 
taking is the question whether the risky decision context presented during experimental 
tasks will induce the same reactions and processes as risky situations in real life. Risky 
decision making in real life  is thought to result from the interplay between cognitive, 
motivational (Kouneiher et al., 2009) and affective processes (Figner & Weber, 2011). 
Our findings indicate that risky decision making in a dynamic and engaging context 
may better reflect the processes involved in real-life risk-taking behavior than more 
standard and static gambling tasks. 
Individuals appear to differ with regard to their reliance on executive functions and/
or affective processes during real-life risky decision making (e.g., Pauchur & Galesic, 
2013). We reasoned that these individual differences might be optimally captured in a 
decision-making context that is likely to tap into both processes. Such a setting was 
created because most of the existing explicit risky decision-making tasks, such as 
the Game of Dice Task do not necessarily rely on affective processes (Brand et al., 
2006). Experimental research showed that risk taking was associated with decreased 
task-relevant information use in an affectively engaging risky decision making context 
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as compared to a less affectively involving version of this context (Figner et al., 2009). 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) demonstrated that ‘affect-rich’ outcomes result in 
the overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities as 
compared to ‘affect-poor’ outcomes. Thus, neglecting the potential influence of affective 
processes might be an important omission when relating performance on such tasks 
in the lab to everyday risk taking behaviors. 
We believe that the driving simulation used in part of the described studies tapped 
into both cognitive and affective processes. First, the overall finding that risky choices 
were more frequent for options associated with a large probability of a positive 
outcome demonstrates the involvement of cognitive processing. Second, the setting 
was expected to be engaging (motivationally salient), because it entailed an ongoing 
activity in a simulated environment, which makes the task less prone to disengagement. 
Third, the execution of a specific action (overtaking) was required in response to a risky 
decision. This action was thought to increase commitment to the decision because one 
has to prepare its execution (Ernst & Paulus, 2005) and steer the virtual car in the right 
direction. This active choice contrasts with decision making in most tasks during which 
participants are required to merely press one of multiple response buttons to indicate 
a choice. Fourth, the risky decision involved the initiation of an overtake attempt that 
could possibly end in a crash. Both the crash and its anticipation are likely to have been 
experienced as aversive, thereby contributing to the affective involvement during the 
task. Conversely, a successful overtake is likely to have induced positive affect during 
and shortly after the execution of the maneuver. Taken together, whereas static explicit 
decision-making tasks largely depend on cognitive processes (Brand et al., 2006) and 
elicit only minor affective responses (Figner et al., 2009), the aforementioned features 
of the SDT were expected to increase the affective involvement of participants. As 
previously mentioned, individuals reported to have enjoyed the SDT more than the 
other behavioral measures according to the study described in chapter 5, indicating 
a higher level of affective involvement. In addition, results described in chapter 3 
confirmed our hypothesis that risk taking in a dynamic and engaging context was 
more strongly associated with real-life risk-taking propensity than decisions in a more 
static lottery context.
To conclude, the studies described in this thesis indicate that examining risky 
decision making in a dynamic and engaging setting may better reflect risk-taking 
propensity in real life, during which both affective/motivational and cognitive control 
processes play a role. The extent to which these processes are deployed seems to differ 
across individuals (Pachur & Galesic, 2013; Brand et al., 2006; Venkatraman, Payne, 
Bettman, Luce, & Huettel, 2009). By inducing affective involvement in experimental lab 
tasks, the applied decision-strategies during such tasks are more likely to reflect the 
decision strategies that individuals apply in real-life risky situations. More insight in these 
individual differences and associated cognitive processes and their specific share in 
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risk-taking behaviors may eventually help in targeting undesirably risky behaviors but 
also in tackling overly cautious behaviors.  It is known that successful goal-directed 
behavior depends on a system that implements the required level and type of control 
to achieve a specific goal in a given situation (Miller, 2000). Reduced cognitive control 
may result in a less deliberate processing style and hence, a reduced consideration of 
potential risks (as reflected by less experienced decision conflict). Applied to everyday 
situations, findings in this thesis indicate that the adequate implementation of cognitive 
control may prevent one from taking unnecessary risks. Difficulties in implementing the 
required amount of control may be especially true for individuals with executive function 
deficits, but also for healthy individuals who are generally more impulsive, temporarily 
distracted, tired, or engaged in other cognitively demanding tasks. In addition, the 
promise of reward may overrule cognitive processing, especially for those with increased 
sensitivity to rewarding aspects of a given context, such as adolescents, individuals 
with ADHD or ‘plain’ sensation seekers.  By taking into account affective/motivational 
components of risk and individual differences in associated cognitive processes, the 
studies described in this thesis provided a more fine-grained picture of the different 
processes involved in real-life risk taking.
Limitations and future directions
The studies that included the administration of the SDT provided a first innovative 
step to obtain more insight in the underlying determinants of everyday risky decision 
making. Nevertheless, some limitations of these studies need to be discussed. Although 
the studies described in chapters 3, 4 and 5 were aimed at inducing motivational salience 
and affective involvement, this was only measured by evaluations of the tasks through 
self-reports. Physical measurement of emotional arousal could have been a useful 
addition to gain more insight in the degree of affective involvement of participants. In 
judgment and decision-making research, skin conductance is increasingly used as an 
indicator of affective involvement (Figner & Murphy, 2011). Changes in electrodermal 
activity (EDA) and the associated magnitude of the skin conductance response (SCR) 
reflect activity of the sympathetic autonomous nervous system related to emotional 
arousal (e.g., Chritchley, Elliot, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000). Another measure of emotional 
arousal is pupil dilation that similarly reflects the activation of the sympathetic nervous 
system (Lang & Bradley, 2010). Such physiological measures may provide more insight 
in the degree of affective processes involved during risky decision making on engaging 
tasks such as the SDT. 
Another limitation of these studies is that the relative impact of explicitly stated 
probabilities and values of outcomes on the decision-making process in the SDT were 
not further disentangled. Still, explicitly stating these components allowed participants 
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to make deliberate decisions based on these components. A valuable next step would 
be to examine the impact of these underlying constructs independently, by varying 
expected value and risk (variance) orthogonally (e.g., Preuschoff et al., 2006) in an 
adapted version of the SDT.
Another important issue that should be mentioned is the tension between isolating 
and measuring components important to risky decision making, while at the same 
time trying to make the context as realistically as possible. In balancing between 
control and generalizability, the idea of creating an ‘as realistically as possible’ traffic 
experience was dropped early in the process of developing the SDT. The final set-up 
was chosen because the decision to overtake a slower vehicle is a classic example 
of a risky decision that most of us are familiar with, either from a drivers’ or from a 
passengers’ perspective. Most people recognize the experience of decision-conflict 
in that situation. The fact that decisions need to be made during an ongoing activity 
(virtual driving), promotes a dynamic and engaging experience. Therefore, despite the 
necessary level of control integrated in the task, the decision-making process during 
this engaging experience was expected to better reflect the affective and cognitive 
processes involved in everyday risky decision making and the individual differences 
therein, than performance on standard and less dynamic gambling tasks. Still, the 
implemented task control may have posed restrictions to the generalizability of the 
findings to real life. In future studies it should be examined whether the boundaries 
of experimental control can be stretched further, to improve the external validity of 
risky decision-making measurements without making results incomparable across 
individuals or across time. 
Finally, it should be noted that real-life risk taking remains difficult to investigate 
directly, research on this topic depends for a large part on self-reports and experimental 
lab tasks. It remains a challenge to examine risk-taking behaviors as realistically as 
possible. Although a risky endeavor, a step was taken in this direction as demonstrated 
by the conducted lab experiments reported in this thesis. Innovative research tools such 
as the Oculus Rift (Oculus VR), which is a very light-weighted virtual reality head-set by 
which you become immersed in a virtual environment with a 3D view, may turn out  useful 
to future risky decision-making research. Contexts can be created that require one to 
make all sorts of choices that vary in riskiness, while walking in a virtual environment. 
The innovations in the development of such devices and software contribute to the 
creation of increasingly realistic experiences from which risky decision-making research 
may potentially benefit.
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Main conclusions
In most of the reported studies in this thesis, risky decision making was examined by 
taking into account motivational and affective components of the decision process 
in addition to the evaluation of probabilities and the expected values of outcomes. In 
addition, risk-taking was examined in samples of subpopulations that are known for 
their increased propensity to take risks in real life, namely adolescents in general and 
adolescents with an ADHD diagnosis. Together, the separate studies contributed to 
revealing the underlying mechanisms and subtle individual differences in the process of 
risky decision making, which will eventually provide more insight in how risky decisions 
come about and in what way individual differences and context effects may influence 
this process. As a consequence, it should become more feasible to predict when 
people will engage in risky behaviors in real life and to prevent them from undertaking 
unnecessary risk that might be dangerous to themselves or others. At the same time, 
it may help others overcome extreme risk aversion and disadvantageous decision 
making as a consequence.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
De keuzes die mensen in het dagelijks leven maken bevatten vaak een afweging 
tussen risico’s en beloningen. Te hard rijden zorgt ervoor dat je sneller op plaats van 
bestemming bent, maar maakt ook de kans op een ongeluk groter. Een goedkope 
zorgverzekering bespaart je maandelijks een hoop geld, maar vergroot het risico op 
een lage dekking bij onverwachte medische kosten. Bergbeklimmen is een spannende 
en bijzondere ervaring die je altijd bij blijft. Door de fysieke uitdagingen en het soms 
extreme weer brengt deze sport echter de nodige risico’s met zich mee. Onderzoek 
naar risicovolle keuzes is erop gericht meer inzicht te krijgen in de factoren die hierbij 
een rol spelen, zodat beter voorspeld kan worden wanneer en in welke situaties mensen 
(onnodige) risico’s nemen. Dit is belangrijk omdat enerzijds het nemen van (te grote)
risico’s ongunstige gevolgen kan hebben voor zowel de risiconemer, als zijn of haar 
omgeving. Anderzijds kan extreem risicomijdend gedrag eveneens leiden tot ongunstige 
uitkomsten, omdat in bepaalde situaties enig risico moet worden genomen om een 
beter resultaat te bereiken. 
De omstandigheden en mate waarin mensen risico’s nemen, lopen sterk uiteen. 
Onderzoek laat zien dat er verschillende interne en externe factoren aan te wijzen zijn 
die verklaren waarom individuen verschillen in hun bereidheid risico´s te nemen. De 
bereidheid risico’s te nemen is bijvoorbeeld verhoogd bij adolescenten, mensen met 
psychiatrische aandoeningen zoals ADHD, bij hersenbeschadigingen in de prefrontale 
cortex, en  bij persoonlijkheidskenmerken zoals impulsiviteit en sensatiezucht. De mate 
waarin mensen geneigd zijn risico’s te nemen kan daarnaast ook afhangen van externe 
factoren zoals de situatie en het type risico. Iemand die veel gezondheidsrisico’s neemt 
zoals roken of ongezond eten zal waarschijnlijk minder geneigd zijn een risicovolle sport 
te beoefenen, en vice versa. 
Het blijkt niet eenvoudig om, met behulp van gecontroleerde experimenten in het 
lab risicogedrag op een realistische manier te onderzoeken. In de psychologie maken 
onderzoekers veelal gebruik van impliciete gedragstaken. Deze taken worden impliciet 
genoemd omdat de precieze kans op een succesvolle uitkomst bij een risicovolle 
keuze onbekend is. Impliciete taken hebben het voordeel dat ze over het algemeen 
risicogedrag in het echte leven redelijk goed voorspellen. Het nadeel van dit soort taken 
is dat onduidelijk blijft op basis van welke informatie keuzes worden gemaakt. Doordat 
de kans van slagen bij het nemen van risico’s niet weergegeven wordt (in procenten 
bijvoorbeeld) kan het zijn dat sommigen het risico op een ongewenste uitkomst 
overschatten terwijl anderen dit risico juist onderschatten. Verschillende individuen 
maken dan keuzes op basis van verschillende aannames, waardoor deze keuzes 
onderling niet meer goed vergelijkbaar zijn en er weinig inzicht is in de totstandkoming 
van het keuzeproces. Onderzoek met impliciete taken heeft echter wel aangetoond 
dat mensen die op dit soort taken meer geneigd zijn risicovolle keuzes te maken, ook 
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in het echte leven meer risicovol gedrag vertonen. 
In het interdisciplinaire onderzoeksveld van de psychologie, economie en 
neurowetenschappen wordt risicovol gedrag op een meer kwantitatieve en expliciete 
manier benaderd. Onderzoekers uit dit veld definiëren risico meestal als de mate waarin 
mogelijke (vaak financiële) uitkomsten van een keuze variëren. Bij een risicovolle keuze 
is er sprake van meer variatie in mogelijke uitkomsten dan bij een veilige keuze. Stel dat 
je moet kiezen tussen optie A: een zeker bedrag van 5 euro of optie B: 30% kans op 10 
euro, dan is het aantal mogelijke uitkomsten van optie B groter. Er is immers een kans 
van 30% op een positieve uitkomst en een kans van 70% op een negatieve uitkomst. 
Voor optie A is deze variatie er niet; er is sprake van 100% zekerheid dat de uitkomst 
5 euro zal zijn. In vergelijking met de veilige keuze kan de risicovolle keuze zowel een 
hogere als een lagere beloning opleveren. In interdisciplinair onderzoek naar risicovolle 
beslissingen wordt aan proefpersonen vaak dit soort keuzes voorgelegd. Het voordeel 
van dit type taken is dat de kans en de waarde van de uitkomst voor iedere keuze 
expliciet vermeld wordt. Op die manier kan worden nagegaan wat de precieze invloed 
is van deze factoren (kans op en waarde van de uitkomst) op het keuzegedrag (en in 
welke mate variatie in kans en de waarde van de uitkomst samenhangt met processen 
in de hersenen) van individuen. Het nadeel van dit type taken is dat ze risicogedrag in 
het echte leven minder goed voorspellen.
Samenvattend: impliciete gedragstaken voorspellen risicovol gedrag in het echte 
leven doorgaans goed, maar bieden beperkt inzicht in de mechanismen die ertoe 
bijdragen dat iemand wel of niet geneigd is risico’s te nemen. Expliciete gedragstaken 
laten goed zien hoe onderliggende factoren, zoals de waarde van en de kans op een 
positieve uitkomst van invloed zijn op het keuzegedrag van individuen. De uiteindelijke 
keuzes op dit soort taken zijn echter weinig indicatief voor de mate van risicovol 
gedrag dat mensen in het echte leven vertonen. In dit proefschrift heb ik daarom met 
behulp van innovatieve onderzoeksdesigns geprobeerd meer inzicht te verkrijgen in 
de factoren die van belang zijn voor de mate waarin mensen geneigd zijn risico’s te 
nemen in het dagelijks leven. 
Binnen de gehanteerde onderzoeksdesigns wilden we ruimte bieden aan de invloed 
van zowel affectieve (positieve of negatieve gevoelens opgewekt door de situatie of 
keuzes) als cognitieve processen (bijvoorbeeld de kans op en de waarde van een 
uitkomst analyseren) op het keuzeproces. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat beide processen 
belangrijk zijn om tot een optimale keuze te komen; een eenzijdige focus op cognitieve 
processen zoals in veel studies naar risicovol keuzegedrag zou daarom te beperkt zijn 
om risicogedrag in het echte leven te kunnen voorspellen. Bovendien variëren mensen 
in de mate waarin ze keuzes gevoelsmatig maken of baseren op een meer cognitieve 
of beredeneerde inschatting van de situatie. Door ruimte te geven aan beide processen 
verwachtten we meer inzicht te krijgen in risicogedrag in het echte leven en de subtiele 
individuele verschillen daarin. Met dit specifieke doel voor ogen werd een rijsimulatietaak 
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ontwikkeld. In deze rijsimulatie bestuurt de proefpersoon een gesimuleerde auto op 
een gesimuleerde weg. Tijdens het rijden krijgt de proefpersoon herhaaldelijk de keuze 
voorgelegd om een auto die voor hem of haar rijdt in te halen. De proefpersoon krijgt 
elke keer vooraf te zien wat de kans is op een succesvolle inhaalmanoeuvre, en hoeveel 
punten er verdiend kunnen worden wanneer het daadwerkelijk lukt om in te halen. Als 
de inhaalmanoeuvre mislukt en de proefpersoon op een tegenligger botst, levert dit 0 
punten op. In plaats van de auto in te halen, kan de proefpersoon ook altijd voor de 
veilige optie kiezen en achter de auto voor zich blijven rijden. Dit levert altijd punten 
op, maar minder dan het aantal punten voor een succesvolle inhaalmanoeuvre. Om 
inzicht te blijven behouden in de cognitieve processen, hebben we het keuzeproces 
expliciet gemaakt, zoals ook bij ‘standaard’ risicotaken gebeurt. De kans (in procenten) 
en de waarde (in punten of euro’s) van de uitkomsten wordt exact vermeld. Hierdoor is 
duidelijk op basis van welke informatie keuzes gemaakt worden en kan er vergeleken 
worden in welke mate en op wat voor manier deze factoren van invloed zijn op het 
keuzeproces van verschillende individuen. We verwachtten dat de dynamische rijtaak 
leuker en spannender zou zijn dan een meer ‘standaard’ expliciete risicotaak, waardoor 
affectieve processen mogelijk een grotere rol zouden hebben in het keuzeproces. 
Hoofdstuk 2 betreft een eerste verkennend EEG onderzoek naar keuzes op een 
simpele  verkeerstaak, om te zien of bij keuzegedrag gebaseerd op situaties in het echte 
leven (kennis van de betekenis van verkeerslichten) dezelfde cognitieve processen 
betrokken zijn als bij simpele taken waarbij stimulus-response combinaties niet zijn 
gebaseerd op associaties uit het echte leven. Proefpersonen hadden steeds opnieuw 
de keus een kruispunt wel of niet over te steken. Een succesvolle oversteek leverde 
pluspunten op terwijl een botsing met de andere verkeersdeelnemer puntaftrek tot 
gevolg had. De N2, een negatieve piek in elektrische hersenactiviteit die optreedt bij het 
ervaren van conflict was sterker voorafgaande aan de combinatie van verkeerslichten 
die in het echte leven het minst eenduidig verbonden zijn met een bepaalde keuze, 
namelijk twee oranje verkeerslichten. Bij oversteekpogingen die niet goed afliepen was 
de FRN, een negatieve piek in hersenactiviteit die optreedt na het krijgen van negatieve 
feedback sterker actief dan bij oversteekpogingen die goed afliepen; de kleur van de 
verkeerslichten speelde hierbij geen rol. Dit onderzoek laat dus zien dat complexe 
gecontroleerde lab-taken ook geschikt kunnen zijn om inzicht te krijgen in de cognitieve 
processen die een rol spelen bij meer alledaags keuzegedrag. 
In het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 is onderzocht of keuzegedrag op een 
meer dynamische risicotaak in een virtuele rijomgeving de neiging tot het maken van 
risicovolle keuzes in het dagelijks leven beter voorspelt dan een in eerder onderzoek 
veelgebruikte ‘standaard loterijtaak’. De keuzes in termen van de kansen en waarden 
van uitkomsten waren op beide taken hetzelfde en expliciet weergegeven, zodat 
proefpersonen hun keuzes konden baseren op dezelfde informatie. De neiging tot 
het nemen van risico’s in het dagelijks leven was inderdaad sterker gerelateerd aan 
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het aantal risicovolle keuzes in de rijttaak dan in de loterijtaak. Daarnaast voorspelde 
risicogedrag op de rijtaak het nemen van risico’s in het recreationele, financiële, en 
gezondheidsdomein, terwijl risicogedrag op de loterijtaak alleen samenhing met het 
nemen van financiële risico’s. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat risicogedrag op een meer 
dynamische en levendige taak accurater de neiging tot risicogedrag in het echte 
leven weerspiegelt. Waarschijnlijk komt dit doordat in tegenstelling tot de loterijtaak, 
de rijsimulatie zowel de cognitieve als affectieve processen aanspreekt die ook in het 
echte leven een rol spelen bij het nemen van risico’s. 
Het EEG onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 was gericht op het verkrijgen 
van meer inzicht in de ‘real-time’ cognitieve processen betrokken bij risicovolle 
keuzes in een dynamische omgeving. Hiervoor werd een aangepaste versie van de 
rijsimulatie gebruikt. Hersenactiviteit voorafgaande aan risicovolle en veilige keuzes 
werd vergeleken; daarbij keken we specifiek naar alfa oscillaties in de posterieure 
cortex en theta oscillaties in de midden frontale cortex. Activiteit in deze frequenties 
is gerelateerd aan respectievelijk cognitieve controle en aandachtsprocessen. Uit dit 
onderzoek kwam naar voren dat theta-activiteit sterk gereduceerd was voorafgaande 
aan risicovolle keuzes (inhalen waarbij er 50% kans was op een botsing), wat er op wijst 
dat er sprake was van verminderde cognitieve controle. Daarnaast werd onderzocht 
of de mate van betrokkenheid van deze cognitieve processen bij toenemend risico 
afhing van risico-gerelateerde persoonlijkheidskenmerken. Onderzoek heeft laten 
zien dat de neiging het nemen van risico’s hoger is bij individuen die hoog scoren op 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken zoals impulsiviteit en sensatiezucht. Voor proefpersonen 
met een hoge sensatiezucht was er voorafgaande aan de inhaalmanoeuvre (risicovolle 
keus) een afnemend patroon van alfa-activiteit te zien naarmate de kans op succes 
toenam. Dit kan er mogelijk op wijzen dat bij individuen met verhoogde sensatiezucht 
de aandacht snel verslapt naarmate de uitslag minder onzeker is. Dat zou mede kunnen 
verklaren waarom mensen die hoog scoren op dit persoonlijkheidskenmerk geneigd zijn 
risico’s enigszins op te zoeken, omdat het anders ‘te saai’ voor ze wordt. Verder bleek 
de theta-activiteit oftewel de hoeveelheid ingezette cognitieve controle bij individuen 
met een lage score op impulsiviteit, het hoogst was voorafgaande aan risicovolle 
keuzes met een onzeker slagingspercentage (van 30% of 50%). Dit patroon was niet 
zichtbaar bij proefpersonen met hoge scores op impulsiviteit. Deze bevinding lijkt er 
op te wijzen dat bij mensen die laag scoren op impulsiviteit er conflict ontslaat bij het 
maken van risicovolle keuzes met een erg onzekere kans van slagen. Al met al laat 
dit onderzoek zien dat het inzetten van cognitieve controle een belangrijke rol speelt 
bij het maken van risicovolle keuzes en zijn er voorzichtige aanwijzingen dat de mate 
waarin cognitieve processen (waaronder ook aandacht) daarbij betrokken zijn afhangt 
van risico-gerelateerde persoonlijkheidskenmerken. 
De laatste twee onderzoeken beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 waren gericht op het 
onderzoeken van risicovolle keuzes en risicogedrag voor groepen die bekend staan 
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om een verhoogde neiging tot risicogedrag in het dagelijks leven. In het onderzoek 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 stond het risicogedrag van jongeren met ADHD centraal. 
We wilden nagaan of de rijsimulatie een beter instrument zou kunnen zijn dan een 
gebruikelijke risicotaak om mogelijke verschillen in het maken van risicovolle keuzes 
tussen jongeren met en zonder ADHD te onderzoeken. Naast een versimpelde versie 
van de rijsimulatie werd de ‘Cake Gambling’ taak afgenomen. In de rijtaak werd alleen 
de kans op een succesvolle uitkomst gevarieerd, terwijl de waarde van de uitkomst 
behorende bij de risicovolle keuze constant bleef. In de ‘Cake Gambling’ taak bleef 
de kans op een bepaalde uitkomst constant maar varieerden de uitkomsten. Op deze 
manier kon zowel de invloed van de kans en de waarde van de uitkomst op het nemen 
van risico’s onderzocht worden. Resultaten lieten zien dat de jongeren met ADHD 
meer risico’s namen op de rijtaak dan de controlegroep wanneer de kans van slagen 
50% was. Dit verhoogde risico hing samen met de ADHD symptomen hyperactiviteit/
impulsiviteit en aandacht. Daarnaast nam deze groep meer risico’s dan de controle 
groep op de ‘Cake Gambling’ taak wanneer de waarde van de uitkomst relatief hoog 
was. Dit verhoogde risico hing samen met hyperactiviteit/impulsiviteit, maar niet met 
aandacht. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat, vergeleken met leeftijdgenoten zonder ADHD, 
jongeren met ADHD eerder geneigd zijn risico’s te nemen in a) onzekere situaties en 
b) wanneer de verwachtte beloning hoog is. Verder zijn er voorzichtige aanwijzingen 
dat met wat aanpassingen de rijsimulatie een beter instrument zou kunnen zijn om alle 
factoren van risicogedrag bij jongeren met ADHD en de subtiele verschillen daarin met 
betrekking tot de symptomen bloot te leggen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 werd tot slot onderzocht of blootstelling aan risicovol rijgedrag in 
films gedurende de vroege adolescentie leidt tot meer toekomstig risicovol rijgedrag. Na 
controle voor een aantal andere mogelijk verklarende factoren bleek dit inderdaad het 
geval: hoe meer jongeren hadden aangegeven films gezien te hebben waarin risicovol 
rijgedrag voorkwam, hoe meer geneigd ze waren op latere leeftijd risicovol rijgedrag 
te vertonen. Onaandachtig rijgedrag werd daarentegen verklaard door verminderde 
zelfcontrole. Verhoogde sensatiezucht was daarnaast ook gerelateerd aan meer onveilig 
rijgedrag. Mannen en jongeren met verhoogde sensatiezucht bleken minder geneigd een 
autogordel te dragen tijdens het rijden. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat niet alleen interne 
factoren, maar ook externe factoren zoals blootstelling aan risicogedrag in de media 
van invloed kan zijn op het risicogedrag onder jongeren. 
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Conclusies en relevantie
Het belangrijkste doel van de studies beschreven in dit proefschrift was om meer 
inzicht te krijgen in de interne en externe factoren die een rol spelen bij het nemen van 
alledaagse risico’s. Uit onderzoek blijkt namelijk dat het lastig is om de factoren die 
van belang zijn voor het nemen van alledaagse risico’s te onderzoeken met behulp van 
gecontroleerde gedragstaken in het lab. Met dit doel voor ogen werd een rijsimulatie 
ontwikkeld. Het idee hierachter was dat deze dynamische taak meer ruimte zou geven 
aan zowel affectieve als cognitieve processen, die tijdens het nemen van alledaagse 
beslissingen vaak gezamenlijk een rol spelen. We verwachtten dan ook dat het nemen 
van risico’s op de rijtaak een betere voorspeller zou zijn van alledaags risicogedrag 
dan risicotaken die eenzijdig focussen op de cognitieve aspecten van risicovol gedrag. 
Deze verwachting wordt gedeeltelijk ondersteund door bevindingen in dit proefschrift. 
Daarnaast verwachtten we dat de gesimuleerde rijtaak meer inzicht zou kunnen geven 
in de onderliggende processen en individuele verschillen hierin. Hiertoe werd zowel 
gedrags- als hersenonderzoek verricht. Deze onderzoeken laten zien dat cognitieve 
controle en het ervaren van conflict in onzekere situaties een belangrijke rol speelt bij 
het nemen van beslissingen waar een bepaalde mate van risico aan kleeft. Tot slot lijken 
de resultaten er voorzichtig op te wijzen dat cognitieve processen die een rol spelen bij 
het nemen van risicovolle beslissingen voor een deel van persoonlijkheidskenmerken 
afhangen zoals impulsiviteit en sensatiezucht, maar ook van ADHD-symptomen of van 
externe factoren zoals blootstelling aan risicogedrag in de media tijdens de risicogevoelige 
ontwikkelingsfase van de adolescentie. Door het verkrijgen van meer inzicht in de 
cognitieve en affectieve processen bij het nemen van risicovolle beslissingen en de 
individuele verschillen hierin wordt het in de toekomst wellicht mogelijk risicogedrag 
beter te voorspellen en waar nodig, te voorkomen. Tegelijkertijd kan meer kennis over 
deze processen weer anderen helpen om dysfunctioneel risicomijdend gedrag af te leren 
en de soms noodzakelijke risico’s te nemen om bepaalde doelen te kunnen bereiken. 
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vooral bij het begin van mijn project betrokken. Ik waardeer de kans die ik kreeg om 
een internationaal samenwerkingsproject aan te gaan, wat ik als erg leerzaam en als 
een waardevolle toevoeging aan mijn werk heb ervaren. Jim and Mike, thank you for the 
opportunity to collaborate with you on our “reckless driving project”, and for the invitation 
to take part in the thematic meeting on “media influence and health risk behavior” at 
Dartmouth. The Mount Moosilauke hike was a great experience! Anouk, het was leuk 
om met jou en Renske samen te werken op ons “ADHD” project. Jouw expertise en 
motivatie een inhoudelijke bijdrage te leveren beschouw ik als zeer waardevol.
Ook de Technical Support Group heeft in grote mate bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming 
van meerdere onderzoeksprojecten in dit proefschrift. Vanwege de innovatieve 
onderzoeksdesigns waren de mensen in deze groep onmisbaar voor mijn project. 
Een paar mensen van deze afdeling wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken voor hun inzet. 
Hubert, ik kan me nog herinneren dat we eindeloos hebben gewerkt aan de verouderde 
programmering van de destijds aangeschafte rijsimulator. Achteraf gezien verloren 
tijd, maar wat hebben we gelachen tijdens het werken eraan. Erik, de programmering 
van een vernieuwde versie van de rijtaak kon ik met een gerust hart aan je overlaten. 
Je had altijd ontzettend goede eigen ideeën en inbreng om de programmering en 
beleving van de rijtaak te optimaliseren. Ook Ronny Janssen van het BSI-lab wil ik 
graag bedanken. In de vele uurtjes die ik in het lab heb doorgebracht was je altijd 
even behulpzaam en had je ook altijd wel even tijd voor een praatje tussendoor. Mijn 
onderzoekswerkzaamheden heb ik gelukkig niet alleen hoeven uitvoeren. Lukas en 
Birgit, jullie hebben mij beurtelings enorm geholpen met de afname van de rijtaak in 
het RIVERLab en het EEGlab. Elektrodes aanbrengen en het EEG systeem werkend 
krijgen gaat toch sneller met twee paar handen! Jullie waren altijd erg behulpzaam en 
190
dat was prettig werken. Ook Jolanda en Vanessa van het secretariaat wil ik bedanken 
die altijd klaar stonden met raad en daad wat betreft het regelen van praktische zaken. 
Tot slot wil ik nog een aantal collega’s bedanken voor het leuke contact en de support 
tijdens mijn promotietraject. Hanneke, je was een fijne kamergenoot. We hadden leuke 
gesprekken tijdens ons dagelijks “koffiemomentje”. Soms was ik erg chaotisch bezig; 
dan stond je altijd klaar om me te helpen. Je hebt goede humor en ik vond de etentjes 
met jou en Renske altijd erg gezellig! Dana, we zijn ongeveer tegelijk begonnen aan 
ons promotietraject en al op de eerste dag hadden we leuk contact. Ik vond het altijd 
prettig om met je “uit te waaien” en bij te praten tijdens onze vele lunchwandelingen. 
Gerine, met jou heb ik veel goede gesprekken gevoerd over de meest uiteenlopende 
onderwerpen. In de eindfase van onze onderzoeksprojecten vond ik het prettig om 
ervaringen met je uit te wisselen en elkaar op de hoogte te houden van onze vorderingen. 
Johanna, je hebt relatief kort op de afdeling gewerkt en ik vond het verfrissend om zo 
nu en dan gedachten te wisselen met iemand buiten de wetenschap. Je adviezen en 
nuchtere kijk op dingen kon ik erg waarderen. Met Gerine en jou heb ik ontzettend veel 
gelachen tijdens onze gezellige etentjes bij Tati. Inti en Erik, ik wil jullie bedanken voor 
alle nuttige adviezen en input die jullie me tijdens mijn project belangeloos gegeven 
hebben. Maartje, het was leuk om jou in de eindfase van mijn project als buurvrouw 
te hebben op de afdeling. Jouw nuttige tips en ideeën hielpen me vaak verder. Eeske 
en Daan, jullie waren leuke “koffiedrink- en lunchmaatjes”. Junilla, Anna, Marloes, 
Hannah, July, Marieke, Diana en Martine, bedankt voor de leuke gesprekken tussen 
het werken door of tijdens de lunchwandelingen. Linda, leuk om je wat beter te hebben 
leren kennen in de eindfase van mij project. Fijn dat ik je als “ervaringsdeskundige” 
zo nu en dan heb mogen raadplegen over de organisatie van het promotiegebeuren. 
Verder zijn er nog een aantal collega’s waar ik vooral in de beginfase van mijn project 
contact mee heb gehad en die ik daarom graag nog even wil noemen. Rebecca, veel 
dank voor de prettige samenwerking op een van mijn eerste onderzoeksprojecten. 
Kirsten en Kathrin, met jullie heb ik veel leuke momenten buiten het werk beleefd, 
zoals ons uitstapje naar New York. Helle, toen ik naar Nijmegen kwam was jij al met 
de afronding van je promotieproject bezig en hebben we een kort maar desondanks 
erg leuk contact gehad!
Tot slot wil ik iedereen bedanken in mijn naaste omgeving voor alle support en 
interesse in de voortgang van mijn promotietraject. Het was erg prettig om ook aan 
mensen buiten de wetenschap over de verschillende fasen van mijn onderzoeksproject 
te kunnen vertellen en erover van gedachten te kunnen wisselen. 
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